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MORAL THEOLOGY 


Vol. 


6é 


&¢ 


DOGMATIC THEOLOGY 


BY 
FRANCIS J. HALL, D.D. 


A series of ten volumes, each complete in itself, 
designed to constitute a connected treatment of the 
entire range of Catholic Doctrine. 


i 
i. 


Introduction to Dogmatic Theology. 
Authority, Ecclesiastical and Biblical. 

The Being and Attributes of God. 

The Trinity. 

Creation and Man. 

The Incarnation. 

The Passion and Exaltation of Christ. 
The Church and the Sacramental System. 
The Sacraments. 

Eschatology. Indexes. 


MORAL THEOLOGY 


BY THE 
Rey. FRANCIS J. HALL, D.D. 


PROFESSOR OF DOGMATIC THEOLOGY IN THE » 
GENERAL THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY, NEW YORK CITY>, ey 


AND THE 
Rev. FRANK H. HALLOCK, D.D. 


PROFESSOR OF OLD TESTAMENT AND SEMITIC LANGUAGES 
IN SEABURY DIVINITY SCHOOL, FARIBAULT, MINN. 


LONGMANS, GREEN AND CO. 
§5 FIFTH AVENUE, NEW YORK 
39 PATERNOSTER ROW, LONDON, E. C. 4 
TORONTO, BOMBAY, CALCUTTA, AND MADRAS 


1924 


COPYRIGHT, 1923, BY 
LONGMANS, GREEN AND CO. 


MADE IN THE UNITED STATES 


HBredicated 


WITH HIS GRACIOUS PERMISSION 


TO THE 
RIGHT REVEREND 
WILLIAM WALTER WEBB, D.D. 


BISHOP OF MILWAUKEE 
AND 


AUTHOR OF THE VALUABLE MANUAL 


“THE CURE OF SOULS” 


Digitized by the Internet Archive 
in 2022 with funding from 
Princeton Theological Seminary Library 


https://archive.org/details/moraltheologyOOhall 


PREFACE 


I HAD intended, after finishing the production of 
my series of ten volumes in Dogmatic Theology, to 
add as sequel thereto a work on Moral Theology, a 
subject which I taught in the Western Theological 
Seminary for some twenty years. Various reasons, 
however, threatened greatly to delay my completion 
of this work, when my scholarly friend and former 
pupil, Dr. Frank H. Hallock, offered to help me in 
preparing existing material of mine for immediate 
publication. I was the more ready to accept his 
kind offer because of the numerous letters which I 
was receiving, urging the present need of some kind 
of handbook of Moral Theology. 

Accordingly, Dr. Hallock has taken my Western 
Seminary Syllabus, has slightly enlarged it, amended 
it, and brought it up to date, and has filled in the 
footnotes—an arduous undertaking. I have in turn 
gone over the footnotes and, with occasional slight 
amendments of both text and notes, have added to 
the bibliographical matter. I am also responsible 
for the opening chapter on “The Study of Moral 
Theology.” 

With grateful thanks to Dr. Hallock for his most 
valuable help, I express my earnest hope that our 

vil 


Vili PREFACE 


book may help on the revival so much needed of the 
study of Moral Theology. It is, of course, a mere 
handbook, and does not remove the need of more 
adequate treatises. 

LO Pils & 


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CONTENTS 


CHAPTER I 
THE STUDY OF MORAL THEOLOGY 


Part I. Introductory 


PE ROUIVALOLITILELES Eeyore eee ee Uae Ua eg Tce 
. Onesided Tendency of Ethical Literature.......... 
Pieurrent Utilitariany LGGAlSs ce ue og ail ie ie 


Part II. Survey of Moral Science 


. Its Several Branches: Practical Aspect............ 
. Legalistic and Ascetic Elements. 0) .0..003655 
. The Place of Psychology...... TOM Onge Nhat teeta 


Part III. Some Snares 


. In Distinguishing Venial and Mortal sin.......... 
. In Judging the Guilt of Relapses................. 
. In Teaching the Need of Sacramental Confession... 


CHAPTER II 


INTRODUCTION AND HISTORY 


. Definitions eoeepeveoeveeere ee epee eovnee sree ed eeooeoe ene eone@ 


Part I. Ancient Pagan Ethics 


37 


CONTENTS 


x 
PAGE 
Sa) Greek Ethics o's lela visteie t mauelemre. alee: petenue arnt oar 24 
§)\5)) Greco-Roman Ethics. hogs oie emais ern ea aeane 30 
Part II. Christian Ethics 
$6.) New departures.) ‘sa cys cleiebile eels Cy ene ieee 32 
S 7) Patristic: Ethics ny ion wo aa ee aataretrar onare 27 
$5. Scholastic Behics, Jee Oc nel ae eat ea AI 
$0. Later; Roman Ethics.) (ace gama cise eee 44 
Sto.|' Protestant Ethics .:.!0. eed eens Ue mines aie tae 46 
Part III. Modern Ethics 
Sir. Hobbes to Hume oy eee hee 47 
§12:\Precipitations after umesr nie aay hha 50 
§13. Epitome of Ethical Systems..... a ncd es phga Waa we) OnL lel onan ate 
CHAPTER III 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY OR SYSTEMATIC ETHICS 
St) Assumptions... ee ra. rete iegia cieievehk ane 60 
Part I. The Agent 
§'2.\ The Intellectual Faculties f073 (isa eee ae 62 
$3: The Emotions) ui uiet Aa) Cuan aman oe ee 68 
Sep ane WTA OTT OEM er VANS Un ti iMag) Ay Nhat 69 
8) 6. The Body s Ve ue Dare ae a acco ea Ra Oa ca 75 
$!'6,' Man’s: Moral History dupe ua aus ee wen ee 76 
Part II. The End 
§ 7. Ends of Moral Conductom uy ima, ae oa cua aan 77 
88) Motivese. ge IO Aa a en at ae Gee 80 
Part III. The Act 
8.9. The Morality’ of Actions (vie mie ls cn aera 83 
$10. Acts Classified iit i) i Cn nl TE nS cD a lia 86 
Sir. Virtues and) Vitese Join Ole Wily ae ine 89 
§12, ‘The Practice of Religion. (Ann cunaiaeuaie ss wue g2 


602602602 6072602607 602COR 
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CONTENTS xi 


CHAPTER IV 
MORAL THEOLOGY PROPER: LAW 
Part I. The Law of God 


PAGB 

- Definition of Moral Theology Proper............. 95 
UME WW IL an Law OL. Gr0du ice int ielsa aa aele wt 97 
POVLELDOC Ob) ETERCINON Uys wana wat ianier stint 99 

Part II. The Law of Reason 
PAINOtviciias Obligations. rarer Pen a ie 100 
Pr OOCIAL CDG AtIONS it's slaaaeitad cele puree te were IOI 
Part III. Superimposed Moral Law 
. The Decalogue and Christ’s Summary............ 102 
Le First Commandment vii Genie 45 6 beaver eu 105 
The: Second Commandment wwii eee oe 106 
A neuLnird AcommaAndiment cgay ee Uy 107 
‘he; Fourth Commandment .s 0.) aes cS 109 
POG UAC COM MANGMeNG. wi c)hslslee fies ke whe seleib ois i12 
Moi a COMMAnOMenL sce A aie eats 117 
THeimevench, COmMManCMeNnt ww y juny nual wie II9 
Matte signi i Commandmenty sii) signs ca syle do e's 122 
Wise MINDEN COMmMMaAnamMent ye Wire cle ok gat male hace 124 
PRVOCMLENEN COMMMANGMENL, . galsicy decimate gc uray ie 126 
CHAPTER V 
SACRAMENTAL OBLIGATIONS 

ne acramien tatty Crenetats suis clas si die eee oars ete 129 
BAAN hd LESSER LAT erate eb ehaihl celal) Wid tate drm a Rodd oa ewe 131 
PPALONTIETIALION | un mene Rack Ce vrata hte tanita 20 133 
POL COMMUNION Vs Sere Ce NS car nas Tas 

PR EMIALICOW cre ts ons ai ites CUM Ian Eccles stad la. '8 tara otc mane 137 
POLO AIT GET SI hoot ae Caters shale WOMAN cy ati’ "ob a a natal 142 
METROUY UNI AVITEOTIY © tie hrenate ea iG. se raia rary bie nie vie a areal ats 146 
SITET OLFLHE ICR Shite so Gite nyt Waly Sa eee dala ara ea 150 


€OR 00? 60200? 60760200? 
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CONTENTS 


CHAPTER VI 
OTHER OBLIGATIONS 


Part I. Notable Duties 


PAGE 

PLAY ET ain ss aie. oul pinibiace's <3 gmie Wie Strout ite en noes 152 

» PASTING 2. so saoo esd lala oe ale SP MG ene Ren Tet err eae 154 
Almsgiving< 3.055.452 spine ees ova emer n cena 155 

Part IT. Civil Obligations 
SOUECO) Se he ee a en ae 157 
LUTE ele nb getaue ce ep wala teehee ole tie ean ein ee 158 
Part III. Soctological Obligations 
; in General, Socialism.3 7c) nen ss eee eee ee 160 
. Industrialism .):* : (awit os sceieick sc eieee ieee en en eee 163 
Contracts 3555.5) ) ctoleale ica i aieleeti eerie da cae ee cae nn a at 164 
Economic Laws, 0.0 ie vin cuivanty ee aaienias kee ee 165 
Incidental Questions, (2 Wiese) esesee oie abe ween 168 
Part IV. Obligations Voluntarily Incurred 

OP VOWS ee ae a tie fear oy Aner ehee eae mae 172 
Of vocation Orilife workie i. ia veo ea ae Les 


CHAPTER VII 
EXPEDIENCY AND EXAMPLE 


. Non-legalistic Obligations: The Call to Perfection.. 175 
») Virtues and @iaracter [ao Ge ain ub ey gine mete hares 176 
»/ Christian i Manneras iy ven eiius, E ican As ce Gaon tenet a 178 
, Expediency: Permissions sc uxeiis. cts) eel sia eine es 179 
COunsels oe ee i aaah igi tee Statens 181 
Example 27 Or c's eile Guk CWI tseN a went Ger ee aaa 185 


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CONTENTS 


CHAPTER VIII 


THE SACRAMENT OF PENANCE 


PE ACASUIGEDY for, eel ici eieise so hae are ate hen gh Ras ue 4 


The Requirements of this Sacrament............. 
The Duty and Profit of Confession............... 


eualincations of the Priest so. ywieg sacle domes ole 
. The Mode of Hearing Confessions...............- 
PEIPTCELORAtIONS Atte huis a uiee hamiG male mene dee ek 
Mr ypestOlye CMIteNtS es sche visi roe ae sieime aera bee Sirk 


Confessions of the Sick and Dying... ..seeesreeee 


CHAPTER IX 


SIN 


PPL IOUIM ONG Cs ce See ee res Pe Poptare dtd iomrey Weatnnai 
PEC ATACLErIstics: ANGOTIFIN  . Se ass see ace als Were 
PEINLOTERT AOC) VEDIAL ITE ae ou lari erec nme tial ate 


Temptations and Occasions of Sin...........0.02- 


PIS ITIS OE INL triatey ite yet tee ae ane ete Late aN Tyee 
mele seven Capltalisingayy cue eee ke sy 
. Sins that Cry to Heaven for Vengeance........... 
 Lhe.Sin against.the Holy Ghost... yoko 


Bibtiograpiical, INGeK aw. vases asic eee He sas 
DUOC INUCK si ils tor sia anny F te wine Gilato teed 


PAGE 
189 
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200 
203 
209 
210 
214 
220 


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MORAL THEOLOGY 


CHAPTER I 
THE STUDY OF MORAL THEOLOGY 


I. Introductory 


§ 1. One of the most encouraging incidents of the 
catholic revival in the Anglican communion is the 
renewal of interest in Moral Theology which is grad- 
ually extending among the Anglican clergy. This 
interest, however, is far from being as yet what it 
should be, and its development is retarded by a very 
serious lack of literature in the subject adapted to 
Anglican conditions and needs. Quite a few con- 
tributory productions of value have appeared in 
recent years; but constructive manuals of systematic 
and comprehensive nature, suitable for the general 
guidance of priests in dealing with souls, are not in 
evidence. They are greatly needed; and the imme- 
diate urgency of this need explains our publication 
of this comparatively brief handbook, without the 
long delay that would be required for its full elab- 
oration. 


2 THE STUDY OF MORAL THEOLOGY 


§ 2. The general tendency of moral writers outside 
the Roman Communion has been to deal almost 
exclusively with the more pressing problems of indus- 
trial and social life, and beyond that field to confine 
their attention to ethical theory. Moreover, in 
ethical manuals of to-day the claim of supernatural 
religion to be the true organizing principle of life 
and character in this world is very generally ignored. 
This is a very serious omission. Its natural result 
is that current practical ideals are largely of exclu- 
sively humanitarian and utilitarian types—as if man 
were his own end, and general human welfare in this 
world the organizing aim of all human duty. The 
larger Christian meaning and purpose of human 
effort, whenever it is sought to be reénforced, is stig- 
matized as an interimsethic, or as “‘other-worldiness”’; 
and is lightly put aside as antiquated and unhelpful 
to those who would face the problem of this twen- 
tieth century—the problem, that is, of making this a 
better world to live in, here and now. The supreme 
duty towards God, if discussed at all, is re-defined as 
consisting in helping our neighbours, in promoting 
their earthly well-being. 

That to do earthly good to our neighbours, or to 
serve them as opportunities occur in matters of tem- 
poral welfare, is an integral and vital part of Christian 
duty cannot rightly be denied, of course. Christ 
Himself has set us an example in going about doing 
good, and so far as modern practical idealism repre- 
sents in this direction a recovery of Christian sense 


INTRODUCTORY 3 


of responsibility to do physical works of mercy, and 
a call to promote the present welfare of all classes of 
society with the aid of improved social science, it 
ought to obtain our entire approval and enlist our 
earnest practice. 

§ 3. None the less, the swing of the pendulum 
has been excessive, and the central and organizing 
principle of Christian ethic has been driven out of 
sight in the utilitarian idealism referred to. Doing 
present good, healing the sick and so forth, was cer- 
tainly an inevitable adjunct and promotive factor in 
what Christ came to do. But the purpose which 
brought Him into the world was to bring men to 
eternal life—into living touch with God forever. 
His immediate good works were undertaken as revela- 
tions of His love and as adjuncts of His main design— 
to facilitate the turning of men to God. The Gospel 
evidence of this is abundant, and while the Catholic 
Church has never ceased to include temporal benefi- 
cence among Christian duties, it has consistently 
retained Christ’s standpoint and aim as the organizing 
principle of its ethical teaching. 

This world is our school for the life which is to be 
enjoyed hereafter. It is the sphere of probation and 
discipline; and present happiness, even of the great- 
est number, cannot be made the controlling aim of 
all earthly endeavour, the supreme standard of refer- 
ence in determining duty, without shifting the moral 
centre from where God has placed it, and conse- 
quently altering in fatal ways the righteousness 


4 THE STUDY OF MORAL THEOLOGY 


which we are set to cultivate. It dethrones God and 
reduces Him to a mere agent for human purposes 
and human comfort. 

A true moral science places God at the centre, as 
our chief end. Whatever we are and for whatever 
end we came to be are determined wholly by God’s 
will and purpose in making us; and He made us for 
Himself, to be His friends forever. Accordingly, He 
has so made us that no temporal good, no purely 
human fellowship, can satisfy us in the long run. 
God does indeed will that we should attain to hap- 
piness; but He has so determined our nature that no 
abiding happiness is possible if we seek it otherwise 
than through life with Him. This means that our 
chief end does not lie unqualifiedly in seeking and 
promoting happiness, but in making the happiness 
which we seek and promote to consist in the life with 
God and His saints for which we are made. 

So it is that religion, or the cultivation of true 
relations with God, is no mere aid to natural goodness, 
but is the central element of righteousness, the ele- 
ment that organizes all obligations and ideals what- 
soever around our chief end. Apart from its prac- 
tice the natural virtues—virtues though they truly 
are—fail to be linked up with their higher and 
heavenly complements, with the way to life and the 
light that reveals that way. Problems of present 
distress are treated as if they were the ultimate ones; 
and the remedies sought to be applied serve as con- 
cealments of the real situation instead of means of 


INTRODUCTORY 5 


recovery for the journey to God. It is idle to set 
over against this the widespread neglect by catholic 
Christians of the utilitarian branch of their duties, as 
if this justified giving such duties the paramount 
place. A reformation of this neglect is rightly 
demanded, but to make this world’s social welfare 
the controlling standard of moral obligation is to 
subvert the teaching of Christ and to revert to 
paganism. Moral Theology should measure all 
obligations in the light of their bearing on eternal 
life; and when this is done practically the true and 
abiding welfare of mankind will be promoted effect- 
ively and in the manner that God wills. 

§4. An adequate and justly proportioned moral 
science, suitable for the conditions under which Angli- 
can priests have to labour, has yet to be developed— 
a development that will make no important headway 
so long as our moral writers postpone experimental 
effort in producing really constructive treatises. The 
ideal treatise of which we dream cannot come except 
as the sequel of pioneer efforts and numerous imper- 
fect manuals. 

In the meantime, our clergy are under obligation 
to study Moral Theology, if they are to serve as 
intelligent pastors and guides in and out of the 
confessional, and not to be reckless exploiters of indi- 
vidualistic judgments, judgments unrelated to the 
cumulative experience and consentient opinions of 
their predecessors from the beginning. Where shall 
they turn? 


6 THE STUDY OF MORAL THEOLOGY 


First of all they need to study Holy Scripture, espe- 
cially the New Testament, as a storehouse of deter- 
minative data—the moral teaching of Christ and His 
Apostles, the cases in which their teaching received 
significant application, and the ideal of Christian 
conduct and character there exhibited. 

Then they need to study the post-apostolic moral 
teaching, precepts and discipline of the Catholic 
Church, tracing it carefully through the ages to the 
present day. This study, along with the biblical, 
will provide the materials of Moral Theology and 
afford many determinative hints both for constructive 
ordering of moral science and for pastoral judgment. 
Above all it will go far to save the student from one- 
sidedness, whether of ecclesiastical provincialism or 
of modern utilitarianism. 

The great ethical classics should receive attention, 
especially Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics and St. 
Thomas’ Summa Theologica, Part II, which more 
than any other ethical treatises have created the 
terminology of moral science. To St. Thomas we 
owe the accepted definition of many moral concepts, 
and to leave him out is like leaving Hamlet out of 
Shakespeare’s drama of that title. 

Again, we cannot pass over the study of Roman 
Catholic treatises. In them alone do we find large 
and constructive treatments of the whole subject. 
These treatises have defects, and are adjusted to 
ecclesiastical conditions other than ours; and some 
of their defects will be indicated in these pages. But 


SURVEY OF MORAL SCIENCE 7 


nowhere else can we find complete handling of many 
questions which we have to face somehow in dealing 
with souls. 

Finally, an adequate study of moral science must 
include a reckoning with modern ethical literature of 
the contributory type, both Anglican and other— 
the modern manuals of Ethics (mostly theoretical) 
and Anglican contributions from such writers as 
Bishop Gore, T. B. Strong, K. E. Kirk, F. G. Belton 
and others mentioned in our footnotes. In particu- 
lar, the modern industrial situation has to be faced, 
and some knowledge needs to be gained of law, eco- 
nomics, sociology and psychology. Surely the sub- 
ject of moral science is large; but its largeness ought 
not: to conceal the imperative need of mastering it as 
well as we can. 


IT. Survey of Moral Science 


§ 5. The several branches of Moral Theology in 
general are as follows: (a) Moral Philosophy, the 
principal content of modern ethical manuals, con- 
cerned with ethical theory and the definition of the 
fundamental ethical concepts; (b) Moral Theology 
Proper, giving a logically connected account of all 
Christian obligations, in the light of the law of both 
God and man and of the terms of the Christian cove- 
nant; (c) Casuistry, concerned with problematical 
cases of conduct, and with the principles which should 
guide a priest in dealing with individual souls; (4) 


8 THE STUDY OF MORAL THEOLOGY 


Ascetic Theology, or the science of Christian progress 
towards perfection; (e) Mystical Theology, con- 
cerned with the supernatural experiences of those who 
in this life attain to occasional enjoyments of union 
with God approximating that which is pledged to the 
faithful in Heaven. 

It is to be noticed that the study of moral science 
has a practical aim, an aim which cannot be fulfilled 
by concerning ourselves exclusively or chiefly with 
ethical theory. Sound ethical theory, which means 
theory that reckons seriously with the supernaturally 
revealed Christian faith and covenant, is indeed 
indispensable; but it should be regarded as intro- 
ductory only, and should be applied in a coherent 
treatment of the whole range of Christian obligations, 
Godward and manward, of supernatural religion 
and of good morals in the usual sense of that phrase. 
The widespread assumption that no such science is 
needed, even for Christian pastors, is hopelessly mis- 
taken. Without it the range of duty is inadequately 
understood by the clergy; and the problems that con- 
tinually arise in the guidance of souls are apt to be 
handled crudely and determined badly, with oblivi- 
ousness of established principles and precedents in the 
Church of God. Moral Theology Proper, its supple- 
ment of Casuistry, and its complement of Ascetic 
Theology are plainly necessary, therefore, for the 
equipment of priests. 

§ 6. I have called Ascetic Theology the ‘‘comple- 
ment’ of Moral Theology Proper. The realization 


SURVEY OF MORAL SCIENCE 9 


of this is needed if we are to avoid a serious danger, 
one not wholly escaped in Roman moral treatises. 
I mean the danger of setting up two standards of 
Christian vocation and duty, the legalistic and the 
ascetic. The distinction between sinlessness and 
positive perfection is indeed real and important; 
and therefore the separate treatment of Moral The- 
ology Proper, concerned mainly with distinguishing 
between the sinful and the non-sinful, and of Ascetic 
Theology, concerned with growth in heavenly virtue, 
is justifiable and convenient. The former science, 
coupled with Casuistry, is for the judicial equipment 
of priests in the tribunal of Penance; while the latter 
is for their equipment in guiding souls in the way to 
God that has still to be travelled by those whose sins 
are being forgiven and forsaken. 

But no penitents, however backward in spiritual 
culture, should be allowed without corrective enlight- 
enment to acquiesce finally in the notion that the 
avoidance of sin is the only obligation imposed upon 
them by their Christian vocation. All Christians are 
called of God to positive perfection—not indeed as 
immediately attainable, but as the appointed goal 
towards which they are under obligation by God’s 
grace to direct their efforts. In saying this I do not 
forget that backward souls have to be dealt with 
very patiently, and that in a vast number of cases 
they cannot be expected in this worldly stage of 
progress wholly to escape from the legalistic concep- 
tion of Christian duty. My point is that their ulti- 


10 THE STUDY OF MORAL THEOLOGY 


mate escape from it is a sine qua non of their entrance 
into the joy of God. A merely sinless creature is not 
fit for full divine communion and fellowship until 
perfected in the positive graces of character which 
Christ has exhibited for our attainment. So it is that, 
limited in scope though it be, no Moral Theology 
Proper is rightly studied and applied except from the 
background of the fuller conception of Christian 
obligation which is unfolded in Ascetic Theology. 
For this reason, brief as this manual is, we have given 
our seventh chapter to a short summary of the higher 
side of Christian responsibility. 

§ 7. The work of the Holy Spirit and His opera- 
tions of supernatural grace in the hearts of Christians 
are necessarily presupposed and allowed for in Moral 
Theology. But the work of grace is not subversive of 
human nature and freedom and of the natural laws 
of human conduct. The purpose of grace is to assist 
and uplift human nature on its own lines and to 
sanctify it. But in those aspects of conduct and 
development of character which are susceptible of 
observation the laws of human nature hold their 
own, and their investigation is a useful adjunct of 
Moral and Ascetic Theology. 

This means that the Psychology of behaviour and 
of sainthood is a legitimate and fruitful line of study; 
and works like those of Joly, on the one hand, and 
James, on the other, furnish important contributions 
to our science. But in admitting this we ought not 
to forget an important limitation of psychological 


SOME SNARES I 


science. Like other natural sciences it is concerned 
exclusively with natural factors; and the self- 
coherence and apparent self-sufficiency of its descrip- 
tion of the laws that control the natural functioning 
of our spirits should not blind us to the evidences that 
the higher level of sanctity in which such functioning 
occasionally results is not explained by natural factors 
alone. Psychology describes the course of nature 
that is involved in saintly development; but that it 
should pursue such a course, and with such a result, 
is due to supernatural grace and to lines of self-dis- 
cipline which such grace alone makes possible and 
successful. Valuable as knowledge of the natural or 
psychological factors of moral behaviour is to a 
priest, Psychology for his purpose is a handmaid 
rather than the mistress of his moral science. 


III Some Snares 


§ 8. The danger of acquiescing in a double standard 
of Christian obligation, above referred to, is not the 
only one that attends the study and application of 
moral science. The distinction between venial and 
mortal sin is plainly made in Scripture, and is very 
necessary for practically judging the gravity of sins 
both in the tribunal of Penance and in self-examina- 
tion. A momentary loss of temper is not to be 
treated as having the degree of guilt which is to be 
ascribed to deliberate and wilful murder; and if we 
would not drive men to despair, we ought not to deal 


12 THE STUDY OF MORAL THEOLOGY 


with their lighter sins as if immediately fatal to the 
spiritual life. ) 

But serious danger, none the less, attends the 
rather common habit of making the technicalities of 
venial and mortal sin take the place of careful and 
discriminating judgment. ‘The distinction referred to 
is qualitative, and in its application requires consider- 
ation not only of the gravity of matter or the act as 
such, but also the degree of knowledge, deliberation 
and wilfulness of the sinner. Sins of invincible 
ignorance, of sudden impulse, and of weakness in 
unusually severe temptation, are not invariably to 
be reckoned as mortal because of the gravity of their 
matter; nor are the small sins, materially considered, 
to be treated as venial when they are committed and 
clung to with deliberate, malicious and obstinately 
impenitent wilfulness. To forget this, and to neglect 
careful consideration of the subjective as well as the 
objective elements of sins, invites one or other of two 
serious consequences: (a) of driving struggling souls 
to despair by undue severity of judgment, treating 
sins as mortal when they are really venial; and (0) 
of lightly estimating sins of relatively light matter, 
as if necessarily and invariably venial, when perhaps 
they are forms of deadly malice and guilt. 

The distinction between venial and mortal sin is 
often set forth before simple folk in a way that encour- 
ages the notion that one need not worry at all about 
venial sins—a very dangerous notion indeed, and one 
very apt to be encouraged by unqualified assurances 


SOME SNARES 13 


that venial sins need not be recalled and mentioned 
in the confessional. It is of course true that an 
exact enumeration of all one’s sins, however minute, 
is neither possible nor necessary. But the inference 
frequently made by simple minds that venial sins 
need not be repented of, and therefore are not neces- 
sary matters of contrite self-examination and con- 
fession im genere, is hopelessly false and apt to be 
fatal in its consequences. All sins of every degree 
need to be repented of by implication at least, and to 
suppose that besetting sins, even though venial, can 
safely be forgotten in confession is a very precarious 
opinion. 

§ 9. Another snare that needs careful avoidance is 
that of an undiscriminating judgment as to the state 
of those who fail wholly to abandon, or even visibly 
to reduce the frequency of, sins that have been 
ostensibly repented of. Besetting sins by long con- 
tinuance modify the subjective aptitudes of the mind 
and will, and seriously reduce the power of avoiding 
their repetition; and this is as true of the graver forms 
of sin as of lighter ones. The power of grace is lim- 
ited after all, and the entire removal of the danger of 
relapse into previously well-established habits of sin 
is not to be looked for in this world. Such relapses 
may indeed reveal the insincerity of repentance, or a 
malignant carelessness that is very serious indeed. 
But they may be due entirely to weakness, and may 
leave unaltered a growing dissociation of the peni- 
tent’s fundamental aim and attitude from the 


14 THE STUDY OF MORAL THEOLOGY 


habits not yet overcome. The genuineness of 
repentance may indeed be brought under just 
suspicion by the lack of visible amendment of 
sinful habits, but the suspicion should be aban- 
doned if there is*evidence of the sinner’s growing 
detestation of his sinful habit, grounded in increasing 
love of God. 

Of course, relapses have to be attended to with 
great care; and the penitent should be urged to avoid 
the occasions which his previous habits make 
dangerous, and to cultivate by every means in 
his power the growth of his love of God and of 
his hatred of his sin. Never should a case be 
abandoned as hopeless, so long as opportunities of 
spiritual care remain. 

§ ro. A further snare is encountered in hasty con- 
clusions as to the necessity and obligation of resorting 
to the sacrament of Penance. The conventional 
teaching that this sacrament is necessary for salvation 
in case of mortal sin is too precise and sweeping to 
be accepted without qualifications, and is not prim- 
itive. Obviously the necessary conditions of salva- 
tion are not more numerous to-day than in the apos- 
tolic age. The most that can be said unqualifiedly 
is that, when adequate contrition and repentance are | 
practically impossible without resort to Penance, 
that sacrament is necessary; and the Church’s experi- 
ence justifies the further teaching that this impossi- 
bility is apt to exist when the soul has been hardened 
by the graver degrees of deliberate and wilful sin. 


SOME SNARES 22 


Furthermore, the Church has authority to impose 
such disciplinary rules in this direction as its experi- 
ence dictates. 

But the doctrine that adequate contrition secures 
divine forgiveness in any case is undoubtedly biblical 
and ecumenical, and the disciplinary requirements 
referred to have not been precisely set forth except 
provincially and variously. Anglicans are bound 
only by the requirements of Anglican discipline, 
which leave the determination of personal need and 
obligation in this matter to individual judgment. 
Whatever may be our opinions as to the merits of this 
peculiarity of Anglican discipline, it should be clear 
that Anglican priests may not impose disciplinary 
requirements upon their people which the Anglican 
province does not impose. What they both may and 
ought to do is to make clear to those under their 
spiritual care the great value of sacramental confes- 
sion, and the grave danger that failure to make use 
of it may in many instances mean failure truly to 
repent. 

Summing up what has here been said on the snares 
that beset the study and application of moral science, 
these snares arise mainly from the careless use of the 
technicalities of Moral Theology. ‘These are neces- 
sary for scientific purposes, and are true when taken 
with the important proviso that moral principles are 
larger than the rules which are deduced from them, 
and are insusceptible of exclusively technical consid- 
eration. Similarly, moral states of the soul are not 


16 THE STUDY OF MORAL THEOLOGY 


rightly estimated and judged unless their qualitative 
nature is carefully borne in mind. Rules are helpful, 
but they do not obviate the need of exercising a dis- 
criminating judgment in each case. 


CHAPTER II 
INTRODUCTION AND HISTORY 


§ x. “Ethics is the science of Conduct. It con- 
siders the actions of human beings with reference to 
their rightness or wrongness, their tendency to good 
or to evil.” 1 It concerns itself largely with the 
attempt to define the meaning and content of such 
terms as “‘good,” “‘right and wrong,”’ “obligation,” 
“duty,” ‘‘conscience.”’ While Ethics, or Moral 
Philosophy,” is often confused with Moral Theology, 
there is a distinction between them. The latter is 
the science of the Will of God with relation to the 
conduct of men; and is distinguished from Moral 
Philosophy in that one rests upon divine revelation, 
the other upon the processes of human reason. Ina 
wide sense Moral Theology is the science of human 
duty and conduct considered in the light both of 
nature and of supernatural revelation. As Ethics 
usually deals only with the former of these factors, 
it is comparable to Natural Theology; while Moral 

1J.S. Mackenzie, Manual of Ethics, p.1. But it is often treated 
philosophically, and is then the philosophy of conduct and of duty, 


rather than the science of them. 
2F. J. Hall, Creation and Man, pp. 237-248. 


17 


18 INTRODUCTION AND HISTORY 


Theology, including both, may be compared to 
Dogmatic Theology. Moreover, as usually handled, 
Ethics is theoretical, philosophical rather than sci- 
entific, so as to be distinguished from Moral Theology 
proper as the philosophy of a thing is from its science, 
and is, therefore, properly called Moral Philosophy.! 
A science is described as theological in so far as it 
treats of its subject-matter in relation to God, and 
moral science is called Moral Theology because it 
treats of conduct and character in relation to divine 
purpose and government. No moral science can be 
adequate, or even sound, which fails to reckon with 
the revealed will of God and with true religion. This 
will appear in the historical sketch of ethical systems 
which will occupy the greater part of the present 
chapter. 

The term “‘moral’? comes from the Latin mos, 
moris, which means custom, or practice. The cor- 
1 They are thus distinguished in this treatise. See ch. ili, init. 

2Cf. the German term Sittenlehre. ‘‘Customs were not merely 
habitual ways of acting; they were ways approved by the group or 
society.” Dewey and Tufts, Ethics, p. 1. Their origins appear 
when men first begin to live in groups, the earliest being the family. 
Cf. Dewey and Tufts, op. cit., ch. ii; F. H. Giddings, The Principles 
of Sociology. Sometimes the clan takes the place of the family, as 
when husband and wife are of different clans and the wife and children 
remain with the wife’s clan, to which the husband is only a visitor. 
Custom, taboo (the thing to be avoided) or ritual (the way the thing 
prescribed is to be done) gradually, but slowly, emerge to the point 
where conscience becomes a deciding factor. Dewey and Tufts, 
op. cit., chh. iv-v. The earlier state is that of customary morality, 


when dress and the manner of wearing the hair are on a par with 
marriage regulations and laws regarding murder. This customary 


INTRODUCTION 19 


responding term ‘‘ethics” comes from the Greek 
700s, which means custom, or character, and #6:xés, 
which means that which pertains to conduct or char- 
acter, and is closely related to 0s, signifying custom. 

As has been said, the data of Moral Theology are 
taken from both natural and revealed sources—in 
particular from our general experience of human 
nature and conduct, and from that which is made 
known to us of the character, operations, will, and 
purpose of God. A sound and adequate moral science 
assumes that the catholic faith and religion are true, 
and that it is man’s duty to be guided by the light 
which that religion affords.! 


stage gradually passes over to the reflective, but a great mass of 
custom always remains. 

See H. Rashdall, Is Conscience an Emotion?, Lec. ii, on the transi- 
tion from emotional to rational ethical judgments. While allowing 
for the predominance of the emotional, which E. Westermarck, 
Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas, thinks wholly explanatory, 
Rashdall holds that far down in the social life we may find glimmerings 
of the rational. But conduct never advances to the state where it is 
based upon rational motives alone, where there is no impelling desire 
to be reckoned with, nor is it desirable that it should. There is 
room for both. Rashdall, op. cit., pp. 118-119, “‘The practical 
morality of a man like Kant was as defective on one side as that of 
St. Francis was on another. A more rational morality would per- 
haps have induced St. Francis to recognize that he had no right to 
give away his father’s property to the poor, that cleanliness is not 
necessarily inconsistent with godliness, and that it is better to take 
care of one’s health and live to the age of seventy than to neglect it 
and die at forty-five. A more emotional morality might have led 

Kant to visit his crazy sister as well as to support her pecuniarily 
out of respect for the Categorical Imperative.” 

1Qn Ethics as related to other branches of philosophy, see J. S. 
Mackenzie, of. cii., pp. 23-24; A. Alexander, Christianity and Ethics, 


20 INTRODUCTION AND HISTORY 


I. Ancient Pagan Ethics 


§ 2. An historical survey of the more important 
types of ethical theories is desirable before under- 
taking a more systematic treatment of our subject.! 
The most significant of the ancient gentilic systems 
are Buddhism, Confucianism, and the Greco-Roman.? 

Buddhism was taught by Gautama, born in India 
about 560 B.c. Impelled by pity for human sorrows 
he sought to show a way of escape from them. This 
way consists of knowledge of the cause and of the 
remedy. Ignorance brings desire, which induces 
clinging to existence and involves pain. Suffering 


pp. 14-21; Geo. H. Palmer, The Field of Ethics, passim. Pro- 
found metaphysical problems lie back of the study of Ethics and 
appear from time to time in its course. Limitations of space, and 
of the purpose of this work, have obliged us almost entirely to neglect 
them. J. G. Hibben, The Problems of Philosophy, ad rem, may be 
read with profit. 

1 On the hist. of Ethics, see H. Sidgwick, Hist. of Ethics; Hastings, 
E.R.E., s.vv. ‘Ethics,’ “Ethics, Rudimentary,” “Ethics and 
Morality” (series), and for the various systems; A. B. Bruce, The 
Moral Order in Anc. and Modern Thought; J. Martineau, Types of 
Ethical Theory; W. E. H. Lecky, Hist. of European Morals; W. 
Wundt, Ethical Systems; H. H. Scullard, Early Christian Ethics in 
the West; Schaff-Herzog Encyc., s. v. “Ethics,” IL (with fuller bibliog.); 
and the Histories of Philosophy, esp. F. Ueberweg. 

2¥For still earlier beliefs and practices, see S. A. B. Mercer, Relig- 
tous and Moral Ideas in Babylonia and Assyria; Growth of Religious 
and Moral Ideas in Egypt; also a series of articles by the same author 
in the Journal of the Society of Oriental Research, vols. 1-V. These 
articles contain matter dating from as early as 3850 B.c., and show 
much more advanced standards than would generally be expected. 


ANCIENT PAGAN ETHICS 21 


is remedied by the final destruction of desire, and, in 
the meantime, by the acceptance of the eight-fold 
way of right as a guide for life: (a) insight; (0) 
thoughts; (c) words; (d) deeds; (e) behaviour; (f) 
striving; (g) remembering; () self-suppression.! 
Five prohibitions are given: (qa) not to kill any living 
thing; (6) not to seize the property of another; (c) 
not to touch another man’s wife (monks not to touch 
any woman); (d) not to speak untruth; (e) not to 
drink anything intoxicating. The ideal man is the 
wise man who practices apathy. These ways and 
prohibitions are for those who have not entered the 
higher way of abandonment of home and of all desire. 
The goal is Nirvana—the state of salvation, in which 
no re-births occur, and which merges in an impersonal 
blessedness. Buddhism has no god, no sacrifice, and 
no sense of sin or need of salvation therefrom; but 
in popular practice Buddhists are polytheists. 

The defects are: (a) an erroneous account of pain, 
which, in fact, does not come from desire but from 
natural causes and from perverted desire; (6) lack 
of sense of sin; (c) absence of a genuine religion and 
of dependence upon God; (d) denial of personal im- 
mortality, and consequent lack of a goal of develop- 
ment; (e) pessimistic inertia, nullifying progress; 
(f) an aristocratic confinement of its higher blessings 
to the few; (g) intellectual pride. In practice Bud- 


1 These are interpreted by Prof. Rhys Davids, Sacred Books of the 
East, vol. II, p. 144 (abridgement in J. H. Leuba, A Psychological 
Study of Religion, p. 286). 


22 INTRODUCTION AND HISTORY 


dhism has gendered immorality. Even its boasted 
altruism has reference to humanity at large con- 
sidered in the abstract. The Western systems of 
Theosophy and Christian Science contain Buddhistic 
elements with Christian additions; they are hybrid 
systems, vitiated by the Pantheism which underlies 
Indian thought, and are really non-moral; they 
foster a pseudo-spirituality and a blinding self- 
satisfaction.? 

§ 3. Confucianism? was founded by Confucius 
(551-478 B.c.). It presupposes a state religion and 
one which has no determinative creed. Propriety, 
convention, and precedent rule. Virtue is described 
as consisting of knowledge, magnanimity, and valour. 
Worship is directed towards (a) heaven; (0) non- 
human spirits; (c) dead ancestors; especially the 
last. 

Confucius eschewed dogmatism about the super- 
human, tolerating and ignoring popular superstitions. 
He based all upon the law of human nature and upon 
duties to men. ‘The worship of heaven was reserved 
for the emperor, as representing the people, who are 
to worship their ancestors. The family is the centre 
of his religion, and filial piety is the essence of virtue. 


1H. Rashdall, Conscience and Christ, pp. 264-271, has a good crit- 
fcism of the attempts sometimes made to equate Buddhistic and 
Christian theology and ethics, 

2See P. V. N. Myers, History as Past Ethics, ch. v; J. Legge, 
Religions of China. Curious correspondences between early Chinese 
and Greek thought in ethics and in metaphysics are shown by 
Aubrey L. Moore, Essays Scientific and Philosophical, ch. ix. 


ANCIENT PAGAN ETHICS 23 


Taoism and Buddhism are tolerated, subject to 
ancestor worship and filial piety. Human nature is 
good and, if followed, will lead men aright. This 
involves social relations and functions between: (a) 
sovereign and subject; (6) husband and wife; (c) 
parent and child; (d) elder and younger brother; (e) 
friend and friend. These are natural relations and 
involve four rules: (a) serve the sovereign; (6) serve 
parents; (c) serve elder brothers; (d) set an example 
to friends. ‘The sum is reciprocity,” but it is shown 
by observing rules of propriety. ‘These were elab- 
orated and were fixed by convention and by precedent. 
The result was a purely legalistic and external system 
which could not reform mankind. It cultivated con- 
ceit, a low morality, and stagnation.! The inspiration 
of Chinese morality comes rather from Buddhism 
than from Confucianism. 

Lao-Tse, born about 604 B.c., met Confucius in 
517 B.c. He saw the futility of Confucian ethics and 
sought to remedy it by urging a revolt from civilized 
conventions in favour of the virtues of primitive sim- 
plicity and the cultivation of mystical wisdom, but 
his effort was abortive. 


1 Ethics, as everything else in China, has been stationary. P. V.N. 
Myers, op. cit., p. 7, “It is largely because Europe has been con- 
stantly getting a new conscience that its history has been so dis- 
turbed and so progressive, just as it is largely because China has had 
the same Confucian conscience for two thousand years and more, 
that her history has been so uneventful and unchanging.” ‘Taoism 
is pantheistic and may be compared to Nietzscheism, see P. V. N. 
Myers, op. cit., p. 57, note 3. 


24 INTRODUCTION AND HISTORY 


§ 4. Greek ethical developments! properly began 
with Socrates, who may be called the “father of moral 
philosophy.” Previous to his career we have only 
the fragmentary sayings of the so-called “wise men 
of Greece.’ Physical and metaphysical ideas had 
predominated. The Sophists had thrown all funda- 
mental principles into confusion and, in fact, made 
virtue the same as self-interest.” 

Socrates, 470-399 B.C., was the noblest of pagan 
prophets, and rose to as high a level as was possible 
apart from revelation.2? It is noteworthy that he 


1A, Alexander, op. cit., pp. 35-44; Dewey and Tufts, of, cit., 
ch. vii; T. B. Strong, Christ. Ethics, pp. 26-34. 

2H. Sidgwick, Hist. of Ethics, pp. 13-22; R. A. P. Rogers, A Short 
Hist. of Ethics, Greek and Modern, pp. 31-34. The leaders of the 
Sophists were Protagoras of Abdera (nat. c. 480 B.c.) and Gorgias 
of Leontini (mat. c. 483 B.c). The first of these made ethics sub- 
jective. Carried to its conclusion his system was anarchical, imply- 
ing that each may do what he likes without reference to the good of 
others. The teaching of the second leads to skepticism, as there is 
no objective standard of truth and goodness. 

3H. Sidgwick, op. cit., pp. 22-34; R. A. P. Rogers, op. cit., pp. 
34-36; B. Rand, The Classical Moralists, ch. i. He ignored meta- 
physics, natural science and mathematics, and made the study of 
moral man and his duties as a citizen central in education. He was 
skeptical as to the possibilities of knowledge in other fields. He is 
certain that the one thing that man can know is himself. Hence his 
motto ‘Know thyself,’ which does not refer to physiological or 
psychological knowledge but to ethical. His chief claim to fame lies 
in the emphasis he puts upon the authority of conscience; but his 
teaching must be carefully distinguished from that of Kant on the 
categorical imperative. The latter leads one to do his duty without 
inclination for it; whereas according to Socrates the desire for hap- 
piness is fundamental, and coincides with duty; for only the ful- 
filment of duty brings happiness and is worth striving for. His end 


ANCIENT PAGAN ETHICS a 


thought himself to be inspired by a good demon. He 
undertook the mission: (a) of establishing the 
objective value of truth, goodness, and beauty; (0) 
of making men see their ignorance; (c) of turning 
them to self-knowledge. His method was a critical 
definition of accepted ideas and their amendment by 
induction. 

His chief principles are: (a) there is a God, a future 
life of the soul, future responsibility, and absolute 
good; (b) virtue and happiness coincide and are based 
upon wisdom and knowledge, especially self-knowl- 
edge.| These emancipate the will by turning it 
towards the good.” 

Plato, 427-347 B.c., introduced metaphysical and 
psychological additions to the thought of Socrates 
and may be described as the flower of his teaching, 
while Aristotle was its fruit.2 As with Socrates, knowl- 
was practical. ‘‘The quest of Socrates was for the true art of con- 
duct for an ordinary member of the human society, a man living a 
practical life among his fellows.” Sidgwick, op. ci#., p. 39. His 
system contains the germ of all the chief Greek ethical systems. 
The difficulty of interpreting him fully is shown by the variety of 
schools that profess to follow him, the most important of these 
ethically being the Cynics, founded by Antithenes, and the Cyrenaics, 
founded by Aristippus. He wrote no books on ethics. The outcome 
of his speculations was the stimulation of thought, and the attempt 
to give exact expression to this thought begat the several schools 
from which, broadly speaking, the Stoics and Epicureans later on 
developed. 

1“ Knowledge is virtue,” cf. Plato’s Protagoras. This involves 
practice rather than mere intellectual knowledge, and rests upon the 
hypothesis that ‘‘no man is knowingly vicious.” 

2-H. Sidgwick, of. cit., pp. 21-32. 

3H. Sidgwick, op. cii., pp. 34-50; R. A. P. Rogers, of. cit., Pt. I, 


26 INTRODUCTION AND HISTORY 


edge is the essence of virtue, especially knowledge of 
pure reason, of ideas, of principles intuitively seen in 
their internal sense. Ideas are the true realities, 
and are the eternal types of which mundane things 
are passing impressions.! 

Pleasures are to be distinguished because they are 
often contrary. ‘The true ideal is to know and attain 
to the summum bonum, which is likeness to God who 
is the absolute good. As this cannot be embraced 
in its unity, it is to be sought in the manifold by 
rational understanding of truth, beauty, and virtue. 
Man’s perfection lies in resemblance to God. Virtue 
is the harmony of the soul, vice its deformity. Virtue 
is essentially one, but may be distinguished under 


ch. ii; Wm. De W. Hyde, Five Great Philosophies of Life, ch. iii; 
B. Rand, of. cit., ch. ii (a very useful source book). Among modern 
writers who have felt in an especial degree the influence of Plato, 
Carlyle represents the stronger side, Emerson (in whom the Neo- 
Platonic predominates) the weaker. Plato’s chief ethical work is 
the Republic. It seeks to determine the nature and worth of justice 
and the means whereby it is to be realized in the State. The Philebus 
should also be read for the sake of its inquiry into the nature of good 
to the individual. 

1W. Wundt, Ethical Systems, vol. II, p. 10, says, “ Plato’s phi- 
losophy rests wholly and entirely on an ethical basis.” Also p. 11, 
“When Plato, perhaps influenced more by the Socratic life than by 
the Socratic doctrine, rises to the principle that it is better to suffer 
wrong than to do wrong, he can no longer avoid the conviction that 
the good and the pleasurable do not necessarily coincide. It would, 
however, be intolerable to suppose a permanent conflict between 
pleasure and good. There is thus no way out of the difficulty save 
by the opposition of permanent to transitory pleasure; and, since 
the former is unattainable in the life of sense, it must be sought in a 
supersensuous existence.” 


ANCIENT PAGAN ETHICS 27 


four heads in relation to the faculties of the soul: 
(a) of the reason, prudence or wisdom; (8) of the pas- 
sions, fortitude or courage; (c) of the appetites, tem- 
perance; (d) of the harmony of all, justice! These 
are the so-called Cardinal Virtues? of Christian 
Ethics, and are found in the later Jewish writers, in 
the works of St. Ambrose, who first applied the term 
“Cardinal,” of St. Augustine, and of all moral writers 
since. 

He argued at length for the immortality of the soul;3 
but the Christian idea of the immortality of the entire 
man, resurrection from the dead, lay outside of all 
pagan thought. In common with all Greek writers 
Plato treated ethics as political, and regarded the 
individual as subordinate to the state. 

There are certain defects in his system: (a) knowl- 
edge and theory is elaborate, but power is wanting; 
(6) it is an ethic for philosophers, not for men in gen- 
eral; (c) the problem of evil was not faced, but was 


1He attempts a psychological distinction of the faculties of the 
soul, Adyos, Ouuds, éwiuula, reason, emotion (not an accurate 
translation as we have no equivalent word), and desire. The proper 
fulfilment of the function of each leads to virtue. 

2Of the Cardinal Virtues Justice is fundamental. “For the 
intelligence it consists in the correctness of thought (codla, pirocodgla) ; 
for the will, in courage (dvdpla); for the sensibility, in temperance 
(swppoctvn). Wisdom is the justice of the mind; courage, the 
justice of the heart; temperance, the justice of the senses. Piety 
(6o.6rys), is justice in our relation with the Deity. It is synony- 
mous with justice in general.” A. Weber, Hist. of Philosophy, p. 99. 
Cicero terms justice “the mistress and queen of all virtues.” 

* See especially the Phedo. 


28 INTRODUCTION AND HISTORY 


thought to reside in the corporeal, in that which was 
becoming, and was thought to be without remedy. 

Aristotle, 384-322 B.c.,| separated ethics from 
other sciences and began his work with a discussion 
of the summum bonum, which he found in man’s 
welfare, not in God, and regarded as political, this. 
resting upon his well-known description of man as a 
political animal. The end of conduct is the welfare 
of the state, not of the individual. The Greek has 
no more duties to the barbarian than he has to the 
wild beast.2, The summum bonum consists in happi- 
ness, which is defined as a perfect practical activity 
of soul in a perfect life. Mere pleasure, as such, is 
neutral, depending for its relation to happiness upon 
the use made of it. Virtue is founded in natural 
sentiments and in habits which issue in 700s, a moral 
character2 These are of two kinds: (a) moral vir- 
tues, which are developed by acts and the habits 
caused by them; (6) intellectual virtues, which per- 
fect the moral. Practically speaking, the essence 
of virtue is moderation or a mean between two ex- 

1H. Sidgwick, op. cit., pp. 50-71; R. A. P. Rogers, op. cit., Pt. I. 
ch. iti; J. E. C. Welldon, Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle; B. Rand, 
op. cit., ch. iii. 

2P. V. N. Myers, op. cit., p. 169, ‘The relationships and activities 
of the Greek as a citizen, and not his relationships and activities as a 
husband or father or business man, determined his chief duties. 
Conscience was very little involved in that part of his life which lay 
outside the civic sphere. It was solely as a member of a city com- 
munity—that he could live the truly moral life and attain the highest 


virtue.” 
3 He was the first to use the term “‘ethics.’’ 


ANCIENT PAGAN ETHICS 29 


tremes, the via media... The importance of the will 
is emphasized as contrasted with knowledge. The 
evolutionary view of sin may be traced back to 
Aristotle, for he regarded sin as a necessary stage on 
the way to goodness, or as goodness itself in so far as 
it had not yet proceeded from potency to act. There- 
fore it was a mere imperfection, or a less good? 

In general, in Greek ethics human nature was con- 
ceived as essentially good; and morality was mainly 
secular as contrasted with that of the Hebrews. 
Hence it advanced beyond the static religion.4 Greek 
ethical theories gave form and system to those of the 
Church, but Christianity itself gave the spirit which 


1A, Weber, op. cii., p. 132, ‘‘Courage, for example, is a virtue, 
and as such the mean between timidity and foolhardiness; liberality 
is the mean between avarice and prodigality.” R. A. P. Rogers, 
op. cit., p. 72, has a good illustration of this important point of 
Aristotle’s teaching: 


Excess Mean Defect 
Rashness Courage Cowardice 
Licentiousness Temperance Apathy 
Extravagance Generosity Miserliness 
Bad temper Good temper Servility 
Flattery Courtesy Rudeness 


The middle column is printed so as to suggest that the mean is often 
nearer one extreme than the other. 

2W. Wundt, op. cif., vol. II, pp. 19-20, “Aristotle was the first to 
recognize the will as the specifically ethical function within the 
general domain of reason; and for him, accordingly, moral virtue 
consists, not in right knowledge, but in the good will, which is indeed 
dependent upon reason, but not identical with it.” 

3 Metaphysics, XIX, 4, 7d kaxdv adrd 7d Surdwer dryabby, 

4Cf. Aubrey Moore, in Lux Mundi, Essay ii. 


30 INTRODUCTION AND HISTORY 


made them living and realizable. This is often over- 
looked when the debt of Christianity to Greek ethics 
is magnified, or the statement made that Ambrose is 
Cicero with a Christian veneer. Christianity brought 
a new motive power into morality, united the virtues 
in the spirit of love, and attached a new value to 
personality. 

§ 5. In Greco-Roman Ethics, Platonic and Aristo- 
telic efforts brought to birth two opposed systems, 
the Stoic and the Epicurean, emphasizing respectively 
virtue and happiness.! 

The Stoic system? was founded by Zeno, 340-260 
B.c. Among his followers, more or less consistent, 
were Cleanthes, Chrysippus, Panztius, Posidonius, 
Pompey, Cicero, Seneca? Epictetus, and Marcus 
Aurelius. From the standpoint of the pious heathen 
the Stoics were men of lofty virtue. They held that 
virtue is the only true good, the swummum bonum and 
the ultimate source of all happiness; but even virtue 
must be sought in a disinterested manner, for its own 
sake, not for that of consequent happiness. The rule 
of virtue is to live according to nature, which means 
according to enlightened reason. Hence only phil- 
osophers can follow this way. Indifference is the 
proper attitude to observe towards the circumstances 

1 On the Roman moral systems in general, see P. V. N. Myers, op. 
cit., ch. xi; H. Sidgwick, op. cit., pp. 70 ff. 

2'Wm. De W. Hyde, op. cit., ch. ii; R. A. P. Rogers, op. cit., Pt. I, 
ch.v; Wm. Wundt, op. cit., vol. II, pp. 25-28. 


? On the relation of Seneca to St. Paul, see Bp. Lightfoot, Ep. to the 
Philippians, App. 2. 


ANCIENT PAGAN ETHICS 31 


of life—health, fortune, honours, pleasures. All these 
are parts of the system of things, adiaphora, that is, 
indifferent to the wise man. Fortitude under all cir- 
cumstances is the sovereign rule; and all human 
passions are regarded as the sources of evil. They 
are not merely to be restrained, as Aristotle taught, 
but to be eradicated entirely. The chief defects of 
the system are: (a) arrogant self-sufficiency; (0) 
aristocratic indifference to the common people; (c) 
apathy, which is fatal to genuine moral progress; 
(d) immorality, growing out of the principle of 
adiaphora; (e) inevitable resort to suicide when the 
evils of this life become unbearable.! On the good 
side it emphasized the power of the soul to live its 
own life, rising superior to misfortune and suffering, 
and the authoritativeness of duty. 

Epicureanism ” had for its chief promoters Epicurus, 
342-271 B.c., and Lucretius, a Roman poet of the 
second century B.c., and, later on, it was popularized 
by Horace. The summum bonum was happiness,’ 


1Cf. the terse advice of Marcus Aurelius to one who found life 
hard, “If the house smokes, go out of it.” 

2R. A. P. Rogers, op. cit., Pt. I, ch. iv; Wm. De W. Hyde, op. cit., 
ch. i. It is based upon an atomistic materialism, and has regard to 
physical and psychical, rather than moral or spiritual, well-being. 
It is best exemplified in Toto Melema of Geo. Eliot’s Romola. J. 5S. 
Mill bases his system upon it, but incorporates elements from all 
other systems, so that his presentation becomes a hodge-podge of 
contradictory elements. 

3W. E. H. Lecky, Hist. of European Morals, vol. I, p. 14, gives the 
Epicurean canons, “The pleasure which produces no pain is to be 
embraced. The pain which produces no pleasure is to be avoided. 


32 INTRODUCTION AND HISTORY 


which was interpreted to mean pleasure in action 
and in repose, the latter being the more complete. 
The Epicureans found no standard higher or more 
authoritative than the agreeable; but it is to be 
noted that pleasure of the soul is placed above that 
of the body. Virtue means wisdom (¢povyots, or 
insight) in seeking the forms of happiness which will 
not end in disappointment. 

Both systems inculcate the cardinal virtues of 
Plato, although the Stoics interpreted them ideally 
and the Epicureans from a purely hedonistic stand- 
point; but both lack power and adequate motive. 
The Epicureans inevitably gravitate towards Hedon- 
ism, or pleasure of the moment, ‘Let us eat and 
drink, for to-morrow we die.” 


Il. Christian Ethics 


§ 6. The Holy Spirit alone enables men to arrive at 
a sound moral philosophy.! He does this through 


The pleasure is to be avoided which prevents a greater pleasure, or 
produces a greater pain. The pain is to be endured which averts a 
greater pain, or secures a greater pleasure.” Wm. Wundt, op. cit., 
vol. II. p. 29, ‘‘While, like the Stoics, they emphasize repose of 
mind as an essential condition of happiness, the evil to be avoided 
is not, as with the Stoics, passion, but pain. Not apathy, but 
ataraxia, painlessness, is extolled as the blessed state. Thus, while, 
for the Stoics, virtue, since it consists in control of the passions, is a 
good to be sought for its own sake, and from whose possession true 
happiness first arises; for the Epicureans the relation is reversed. 
The goal of all effort is happiness, and virtue is only a means to this 
end.” 


1 Ethical theories are not evidential as to the moral state cf a 


CHRISTIAN ETHICS 33 


both natural and supernatural means. To Him is 
due the dispensation of paganism, which represents 
His work through the natural reason alone, in prep- 
aration for supernatural revelation. In the earlier 
dispensations moral truth is developed in fragmentary 
forms and a definite philosophy cannot be developed 
without caricature. The Mosaic and Christian dis- 
pensations represent a gradual development of authen- 
tic relations with God;! and this development makes 
possible a true knowledge of righteousness and a dis- 
pensation of saving grace. The outcome is a moral 
philosophy which is both sound and capable of appli- 
cation. 

Judaism, or the system which resulted from the 
Mosaic dispensation, supplied what paganism lacked, 
that is, authentic relations with God; but righteous- 
ness was conceived externally as the fulfilment of 
God’s will by God’s people, that is, as obedience to the 
law, for moral obligations were identified with divine 


people, for their embodiment in actual practice is very limited. 
P. V. N. Myers, op. cit., p. 4, “The facts for a history of morals must 
be sought chiefly outside the literature of ethical theory and specu- 
lation. They must be looked for in the customs, laws, institutions, 
mythologies, literatures, maxims, and religions of the different races, 
peoples, and ages of history.” Cf. H. Rashdall, Conscience and 
Christ, lec. vi; and, for the moral conditions when these systems were 
fully developed, Sir S. Dill, Roman Society from Nero to Marcus 
Aurelius, passim. 

1J. R. [llingworth, Christian Character, starts with theses which 
correctly describe the guiding principle of revealed ethic: that life 
is the goal of truly guided human effort, and that sin, being destructive 
of life, is man’s chief enemy. 


34 INTRODUCTION AND HISTORY 


commands. Thus was developed; (a) a sense of 
sin and of need of salvation from above; (b) the mes- 
sianic hope, that the law would some day be written 
on men’s hearts, and become effective among all 
peoples in a kingdom of righteousness.! 

In relation to Judaism Chrisitanity? translated 
divine and moral perfection into human terms in the 
life and conversation of God-incarnate. Thus was 
unfolded the deeper implications of the older dispen- 
sation: (a) the philosophy of love, which at once 


1Qn Old Test. ethics, see A. B. Bruce, Ethics of the Old Test.; 
T. B. Strong, Christ. Ethics, pp. 12-20, 35-46; C. E. Luthardt, Hist. 
of Christ. Ethics, pp. 33 ff; Dewey and Tufts, op. cit., ch. vi; A. Alex- 
ander, op. cit., pp. 44-52; P. V. N. Myers, op. cit., ch. ix; Hastings, 
Dic. of Bible, s. v. “Ethics.” On Jewish ethics in our Lord’s time, 
C. E. Luthardt, op. cit., pp. 57 ff.; Hastings, Dic. of Bible, as cited; 
H. Rashdall, Conscience and Christ, pp. 77-94. Special attention is 
called to S. A. B. Mercer on O. T. Morals, in Angl. Theol. Rev., 
May and Dec, 1918, Oct., 1919. With refreshing honesty he shows 
that the Old Test. morals are less elevated than usually represented. 

2On Christ’s ethical teaching, and the distinctive elements of 
Christian ethic, see Chas. Harris, Pro Fide, pp. 335-356; Chas. 
Gore, The Sermon on the Mount; T. B. Strong, op. cit., Lec. ii; W. L. 
Davidson, Christ. Ethics, pp. 4-10; Hastings, Dic. of Christ, and 
Dic. of Ap. Church, s. vv. ‘Ethics.”” The crude interitmsethic theory, 
set forth by A. Schweitzer, Quest of the Hist’l Jesus, that Christ 
believed the end of the world to be immediately impending and 
therefore disregarded men’s responsibilities for this world, is met by 
E. D. La Touche, Person of Christ, pp. 163-167; C. W. Emmet, in 
Expositor, Nov. 1912; A. Alexander, op. ctt., ch. vili. The para- 
doxical commands of Christ are to be taken as heightened illustra- 
tions of principles; e.g. Have love enough to turn the other cheek 
also, if that is expedient. And the virtues exemplified by his exam- 
ple are of abiding value for this world. They have the note of 
universality. . 


CHRISTIAN ETHICS 35 


explains the law and emancipates from it. Duty is 
no longer constraint, for its principle is love; (0) the 
new external rule of the imitation of Christ; (c) the 
working power which pagan systems lacked; (d) 
a clear revelation of man’s chief end and destiny, 
which is to become the friend of God in life eternal. 

In relation to paganism! Christianity achieved 
three results: (a) it absorbed whatever was true in 
pagan systems; (0b) it supplied the principles which 
enabled men to bring the fragmentary truths of pagan- 
ism into harmonious relation and to apprehend their 
ultimate meaning: (z) that we were made for God 
and for His fellowship; (z) the whole conception of 
Christian immortality; (cz) the true meaning of sin 
and evil; (iv) the gospel of redemption and grace; 
(v) a complete manifestation in human terms of what 
man is intended to become in the example of Christ; 
(c) It transformed what it assimilated from paganism, 
e.g., the pagan cardinal virtues took on a transfigured 
meaning when brought into relation with the heavenly 
virtues of faith, hope, and charity. 

Some of the more obvious innovations? which 
emerged were: (a) Monotheism and the consequent 


1W. Wundt, op. cit., vol. II, p. 33, says the chief points of differ- 
ence between pagan and Christian ethics are: (a) the latter substi- 
tutes love for fear; (6) the Fatherhood of God and the brotherhood 
of man for the limits of nationality and rank; (c) gives an adequate 
view of the origin and future destiny of man. Christianity also 
effected certain changes in terminology: “virtue” was replaced by 
“righteousness,” “‘happiness”’ by “blessedness,”’ ‘‘evil” by “‘sin.” 

2,'W. L. Davidson, of. cit., ch. ii. 


36 INTRODUCTION AND HISTORY 


unification of practical ideals by relating them to one 
God; (b) Catholicity of appeal to all men in behalf 
of a common brotherhood; (c) Certain new virtues,! 
such as humility and self-judgment, purity and self- 
discipline, as distinguished from destructive forms 
of asceticism; (d) The putting of a new valuation on 
individual lives. Christ did not teach a moral phil- 
osophy or science, but: (a) taught and exemplified 
certain fundamental principles which made the devel- 
opment of a satisfactory ethical system possible; 
and (0) established a concrete society or Church 
wherein the conditions of ethical development are 
afforded. Considered in its scientific aspects, how- 
ever, every ethical system is the work of human think- 
ers, fallible and progressive. 

The Christian Church was intended by Christ to 
become a leavening force ina larger world. In it are 
supplied: (a) what the New Testament calls the 
“Way” of Life, and that in concrete and social form; 
(6) effectual relations with God as man’s chief end; 
(c) means of supernatural grace which are the imme- 
diate sources of the power that pagan society lacks; 
(d) an effective propaganda. In this manner was 
established a twofold process: (a) of applying the 
principles gained through apostolic experience of 
Christ to an ever-widening and varying experience of 
the world; (6) of growth of articulate ethical concep- 
tions and of a systematic Christian ethic. But this 
growth was necessarily conditioned and hindered 

1'W. L. Davidson, op. cit., ch. x 


CO tS oOo 


ese 


CHRISTIAN ETHICS 37, 


by certain accidents of the Christian propaganda. 
In order to leaven the wider world-society, imper- 
fectly converted men of the world had to be received 
within the Church, and they brought with them many 
pagan notions. The progress of moral development 
which is involved in this may be summarily described 
as having three stages: (a) the revelation of Christian 
principles to the Church in terms of apostolic experi- 
ence of Christ; (6) progressive application of these 
principles to wider and more varied experience under 
the handicap of the invasion of pagan ideas; (c) 
a slow development of ethical definitions and, finally, 
of a scientific ethic. The definitive stage culminated 
in the scholastic period, but began in the patristic. 
Systematic schemes, developed in the scholastic 
period, have been given a more truly inductive and 
scientific form in modern days. 

§ 7. The patristic period was one of tentative 
exposition and definition of particular ethical ideas, 
called forth, and also hampered, by the Church’s 
contact with classical paganism! and with the 
northern barbarism. This contact involved many 
centuries of struggle with pagan ideas, which entered 
the Church in two general forms: (a) an exaggerated 
asceticism, which makes invidious distinctions be- 
tween religious and secular and between the flesh 
and the spirit, as if the secular and the flesh were 


1See T. R. Glover, The Conflict of Religions in the Early Roman 
Empire; Chas. Bigg, The Church’s Task under the Roman Empire; 
T. B. Strong, op. cit., Lec. IV; C. E, Luthardt, of. cit., pp. 77 ff. 


38 INTRODUCTION AND HISTORY 


intrinsically evil; (0) naturalism, or treatment of 
Christianity as designed simply to improve natural 
morality. The patristic age under these circum- 
stances saw the accumulation of material for moral 
science and the determination of certain preliminary 
issues with paganism. The battle with false asceti- 
cism emerged in the rise and condemnation of Monta- 
nism and Novatianism, which represented recoil from 
pagan social life, and were coloured by belief in the 
inherent evil of flesh and its pleasures. This belief 
was embodied openly in the Gnostic and Manichean 
systems. Incidental manifestations within the Church 
were due to the exaggerated emphasis placed upon 
monastic life and celibacy. The Church came to the 
position that these are vocational, and that true spir- 
itual development is possible in the world and in 
married life. The conflict between Christian ideals 
and the purely natural conception of morality came 
to the surface in the Pelagian controversy of the fifth 
century, which drew pointed attention to the subject 
of the will’s capacity and responsibility, and to the 
doctrines of grace and predestination. 

It was St. Augustine’s task in this connection to 
vindicate the dependence of human wills upon super- 
natural grace for power to choose and to follow the 

1 This error still explains much indifference to supernatural religion 
and to its embodiment in the Church. Religion’s claim has reference 
to the cultivation of those relations with God wherein eternal life 
consists. Natural morality, indispensable for this Christian purpose 


though it be, cannot of itself bring men to God and to the enjoyment 
of their chief end hereafter. 


Ee 


CHRISTIAN ETHICS 30 


good. Pro forma, he made the will the basis of 
responsibility, but his definition of divine predestina- 
tion threatened to overthrow the doctrine of human 
freedom. However, he was a prolific writer and is 
not to be regarded as merely the founder of what is 
called Augustinianism. By his improved classifica- 
tion of the virtues, as well as by his treatment of free 
will and grace, he marks a period in the history of 
Christian ethics. He connected the cardinal virtues 
with the theological;! and laid the foundation for 
the Calvinistic view that the virtues of the heathen 
are “‘splendid vices,’ being apart from the love of 
God in which all true virtue is grounded. Among 
his contributions to moral science are the following: 
(a) The summum bonum is the vision and love of God, 
and the means of attainment is growth in virtue by 
which all man’s faculties reach their highest per- 
fection and the complete satisfaction of all his desires. 
(b) Love is the sum of virtue and is threefold in its 
object, namely, of God, of self, of neighbour. Its 
manward branches are the so-called cardinal virtues. 


1C, E. Luthardt, of. cit., p. 225, ‘The four cardinal virtues become 
virtues in so far as they are manifestations of love to God (de Mor. 
Eccl. Cath., 1, xxv, 15): temperantia, in opposition to love of the 
world; fortitudo, as the overcoming of suffering and pain by love; 
justitia, as service to God; and prudentia, as the right distinction 
between what is to be avoided and what is to be chosen (de Mor., 
I, xxxv-xlv).” St. Augustine defines virtue: “Definitio brevis et 
vera virtutis: ordo est amoris,” de Civ. Det, XV. 22. On his ethical 
teaching in general, see T. B. Strong, op. cit., pp. 188-199, 245-251, 
258-250. 


40 INTRODUCTION AND HISTORY 


(c) The essence of moral evil is the privation of good 
by choice of inferior good. 

The patristic age saw the beginning of what is 
called ‘‘Canon Law,” which is based upon the prin- 
ciple that Christians owe obedience in practice to 
the Church because of the charge of Christ, “Make 
disciples of all nations.’”’ The Canon Law, in its 
larger sense, includes: (a) divine law, as interpreted 
by the Church; (0) the Faith, as supplying the light 
by which we ought to live; (¢) liturgical require- 
ments, including the so-called jus liturgicum of bishops; 
(d) canons, strictly so-called, or the laws enacted 
by councils and the decrees of competent ecclesiastics, 
especially of the Papal See; (e) ecclesiastical customs 
and traditions, which are reckoned to outweigh indi- 
vidualistic private judgment; (f) decisions of com- 
petent ecclesiastical courts, which constitute much of 
the so-called common law; (g) Church laws enacted 
by the state, in so far as they have been accepted by 
the Church; (hk) digests, collections, penitentiaries, 
which have gained recognition by ecclesiastical 
authority. 

The penitentials ! were originally lists of sins with 
their appropriate penances, compiled from patristic 
literature for the guidance of the clergy in dealing 
with penitents. They began to appear in the sixth 
century and developed into collections of miscella- 
neous rules calculated to assist in the administration 


1C. E. Luthardt, op. cit., pp. 288-297; Cath. Encyc., s.v. “‘Peni- 
tential Canons.” 


CHRISTIAN ETHICS 4r 


of public penances. With the decline of public 
penances these manuals dropped out of use, but 
their materials were incorporated into later moral 
treatises. 

§ 8. During the middle ages! and subsequently 
the line of opposition between rival systems of ethics 
was determined by the emphasis, on the one hand, 
and rejection on the other, of those elements in Chris- 
tian ethics which are distinctively Christian and 
supernatural. 

Abelard (1079-1142 A.D.) treated Christian ethics 
as simply a reformation of natural ethics, and made 
intention, or intellectual motive, the subject matter 
of moral distinctions, rather than the actions which 
follow. 

The mystics of the twelfth century represented a 
reaction from the ethics of Abelard, and over-empha- 
sized the supernatural side. The chief original 
promoters of this development were St. Bernard 
(r0gI-1153 A.D.), and Hugo of St. Victor (1097- 
II4I A.D.). They made union with God the proper 
business of human life, and said that this was to be 
gained through withdrawal from the sensuous, illu- 
mination, and ecstatic contemplation, resulting in 
union with God based upon love. They anticipated 
the later division of the spiritual life into the purga- 
tive, illuminative, and unitive ways or stages. Their 


1Qn medieval Ethics, see C. E. Luthardt, op. cit., §§ 50 ff.; H. 
Sidgwick, op. cit., pp. 134-151; Extracts in Benj. Rand, The Class- 
ical Moralists, ch. xi-xii. 


42 INTRODUCTION AND HISTORY 


one-sidedness appears in their ascetic disparagement 
of the normal conditions in the world, to which 
Christians in general are bound to adjust themselves, 
and of the practical virtues of everyday life. 

The main lines of ethical development were car- 
ried on by Peter Lombard and by St. Thomas Aquinas. 
The former laid the foundation for scholastic devel- 
opment by collecting in systematic order the opinions 
of the ancients in four books of Sentences. This 
work became a universally employed text-book for 
several centuries, and every scholastic writer of emi- 
nence wrote commentaries upon it. The scholastics 
were too profound and too restless to be satisfied 
with mere reproductions of patristic opinions, and 
the commentaries on Peter Lombard’s Sentences 
contained much original thought and prepared the 
way for the great Summae. The flower and most 
representative product was the Summa Theologica 
of St. Thomas Aquinas (1226-1274 A.D.). The second 
part of this work not only finished the codrdination 
and systematic presentation of moral science up to his 
time, but crystallized the science on lines that have 
been followed ever since in the Roman Church. It 
also contains many of the elements of modern Protest- 
ant systems. St. Thomas combined the Christian 
standpoint with a free use of Aristotelic and Platonic 
elements and forms of thought. God is the chief 
end. Good and being are the same in fact or reality, 
and evil is defect or falling short. Considered in the 
abstract the good is the desirable, whether morally 


————— ae 


CHRISTIAN ETHICS 43 


desirable, useful, or simply pleasurable. The moral 
good constitutes the determinative end of Christian 
conduct. It pertains to voluntary actions, and these 
are formally good according to their end or intention, 
materially according to their own nature. This dis- 
tinction appears in speaking of sin. We are formally 
guilty when we sin knowingly and wilfully, but our 
guilt is only material when we sin ignorantly or invol- 
untarily. Every human act has good for its end, 
positively speaking. The sinfulness of a sinful act 
lies in the substitution of a lower good for one that is 
higher and ought to be pursued. ‘The intellect, when 
acting in the moral sphere, consists of: (a) synderesis, 
or the theoretical faculty; (0) conscience, which 
applies moral principles to conduct. All virtues fall 
under seven heads, the four cardinal virtues and the 
three theological. The former are natural and lead 
to natural happiness, while the latter are fruits of 
supernatural grace and lead to supernatural beati- 
tude; but the fall makes God’s help necessary for the 
acquisition even of the natural. So God becomes 
the source of all virtues. The divine law is grounded 
in the reason of things as seated in the divine nature, 
and the divine will is what it is because of the divine 
nature, not vice versa. 

After St. Thomas a decay of scholasticism set in 
and moral ideas degenerated. Two factors hastened 
this decay; namely, the theory of works of super- 
erogation, with its mechanical and commercial scheme 
of merits and indulgences, and, in the seventeenth 


44 INTRODUCTION AND HISTORY 


century, that form of probabilism which is called 
laxism. 

§9. Modern Roman Moral Theology is largely 
based upon St. Thomas, but is influenced negatively 
by the indulgence system, and is elaborated with 
reference to the conditions of modern life. In most 
moral treatises the principal heads adopted are: (a) 
‘Virtues; (6) the Decalogue; (c) Precepts of the 
Church; (d) Sacramental Obligations; (e) Contracts 
and Civil Obligations of all kinds. 

Certain special departments of moral science have 
also been developed: (a) Casuistry, the chief pro- 
moters of which have been the Jesuits; (0) Ascetic 
Theology; (c) Mystical Theology. 

During the reformation period the chief influences 
at work were a partial reform of the system of indul- 
gences by the Council of Trent, and the development 
of Probabilism.! The pioneer in this last-mentioned 

1QOn Probabilism, see C. J. Shebbeare, in Ch. Qly. Rev., July, 1912; 
K. E. Kirk, op. cit., pp. 194-197; Koch-Preuss, Moral Theology, 
vol. I, pp. 218-235; J. P. Gury, S.J., Compend. Theol. Moralis, 
§§ 51-80; Cath. Encyc. and Schaff-Herzog Encyc., q.vv. There are 
six theories: (i) Rigorism, that the safest course should always be 
followed, even when the less safe is more probable. This would 
often result in a negation of action, and it was condemned by Alex- 
ander VIII, Prop. dam. 3, Dec. 7, 1690. (di) Tutiorism, that the 
safe side must be taken unless the preponderance of probabilities 
for liberty is very great. (ci7) Probabiliorism, which does not require 
more than a perceptible preponderance of evidence for liberty. (zz) 
Equi-probabilism, that we are at liberty when the balance of argu- 
ments is equal; the view of St. Alphonsus Liguori, whose writings 


have had great influence. (v) Probabilism, which concedes liberty 
if there are solid reasons for it, even though the reasons against 


CHRISTIAN ETHICS AS 


development was Bartholomew a Medina (d. 1581). 
Starting with the thought that a doubtful law cannot 
impose indisputable obligations, the question arises 
between the safer and the more rigid course and the 
apparently less safe but probably permissible one. — 
The various systems of probabilism are distinguished 
by their attitude towards this issue. The rigorist 
school makes the safer course obligatory. At the 
other extreme was laxism, which maintained the per- 
missibility of any course that had any probability in 
its favour. The ultimate form which probabilism 
took in Roman moral science makes a freer or less safe 
course permissible, if it is based on “‘solid”’ probabil- 
ities and upon due enquiry. The less safe course may 
never be resorted to by a conscience which is sub- 
jectively certain that the safer course ought to be 
pursued, nor is a doubting conscience free to choose 
the less safe course until enquiry has been made as to 
whether “solid” probabilities make it permissible. 
In this form the system is crystallized in the more 
mature writings of St. Alphonsus Liguori. 

Current moral science of the Roman type differs 
from medizval literature in its adjustment to changed 
ecclesiastical and civil conditions. The independence 
which the state has gained in modern days, although 
not fully recognized by the Roman See, is to some 
it are stronger. This and the preceding are the theories generally 
followed. (vz) Laxism, which justifies liberty when any arguments 
can be advanced for it. It was condemned by Innocent XI, Prop. 


dam. 3, March 2, 1679. Laxism was ridiculed with terrible power 
by Pascal, Provincial Letters. 


46 INTRODUCTION AND HISTORY 


extent recognized in moral science. Modern socio- 
logical questions are also reckoned with, although 
under the handicap of a terminology which is not 
wholly intelligible to the modern mind. One rather 
important illustration of development is the treat- 
ment of usury, or receiving interest on money loans. 
Down to quite recent times surplus money was 
regarded in the light of a means for moral service, 
and it was considered wrong to charge for such service. 
The progress of the science of political economy has 
made it clear that money is also a commodity, and 
that to charge for its use is in line with rentals of real 
estate. Therefore usury is now sanctioned, or, 
rather, the word usury is applied only to excessive 
interest. 

Among the standard manuals of Roman moral 
theology are those by Gury, Lehmkuhl, Liguori, 
Thomas Slater, and Koch-Preuss, the two latter 
being written in English. 

§ io. The Protestant movement of the sixteenth 
century, ethically considered,’ was a revolt against: 
(a) excessive ecclesiastical control; (6) the whole 
scheme of wage-merit and works of supererogation; 
(c) mechanically conceived purgatorial penalties, 
and indulgences therefrom. ‘The emphasis was laid 
upon: (a) private judgment; (6) justification by 
faith independently of good works; (c) human deprav- 
ity and arbitrary predestination. The consequences 


1See P. V. N. Myers, op. cit., ch. xvii; T. C. Hall, op. cit., ch. viii; 
Thos. B. Strong, Christian Ethics, Lec. vii. 


MODERN ETHICS 47 


of this revolt, or rather of its excessive thoroughness, 
were: (a) a loss of vital elements of the Christian 
covenant and a serious reduction of the divinely 
appointed machinery of grace; (6) ethics was grad- 
ually divorced from religion and reverted to a natural- 
istic form, somewhat akin to pagan ethics; and this © 
paved the way for modern utilitarianism. Among 
the particular developments should be mentioned: 
(a) the monastic life was barred out entirely; (6) 
legalism revived in what was at a later date called 
Puritanism, with its man-made precepts and repro- 
duction of Judaic requirements under Christian con- 
ditions. It represents partly a reaction from six- 
teenth century antinomianism and partly a protest 
against wickedness in high Anglican life; (c) Casuistry 
was at first retained on the basis of Scripture and pri- 
vate judgment in interpretation; but it soon gave 
way to the naturalistic point of view, which makes 
the unaided reason or common sense a sufficient 
guide in morality. 


III. Modern Ethics } 


§ x1. From Hobbes dates a revival of interest in 
ethical studies, stimulated in part by the reaction to 
his theories, which Deism strongly tended to keep 
alive. He was the founder of the modern non- 


1On modern Ethics, see H. Sidgwick, op. cit., ch. iv; Jas. Mar- 
tineau, Types of Ethical Theory; Schaff-Herzog Encyc., s.v. “ Ethics,” 
yan, 


48 INTRODUCTION AND HISTORY 


theological ethics and approximated the position of 
Epicurus.! 

Thomas Hobbes,? 1588-1679 A.D., maintained that 
man is by nature selfish and egoistic. The result is, 
that, to prevent moral clash, the state must regulate 
personal life, and the authority of the state must 
be absolute in the determination of right and wrong? 
This is a reversion to pagan political ethic. He was 
assailed on two lines: (a) in behalf of the absolute- 
ness of the principles of right and wrong, as intui- 
tively discerned, as against all wills, governments, etc., 
by the Cambridge Platonists, e.g., Ralph Cudworth # 


1Thos. Whittaker, The Theory of Abstract Ethics, pp. 40-54, 
regards him as the founder of abstract ethics. 

2R. A. P. Rogers, op. cit., pp. 126-143; T. C. Hall, of. cit., pp. 
445-447. 

3R. A. P. Rogers, of. cit., p. 136, ‘Thus the primitive egoism, with 
which Hobbes starts, ends in the opposite extreme of Political 
Absolutism;” that is, he shows the impossibility of maintaining the 
thesis with which he begins. W. Wundt, op. cit., vol. II, p. 56, 
_ “For Hobbes the natural moral law consists in a correct weighing 
of the beneficial or harmful consequences of an act. A breach of 
the law is therefore an error of the understanding merely; it can 
proceed only from false deduction, since nobody intentionally acts 
contrary to his own advantage. It is impossible that divine law, 
which is contained in the moral teachings of Holy Scripture, should 
have any other contents than that of natural law.” Hobbes says, 
On Human Nature, ch. vii, § 3, Even the goodness which we appre- 
hend in God Almighty is His goodness to us.” With the Leviathan, 
his chief ethical work (pub. 1651), we may compare Mandeville’s 
Fable of the Bees, and Rochefoucauld’s Maxims. R. B. Perry, 
Approach to Philosophy, p. 261, says his “‘unblushing materialism and 
egoism stimulated by opposition the whole development of English 
ethics.” 

4 Treatise concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality, published 
posthumously, 1731. 


MODERN ETHICS 49 


(1617-1688), Henry Moore, and Samuel Clarke 
(1675-1729); (0) in behalf of common good, regarded 
as secured by divine sanctions and laws, prior to 
human law, e.g., by Richard Cumberland (1632- 
1719). Hobbes was the precursor of modern utili- 
tarianism,! and emphasized the greatest benefit 
to all as the summum bonum. 

In the meantime René Descartes (1596-1650) had 
propounded, on the continent, the doctrine of innate 
ideas, or self-evident truths.2 This raised the ques- 
tion as to moral truth being of this nature. Male- 
branche and Leibnitz viewed moral truths as absolute. 
Spinoza? (1632-1677), the pantheist, reduced moral- 
ity to an inevitable play of love and hate, expressive 
of a universal law of substance. Rationally perceived 
law is sovereign and explains moral conduct. The 
will is an illusion. 

John Locke (1632-1704), rejected innate ideas, 
especially moral,* and founded modern empiricism. 

1 The title was first used by Jeremy Bentham. 

2See W. Wundt, op. cit., vol. II, pp. 87-92. Descartes made 
doubt a means for testing truth; laying aside all that could be 
doubted he fell back upon innate ideas. 

3R. A. P. Rogers, op. cit., pp. 143-146; W. Wundt, op. cit., vol. 
IT, pp. 92-97. 

¢ Essay concerning Human Understanding, ch. iii, § 6, ‘ Virtue is 
generally approved, not because innate, but because profitable.” 
Self-love is the ultimate motive for all moral acts. W. Wundt, 
op. cit., vol. II, p. 62, says his labours “‘ were less distinguished by the 
novelty of his ideas than by the circumspection of his judgment, and. 
his careful avoidance of such extreme views as might seem para-- 


doxical to healthy human reason. . . . He is especially anxious to 
steer clear of Hobbes’ radicalism,” Jbid., p. 65, ‘‘All judgments om 


50 INTRODUCTION AND HISTORY 


All knowledge is obtained through sensation and 
reflection, and it is thus that we arrive at the knowl- 
edge of moral law. This law is independent of 
pleasure, although supported by the Christian belief 
in happiness or misery hereafter. 

Joseph Butler 1 (1692-1752), the greatest writer of 
this age, vindicated the authority of conscience in 
judging what is right and what is wrong. He speaks 
of conscience as a “faculty,” but really makes it 
equivalent to the true self. 

David Hume? (1711-1776) formulated the skep- 
ticism that was involved in the philosophies of Des- 
cartes, Locke, and Berkeley, and reduced the mind 
to a mere stream of impressions possessing no real 
unity. All our knowledge is derived from experi- 
ence, we have no knowledge of law, whether moral or 
other, and the will is an illusion. For practical pur- 
poses he was, however, a utilitarian? 

§ 12. After Hume four issues came to the front: 
moral values are the results of rational insight and intellectual 
deliberation.” But this intellectualism is distinguished from that 
of earlier schools by the increased weight he gives to empiricism. 
See also T. C. Hall, op. cit., pp. 447-450. 

1R. A. P. Rogers, op. cit., pp. 163-176. See his Sermons on Human 
Nature. 

2R. A. P. Rogers, of. cit., pp. 177-190; W. Wundt, of. cit., vol. II, 
pp. 74-79; T. C. Hall, op. cit., pp. 460-465. His chief ethical work, 
the Treatise on Human Nature, was published in 17309. 

3H. Rashdall, Conscience and Christ, p. 28, “Utility, according to 
Hume, is the true criterion of morality just so far as utility actually 
pleases. But real utility does not always please. The public does 
not always know its own interests; and what is useful to one circle 
#8 pernicious to others.” 


MODERN ETHICS SI 


(a) between the intuitional and the empirical view of 
the knowledge of moral distinctions; (6) between 
belief in the absoluteness of moral distinctions and 
the utilitarian interpretation of morality; (c) between 
the acceptance of freedom as a fact and its denial 
by necessitarianism; (d) between intellectualism and 
sensationalism or estheticism. 

Thomas Reid (1710-1796) fought for the superiority 
of innate knowledge over empirical, and the self- 
evident and intuitive nature of fundamental and 
moral ideas. He was followed in the same line by 
Dugald Stewart and Victor Cousin. A long series 
of later writers have also taken the intuitionalist point 
of view, including Henry Calderwood.! 

Immanuel Kant, 1724-1804 A.D., reduced knowl- 
edge to impressionism, in which forms and categories 
and transcendental ideas are postulated, but not 
themselves known. Modern empiricism owes much 
to him. As a counter-poise to his skepticism con- 
cerning knowledge, he set forth the “categorical 
imperative,” or rule of duty, and the necessity of 
living in accordance with its requirements. He sum- 
marized all duty in the proposition, ‘‘ Act on a maxim 
which thou canst will to be a universal law.’”? His 


1His Handbook of Moral Philosophy. Pt. I. His contention 
that conscience can not be educated is characteristic of his position. 
Cf. H. Sidgwick, of. cit., pp. 224 ff. 

2R. A. P. Rogers, op. cit., pp. 191-210; W. Wundt, of. ci#t., vol. I, 
pp. 106-119; T. Whittaker, op. cit., pp. 56-65; F. Ueberweg, Hzst. 
of Phtlos., §123. For a criticism of his theory of the ‘Good Will,” 
see Dewey and Tufts, op. cit., pp. 240-246. 

*The moral quality of an action is wholly dependent upon its 


52 INTRODUCTION AND HISTORY 


moral position agrees with Butler’s assertion of the 
authority of conscience; but he may be criticized 
as undermining the intellectual validity of moral 
judgments, as making morality too much a matter of 
law, and as leaving too little place for the emo- 
tions. 

Meanwhile, the intuitionalists contended for the 
absoluteness of moral truth, while the empiricists 
became avowedly utilitarian, making moral distinc- 
tions either equivalent to, or at least wholly deter- 
mined by, happiness. Happiness was further de- 
fined as permanent and of the greatest number. 

William Paley (1743-1805) made benevolence the 
characteristic principle of morality and the mark of 
divine government, which provides everlasting hap- 
piness as the reward and motive for righteousness. 

Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832)1 said that the 
greatest happiness of the greatest number deter- 
mined the moral quality of actions. 
being done in fulfilment of what is conceived as duty, the ideal man 
morally is one whose acts are entirely independent of inclination or 
desire. For a criticism of this view, see quotation from H. Rash- 
dall, p. 19, note, above. 

1R, A. P. Rogers, op. cit., pp. 235-237; W. Wundt, op. cit., vol. 
II, pp. 142-146. The securing of pleasure and avoiding of pain 
“point out what we ought to do, as well as determine what we shall 
do.” The personal value of pleasure depends upon: (a) its intensity; 
(6) its duration; (c) its certainty; (d) its propinquity; (e) its fecund- 
ity, ie., its ability to beget other pleasures; (f) its purity, ie., its 
freedom from accompanying pain; and (g) its value for the com- 
munity depends upon its extent, i.e., upon the number of persons 


who may share it. It may be described as an algebraic system, 
pleasure standing for positive quantities, pain for negative. 


MODERN ETHICS 53 


John Stuart Mill (1806-1873)! was utilitarian, 
while maintaining that the love for virtues as such, 
without reference to utility, is to be cultivated. This 
is because utility is thus promoted. Universal benev- 
olence, with discrimination between higher and lower 
forms of happiness, should determine conduct. 

The publication of the Origin of Species by Charles 
Darwin (1809-1882) in 1859 originated a line of 
thought which has had profound effect upon recent 
ethical theories. ‘The moral sense came to be regarded 
as a product as well as a factor in the evolution of 
the species; its foundations were treated as biological 
and social, and utilitarianism was modified by the 
thought that the happiness of the species is to be 
sought because it makes for the preservation and 
development of the species. Theologians criticize 
Darwin for interpreting nature as cruel, and for giving 
to brute power to survive the higher place; but it 
must be acknowledged that Darwin did not regard 
the process of survival by the extinction of the weak 
as a moral process. Evolutionary thought also 
raised the question as to whether moral judgments 
have any larger validity than that of passing phases 
of evolution. 

In the hands of naturalistic thinkers evolutionary 


1R. A. P. Rogers, op. cit., pp. 237-240; W. Wundt, op. cit., vol. 
II, pp. 151-153. 

2Herbert Spencer (1820-1903) especially. His fundamental 
ethical principles are found in the Data of Ethics and in Justice. 
See R. A. P. Rogers, op. cit., pp. 261-279. Evolutionary ethics sees 
bad only as good in the making, and reacts against personal respon- 


54 INTRODUCTION AND HISTORY 


ethics have become “‘scientific,” by which is meant 
that all our ethical undertakings should be guided 
by the law of evolution. The propagation of the 
species, e.g., should be regulated by eugenics so as to 
produce offspring fit to survive. There is a ten- 
dency also to deprecate hospitals and all forms of 
philanthropy calculated to preserve the unfit. The 
Christian reply is that moral distinctions are what 
they are, and possess absolute validity, independently 


sibility and moral effort. As Aubrey L. Moore says, Lux Mundi, 
p. 47, ‘‘Moral evil is ‘sin’ only to those who believe in God.” Bp. 
D’Arcy, A Short Study of Ethics, Pt. ILI, ch. iv, has a good criticism. 
Ibid., p. xxvi, ‘Consciousness and will erect an eternal barrier against 
the attempt to explain the spiritual activities of man by the processes 
of nature.” See also Dewey and Tufts, op. cit., pp. 371-375; W. 
Wundt, op. cit., vol. IL. pp. 153-159; R.A. P. Rogers, op. cit., Pt. IL. 
ch, viii. Ernst Haeckel, Riddle of the Universe, ch. xix, sets forth 
the theory in terms of crassest materialism; also H. A. Taine, who 
says, in History of English Literature, Introd., ‘Whether facts be 
moral or physical, it makes no matter. They always have their 
causes. There are causes for ambition, courage, veracity, just as 
there are for digestion, muscular movement, animal heat. Vice and 
virtue are products like vitriol and sugar.” We acknowledge that 
there is no uncaused action, but we still allow for freedom of choice. 
The method of evolutionary ethics is to explain the present condi- 
tion by tracing the past history and stages of development. This 
is shown especially in E. Westermarck, of. cit.; and in W. R. Sorley, 
Ethics of Naturalism. One result is to evolve conscience out of 
existence, and to lead us on to Nietzsche’s “superman,” who becomes 
“‘super,” in part, because he has no conscience and is swayed only by 
the ‘will to power.” See the very able refutation of Nietzschean 
ethics and philosophy by J. N. Figgis, The Will to Freedom. Fora 
full historical account and defence of evolutionary Ethics, see C. M. 
Williams, Review of the Systems of Ethics Founded on the Theory I 
Evolution. 


MODERN ETHICS 55 


of the manner in which the human capacity to per- 
ceive them originated. If this capacity is of evolu- 
tionary origin it is not less trustworthy on that ac- 
count, nor are the judgments of conscience reduced 
in authority by the nature of the origin of the con- 
science. 

What is called ‘‘Transcendental Ethics”’ was first 
evolved by G. W. F. Hegel (1770-1831),! to whom 
thought was the fundamental reality. This actu- 
alizes itself in society, regarded as the sphere of per- 
sonal self-realization. 

Thomas Hill Green (1836-1882) ? translated this 
into terms of English thought. He said man’s chief 
end is to be a person, i.e., to realize himself in a society 
of persons. The Christian idea is to grow like God, 
who is the only complete person. Green touched 
on important matter but he did not complete it. 
The chief end of man is to glorify God and enjoy Him. 

§ 13. Little attention has been paid in these out- 
lines to separate definitions of the ethical systems 
that have been developed. It will be convenient to 
classify them as objective and subjective? The 

1R. A. P. Rogers, op. cit., pp. 215-230; Wm. Wundt, op. cit., 
vol. II. pp. 124-127. It is impossible to give his ethical ideas apart 
from a study of his whole system of philosophy, which would require 
too much space. It may be criticized as too abstract to admit of 
general practical application. It also abounds in contradictions. 

2R. A. P. Rogers, op. cit., Pt. II. ch. ix. Green’s system is set 
forth in his Prolegomena to Ethics, which is of an extremely meta- 
physical character. 


3 J. H. Hyslop, Elements of Ethics, ch. viii, is followed in this sec- 
tion. W. E. H. Lecky, Hist. of European Morals, ch. i., divides 


56 INTRODUCTION AND HISTORY 


objective theories are further classified as ontological 
and nomological. The ontological ground morality 
in the nature of God, or of the universe, or of both. 
The nomological ground it in will, either: the divine 
will, as found in the law of God, or human law and 
convention. The subjective theories are either teleo- 
logical or gnosiological; the éeleological relate morality 
to the end sought, whether utilitarian, hedonistic, or 
properly moral. The gunosiological theories are non- 
teleological and regard moral qualities as unrelated 
to all else, whether they are perceived intuitively or 
learned by experience. : 

The true theory is ontological, in that it grounds 
morality in the divine nature; and teleological, in 
that it treats actions as moral with reference to their 
bearing on the attainment of divine fellowship. The 
will, both of God and of society, may furnish rules and 
standards of moral action, but may not be regarded 
as the ultimate source of moral quality and obligation. 
Right is right, of course, whether we discern its per- 
tinency to our chief end or not; but the reason for its 
being right is that it does so pertain. 

It is well at this point to define in terse terms the 
chief specific ethical theories. LEgoism makes the 
good of the agent the end of action; while Altruism 
substitutes the good of others. Iniuitionalism claims 
ethical theories into intuitive and utilitarian, the former treating the 
sense of duty and the fundamental moral ideas as independent of 
utilitarian considerations and intuitively certain, the latter deriving 


moral ideas inductively from experience and making the pursuit of 
happiness the determinative ideal. 


MODERN ETHICS 57 


that we can see clearly and immediately the contents 
of duty and their absolute nature. Hedonism makes 
pleasure the aim of conduct. Utilitarianism is 
hedonism universalized by making the aim the hap- 
piness or welfare of the greatest number or of society 
at large—the happiness referred to is earthly. Mod- 
ern practical idealism is utilitarian, as is also socialistic 
ethics. Evolutionary ethics in its several forms pre- 
supposes that moral distinctions and the moral sense 
are products of biological development, having their 
roots in pre-human stages of evolution! From the 


1In general Bishop D’Arcy says, op. cit., p. 229. ‘Though the 
various ethical theories may be described as rivals, the opposition is 
not so great as it appears. Each theory has contributed some valu- 
able element to the whole of ethical thought.” Dewey and Tufts, 
op. cit., p. 224, “A classification of types of theory is rendered diffi- 
cult, a thoroughly satisfactory classification almost impossible, by 
the fact that the problems arrange themselves about separate prin- 
ciples leading to cross divisions.” ‘This last work classifies them as 
(a) Teleological and Jural; (6) Individual and Institutional; (c) 
Empirical and Intuitional. Egoism and Altruism may be identified 
by holding that “the Zrue Good for every man is a Common Good 
and an Absolute Good,” Bishop D’Arcy, op. cit., p. 102. For “this 
cosmos will not be good for self if determined with reference to self 
only; for persons, though each as a person, that is, for himself, is 
separate and unique, must yet be members of a higher order, com- 
bined by the operation of some transcendent principle of unity. 
They are all one in God. What is good for one is good for all,” 
ibid., p. 104. Bishop D’Arcy develops this at length in Pt. I. 
ch. iili-v. See also Dewey and Tufts, op. cit., pp. 375-391. 

A good description of modern extreme Egoism is found in Geo. 
Meredith’s novel, The Egoist. Intuitionalism is excellently described 
by Bishop D’Arcy, of. cit., Pt. III. ch. i. He says, p. 230, “This 
theory claims conscience as a special faculty, whose office is to give 
judgment upon conduct. Conscience, it is said, is ultimate. It is 


58 INTRODUCTION AND HISTORY 


Christian standpoint the battle to-day lies between 
opposite notions of man’s chief end. Christianity 
makes eternal life with God the goal and organizing 


intuitive in its judgments. It is an essential part of human nature. 
It is therefore supreme. ‘There is no appeal to any higher court.” 
This is the position taken in Jas. Martineau, Types of Ethical Theory, 
and criticized by H. Sidgwick, Methods of Ethics, Bk. III, ch. xii. 

Hedonism is described by Bishop D’Arcy, op. cit., Pt. III. 
ch. ii. He says, p. 236, “The basis of Hedonism is the assump- 
tion that the object of desire is always pleasurable.” On p. 237, 
“In general, the mistake of Hedonism seems to be a confusion of self- 
satisfaction with pleasure. Self-satisfaction is the true end of all 
volition. Pleasure, as a rule, accompanies self-satisfaction; but it 
is not even an index to the value of any particular satisfaction. For 
some of the objects of desire which, when obtained, yield most pleasure 
are among the least satisfying.” 

“Utilitarianism, Bishop D’Arcy says, p. 243, “ is Hedonism grown 
democratic.” See the same work, Pt. III, ch. iii; R. A. P. Rogers, 
op. cit., Pt. I, ch. vii. H. Spencer’s criticism, that the ‘method of 
universalistic hedonism, or utilitarianism, is far more unsatisfactory 
than egoistic hedonism,” Data of Ethics, p. 133, seems to be war- 
ranted. Germany, e.g., would be justified in all that it did in the 
late war if it acted on the premise that its dominion was for the great- 
est good of the greatest number. That is, the end would justify the 
means. As W. E. H. Lecky says, op. cit., vol. I, p. 40, “Even if 
every virtuous act were incontestably useful, it by no means follows 
that its virtue is derived from its utility.” T. C. Hall, op. cit., p. 
596, “English utilitarianism has had a long and honorable history, 
but it has been mainly outside of or even in avowed indifference or 
antagonism to organized Christianity.” We may sum up the teach- 
ing of this important school by giving its fundamental doctrine “the 
greatest happiness of the greatest number,” the attainment of which 
supplies the ultimate ethical standard by which conduct is to be 
judged. Henry Sidgwick (1838-1900), attempted to form a com- 
bination of the Intuitional and Utilitarian positions. Idealism is 
best set forth in T. H. Green’s Prolegomena, and finds many adherents 
in the modern ethical world. 


MODERN ETHICS 59 


principle of conduct; while current secular idealism 
makes the earthly welfare of society determinative. 
The former stresses the other world, while the latter 
emphasizes the improvement of this world. To 
the Christian supernatural religion is of central impor- 
tance, but to the modernist religion is an adjunct 
only of idealistic aims in this present world-society.! 


1See F. J. Hall, “This Miserable and Naughty World,” in Anglican 
Theol. Rev., Oct., 1920. 


CHAPTER III 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY OR SYSTEMATIC ETHICS 


§ 1. Moral Philosophy deals with the theory or 
rationale of duty and virtue.! It is here treated under 
the heads of the Agent, the End, and the Act. 

We must state at the outset certain specific assump- 
tions upon which our treatment rests, assumptions 
which do not belong to Moral Science as such, but 
do affect its treatment. 

(a) “The chief end of man is to glorify God and 
enjoy Him forever.’ 

(6) To fulfil this end requires the light and prac- 
tice of true religion.? Religion, concretely speaking, 
is the working system by which men are brought into 


1 Dewey and Tufts, op. cit., ch. xvi. A very brief summary of 
Moral Philosophy is given by F. J. Hall, Creation and Man, pp. 
226-248. Among the best manuals are, Jos. Rickaby, Moral Phi- 
losophy; H. Calderwood, Handbook of Moral Philosophy; J. S. 
Mackenzie, Manual of Ethics; N. K. Davis, Elements of Ethics; 
N. Porter, Elements of Moral Science. For larger lists, see J. M. 
Baldwin, Dic. of Philosophy, vol. III, pp. 812-912; Schaff-Herzog 
Encyc., s.v. Ethics.” 

2 Westminster Catechism. See F. J. Hall, op. cit., pp. 243-245. 

3F, J. Hall, op. cit., pp. 229-232; M. MacColl, Christianity in 
Rel. to Science and Morals, pp. 292-303. 

60 


ASSUMPTIONS 6r 


relation with God, and true religion is nowhere fully 
exhibited except in the Catholic Church.! 

(c) Holy Scripture, viewed as recording a pro- 
gressive revelation, and interpreted by the Catholic 
Faith, affords true and determinative knowledge of 
the will of God and of human duty.? 

(d) Men are born in a state of moral insufficiency 
and corruptibility, with more or less blinded con- 
sciences, perverted affections, and weakened wills; so 
that, apart from supernatural revelation and grace, 
they are naturally prone to sin and vice. 

(e) The death of Christ is the basis of remedy 
for this evil; and the means of recovery and per- 
fection are committed by God to the stewardship of 
the Catholic Church. The entire removal of the 
taint of evil is not achieved, however, until aiter 
death.* 

(f) This life is probationary. Men are respon- 
sible agents. An everlasting future is to come after 
death, determined as to its nature by the judgment 
of God upon the moral value and tendency of our 
lives in this world? 


1 F, J. Hall, op. cit., pp. 213-226. Cf. H. P. Liddon, Some Elem. of 
Religion, Lec. i. 

2N. Porter, op. cit., §§ 140-144; J. B. Mozley, Ruling Ideas in 
Early Ages, passim; F. J. Hall, Theol. Outl., vol. I, Q. xvii, §§ 3-4. 

3 F. J. Hall, Creation and Man, ch. ix, esp. pp. 285-289; H. Calder- 
wood, op. cit., Pt. V; J. J. Elmendorf, Moral Theology, I, vi.1o. 

4F, J. Hall, op. cit., ch. x, §§ 1, 6-7; and Passion and Exalt. of 
Christ, pp. 103-109. 

SF, J. Hall, Eschatology, ch. ii, §§ 4-6, 8. 


62 MORAL PHILOSOPHY, SYSTEMATIC ETHICS 


(¢) Men will hereafter be judged not only accord- 
ing to the knowledge which they have actually 
acquired, but also according to their disposition to 
obtain knowledge of the divine will. It isa part of 
human righteousness to learn, so far as opportunities 
permit, wherein righteousness of life and heavenly 
virtues consist. 


I. The Agent 


§ 2. Men are called moral agents because they pos- 
sess rational freedom and can distinguish and choose 
between right and wrong action, having a sense of 
responsibility for their choice.2 As moral agents 
they possess what are called moral faculties, and these 
correspond to the psychical faculties of intellect, feel- 
ing, and will. The moral faculties are neither inde- 
pendent nor separable; but are specific functions and 
operations of the above-named psychical faculties. 
Moreover, we may not divide the psychical faculties 
from each other, for each faculty is conditioned in its 
exercise by the action of the others; neither pure intel- 
lect, nor pure emotion, nor pure will have ever been 
experienced.2 The moral faculties of the intellect 
are the ordinary intellectual faculties, which are 
called moral in so far as they are given moral direc- 
tion and are subject to moral conditions; any good 

1F, J. Hall, Eschatology, ch. vi, §§ 6-8. 


2H. Calderwood, op. c##., Pt. I, div. I, ch. i, §§ 8-9. 
3F, J. Hall, Creation and Man, pp. 190-194. 


THE AGENT 63 


treatise of psychology is, therefore, a serviceable 
introduction to their study. 

For the purpose of moral science these faculties 
may be conveniently divided into the theoretical and 
the practical. The theoretical faculty, called syn- 
deresis by scholastic writers,| has to do with the 
speculative and scientific appropriation and consid- 
eration of moral truths and principles. It calls into 
play external perception, intuition, memory, imagina- 
tion, generalization, and discursive thought gen- 
erally. Its exercise furnishes the mind with axioms,” 
facts, and generalizations which make possible 
and guide moral judgment. ‘The moral judgment, as 
its name indicates, is the practical faculty by which 
we apply moral principles to determine the moral 
quality of immediate lines of action and of habits. 
The conscience is this faculty of moral judgment as 
exercised with reference to one’s own actions and 
habits. By it the individual determines whether his 
actions are right or wrong.? ‘The rational faculties do 


_ 1 The scholastic writers define it ‘‘as a habit:by which the soul per- 
ceives the general principles of right conduct,” Koch-Preuss, of. cit., 
vol. I, p. 188. See Jos. Rickaby, op. cit., pp. 137-138; J. J. Elmen- 
dorf, op. cit., p. 499. J. M. Baldwin, op. cit., s.v. “Conscience,” 
gives the full history of the meaning of the two terms and the change 
of the meaning of conscience. 

2H. Calderwood, of. cit., I. I. iii, shows that the fundamental 
intuitions of morality cannot rationally be contradicted, nor can 
they be proved. They do not result from induction. Cf. ch. iv, 
as criticized below. 

3 Of the immense literature on the subject we mention only cer- 
tain works which are representative of different points of view. 


64 MORAL PHILOSOPHY, SYSTEMATIC ETHICS 


not become either more or less trustworthy merely by 
being exercised in a moral direction. It may there- - 


See in general H. Calderwood, op. cit., I, I, ii, §§ 9-12; I, I, iv; J. J. 
Elmendorf, op. cit., p. 499; J. P. Gury, op. cit., Pt. I, § 36; Bishop 
Butler, Sermons on Human Nature, serm. ii; J. Locke, Essays on the 
Understanding, Bk. I, ch. iii, § 8; R. H. Lotze, Practical Philosophy, 
§ 3; Jeremy Taylor, Ductor Dubitantium, Bk. I, ch. i; Robert San- 
derson, Lectures on Conscience and on Human Law; H. Rashdall, 
Is Conscience an Emotion?; G. L. Richardson, Conscience, Its Origin 
and Authority. We refer to these authors below by name only. 

It may be helpful, first, to see some typical definitions. St. John 
Damasc., de Fide Orthod., IV, 22, says conscience is the law of the 
mind, which defines it objectively. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa 
Theol., I, lxxix, 13, says conscience is an act; Bp. Sanderson, p. 14, 
says it is neither an act, nor a form, nor a power; but a habit, partly 
innate and partly acquired. He defines conscience as “‘a Faculty or 
Habit of the Practical Understanding, which enables the Mind of 
Man, by the use of Reason and Argument, to apply the light which it 
has to particular Moral Actions.”’ According to the Aristotelean 
division of the mental faculties,—(a) Cognitive Intellect, speculative 
and practical; (6) Appetitive, or Will—conscience belongs to the 
practical cognitive. So Kant, Intro. to the Metaphysical Elements of 
Ethics, § XII (B), says, “Conscience is man’s practical reason, which 
holds before him his law of duty in every case so as either to acquit or 
condemn him.” Bp. Butler, Sermon i, it is “the principle in man, by 
which he approves or disapproves his heart, temper, and actions.” 
J. Martineau, op. cit., it is “the critical perception we have of the 
relative authority of our several principles of action.”” N. K. Davis, 
op. cit., p. 77, “Conscience is pure reason discerning morallaw. This 
faculty has the moral law for its exclusive object, and its exercise is 
the primary, original antecedent condition of any moral activity 
whatever, without which liberty has no moral restraint, and volition 
no moral character.” H. Calderwood, I, I. iv. § i, “Conscience is 
that power of mind by which moral law is discovered to each individ- 
ual for the guidance of his conduct.”’ All these trace ultimately to 
Aristotle, and are well summarized by Origen, In Ep. ad Rom., lib. 
II, ch. ii, who says it is affectum corrector, aique anima pedagogus. 


THE AGENT 65 


fore be said that the synderesis and moral judgment or 
conscience ought to be educated and rightly informed 


As distinguished from other knowledge, Hugo of St. Victor well says, 
Inst. Monast., III, xi, Conscientia est cordis scientia; also, Cor noscit 
se et alia. Quando autem se noscit appellatur conscientia, quando 
preter se alia noscit appellatur scientia, Jeremy Taylor relates it 
to God and gives it a wider basis in human nature; he says, ‘God 
rules in us by His substitute our conscience.”’ As all are related to 
God none can be wholly without a conscience, through it God wit- 
nesses to Himself, it is a perpetual pulse; passively conceived it is a 
witness, actively it is a guide in all moral acts, words, thoughts. 

As to the mental faculties involved, he says, “‘although conscience 
be primarily founded in the understanding, as it is the law-giver and 
dictator, . . . yet it is also memory, when it accuses or excuses, 
when it makes joyful and sorrowful; and there is in it some mixture 
of will; . . . so that conscience is a result of all, of understanding, 
will, and memory.” To the same effect Koch-Preuss, op. cit., vol. I, 
p. 192, ‘‘We may roughly define conscience as a habit or capacity of 
the three faculties of the soul—intellect, will, and feeling,—by which 
man is bound to the moral order of the universe, i.e., the will of God; 
or, in other words, the capacity of applying objective laws to sub- 
jective conduct or of regulating man’s actions in accordance with the 
law.” 

Most modern definitions may be criticized as being too one-sided; 
thus Bp. D’Arcy, op. cit., “‘ Conscience is simply the consciousness of 
obligation,” which places it too much upon a basis of feeling. On the 
other hand, H. Sidgwick, “Conscience is essentially Intellect or 
Reason applied to Practice,”’ errs in identifying it too thoroughly 
with the rational faculty. G.L. Richardson attempts to include both 
sides, “Conscience is the whole personality acting ethically,” p. 69; 
and from a different, practically Christian rather than philosophical, 
standpoint, “Conscience is not sentiment, but a healthy abhorrence 
of sin,” p. 200. H. Rashdall argues against Edw. Westermarck and 
Wm. McDougall (in An Iniro. to Social Psychology) that conscience 
is not an emotion but a rational faculty, for if it is merely an emotion 
ft can have no more objective value than a liking or disliking for 
mustard. Emotions fluctuate. It is by no means certain that I 


66 MORAL PHILOSOPHY, SYSTEMATIC ETHICS 


for their best exercise. The necessary and universal 
intuitions and axioms of the spiritual reason, indeed, 


will react emotionally to-morrow as I do to-day. Westermarck’s 
thesis, op. cit., vol. IT, p. 738, is that “‘the moral concepts which form 
the predicate of moral judgment are ultimately based on moral 
emotions,—they are essentially generalizations of tendencies in cer- 
tain phenomena to call forth either indignation or approval.” The 
hollow unreality of his whole scheme is shown by his treatment of 
the Parable of the Good Samaritan, vol. I, p. 111; and his thesis 
seems to be defeated by such statements as the following, “ Moral 
ideas are expressed in moral judgments,” vol. I, p. 158, for one does 
not ordinarily think of judgments as being founded upon the emotions, 
certainly not in a well-regulated mind. 

As to the origin of conscience there are two opposed schools, one 
regarding it as due to intuition (Calderwood), the other to evolution 
(Spencer). Christianity is committed to neither position, but may 
be said to furnish a synthesis of the two. ‘The fault of the first posi- 
tion is that it denies the ability of conscience to be educated. ‘‘That 
conscience intuitively recognizes moral law, that it is supreme in its 
authority, and that it cannot be educated, are three propositions 
which hang or fall together,’”’ H. Calderwood, p. 71. The argu- 
ments which he uses do not hold good, for both the eye and the ear 
may be, and are, educated. His view is considerably modified in 
the chapter on Moral Sentiments. In opposition we may set the 
statement of Jeremy Taylor ‘Conscience is only a good guide when 
we are truly informed,” in which we should mark the adjective 
“good,” for, as we have seen, conscience must in any case be our 
guide. The error of the evolutionary school is more serious, for it 
tends to leave God out of consideration and to regard conscience 
merely as a natural product. 

Finally, as to the authority of conscience, this is supreme. ‘Had 
it strength as it has right, had it power as it has manifest authority, 
it would absolutely govern the world,” Bp. Butler. In moral decis- 
ions the fundamental standards of judgment are invariable, e.g., 
truthfulness and honesty. They are not like the standards of zsthet- 
ics, or even of measurements, which may vary. H. Calderwood, 
Pp. 53, ‘Truths which are ultimate, . . . are universal not particular; 


THE AGENT 67 


cannot be rationally rejected, for they constitute the 
basis of all moral conclusions and, for that reason, 
are beyond either proof or disproof. But moral 
science can be more soundly developed and the judg- 
ments of the conscience can be changed by education, 
fuller knowledge, and more deliberate reflection. Yet 
no appeal may be taken from the conscience, for its 
judgment signifies our existing knowledge or convic- 
tion as to right and wrong. To disregard this is 
culpable. The practical authority of the conscience 


necessary not adventitious; self-evidencing not demonstrable; un- 
questionable (indubitable and indisputable), incapable of contra- 
diction, whether in thought or practice.” G. L. Richardson, p. 96, 
“As we are bound to trust reason in the intellectual sphere, so we 
are bound to trust conscience in the moral sphere. To deny the 
authority of the one or the other is to distrust the Power in whom 
physical and moral law have their source. The authority of con- 
science is thus paramount for the individual; it will be better for me 
to do what is objectively wrong, but what I conscientiously believe 
to be right, than to do what is in fact right, but what my conscience 
disapproves. And the reason is that to distrust and to disobey 
conscience is an act of disloyalty to my personality; it is a kind of 
moral suicide. Conscience will work itself clear of error in propor- 
tion as it is used and trusted, just as intellectual truth is attained 
by the exhaustion of error.” P. 97, ‘‘The essential thing is not the 
verdict, but the motive which underlies it; and the motive must 
be that we shall allow the Divine Purpose to move freely through 
the human personality.” 

As to the relation to other authority, T. Slater, $.J., A Manual 
of Moral Theology, vol. I, p. 57, says: “The voice of the conscience 
is the authoritative guide of man’s moral conduct. Not that the 
individual conscience is independent of all authority; if the individual 
conscience is right, it proclaims the duty of submitting to all properly 
constituted authority, and especially to the supreme and absolute 
authority of God.” 


68 MORAL PHILOSOPHY, SYSTEMATIC ETHICS 


is self-evident and impregnable. Sin has, indeed, 
clouded the human mind, and made its moral judg- 
ments less accurate and trustworthy. But, even in 
error, one is morally bound to do what he thinks right 
and to avoid what he thinks wrong, although previous 
neglect of light may make the error itself blameworthy. 

§ 3. Some of the more important emotions of the 
moral nature are: (a) pleasure and pain; (bd) desire 
and aversion; (c) love and hate; (d) hope and fear. 
Pleasure and pain are impelling and deterring feel- 
ings which attend, or result from, action or experi- 
ence, whether internal or external, mental, emotional, 
volitional, or physical. Desire and aversion have 
some thing or event for their object, the former seek- 
ing, the latter avoiding, it. Love and hate have 
persons for their object. Love impels to union with, 
and, therefore, also to self-sacrificing service in behalf 
of, persons. Love towards God is the basis and 
regulative principle of righteous love towards man. 
Hate is the opposite of love.' Hope and fear are con- 
cerned with future and contingent events or results 
supposed to be possible. Hope is based on desire 
that the possibility may be realized. Fear is anxiety 
growing out of belief that what is hoped for is uncer- 
tain, or that what is undesired is probable. Despair 
is the entire absence of hope, due to the belief that 
what is desired has become impossible, or that what 
is not desired is inevitable. Sin has caused the 


1F. J. Hall, Eschatology, pp. 250-253; H. Calderwood, op. cit., 
p. 155. 


THE AGENT 69 


wounds of concupiscence and malice. By reason of 
concupiscence the feelings of pleasure, desire, love, 
and hope are directed upon or controlled by inferior 
objects and ends, while malice causes a misdirection 
of pain, aversion, fear, and hate. 

The activities of the intellectual and emotional 
faculties afford the motives by which the will is influ- 
enced, but with a difference. Intellectual motives 
are either directive or prohibitive, while emotional 
motives either impel or restrain. But the intellect 
and the feelings are inseparable. The emotions help 
or hinder the mind in arriving at truth, and to a real 
extent determine the judgments of conscience. The 
mind, on the other hand, affords the objects which 
call forth the emotions. 

§ 4. The will! is the power of choice, and must be 
distinguished from the power of executing choice. 
The acts which are caused or determined by the will 
are called voluntary. Many human acts are either 


1A, Alexander, op. cii., ch. v; Wm. James, Psychology, Briefer 
Course, ch. xxvi; R. Hooker, Eccles. Polity, ‘‘Appetite is the will’s 
solicitor, and the will is appetite’s controller; what we covet accord- 
ing to the one, by the other we often reject.”” A. L. Moore, Essays 
Scientif. and Philos., p. 134, “‘ Will is a power of control over the other 
faculties and capacities of our nature, by means of which we are 
enabled to determine personal activity.’ Bishop D’Arcy, op. cit., 
p. 177, ‘ What is of the utmost ethical importance is the cultivation 
of a virtuous will, that is, a will habituated to subordinate desire of 
every kind to the true good whatever it may be.” See further 
sbid., Pt. I, ch. iii; H. Calderwood, of. cii., Pt. III; J. J. Elmendorf, 
op. cit., I, ii; N. Porter, op. cit., ch. iv; J. P. Gury, op. cit., Pt. I, 
§§ 4 ff. 


%o MORAL PHILOSOPHY, SYSTEMATIC ETHICS 


involuntary or non-voluntary. These may often, 
however, be controlled, modified, or ended by the 
will! If actions were never really determined by 
the will, there could be no moral responsibility for 
them. ‘The will is the pivot of all moral conduct.? 
The will, as will, is necessarily free.? Voluntias, 
will, and voluntary have the same root. ‘The willis a 
true cause. So far, indeed, as the origination of its 
activity is concerned—the choosing of something— 
it is subject to causation; that is, as a rational being 
man must have a motive which moves him to act or 
to refrain from action. But so far as the direction 
of its choice is concerned—its choosing between 
alternatives—it is itself a cause, and free, within 
certain limits imposed on human freedom. In 
other relations than that of choice between courses of 
action the effects of choice are, of course, subject to 


1H. Calderwood, op. cit., III, ii; N. Porter, op. cit., p. 110. 

2.N. Porter, op. cit., §§ 70-72. 

8J. P. Gury, op. cit., §§ 11 ff. Cf. Ecclus. xxxi.10. Kant, Intro. 
to the Metaphysical Elements of Ethics, init., “Nothing can possibly 
be conceived in the world, or even out of it, which can be called good 
without qualification except a good will. ... A good will is good 
not because of what it performs or accomplishes, not by its aptness 
for the attainment of some proposed end, but simply in virtue of 
its volition, that is, it is good in itself. . . . Even if it should happen 
that, owing to special disfavour of fortune or the niggardly provision 
of a step-motherly nature, this will should wholly lack power to 
accomplish its purpose, . . . it would still shine like a jewel by its 
own light, as something which has its whole value in itself.” On 
the conflict between free will and determinism, see C. Harris, op. cit., 
ch. xiii. 

4N. K. Davis, op. cit., pp. 13-14. 


THE AGENT nt 


laws of causation which lie beyond the sphere of the 
human will! The freedom of the human will, and 
of every creaturely will, is circumscribed, because it is 
finite and part of a higher will-scheme. Its limita- 
tions include: (a) occasions and motives, for we can- 
not simply choose to choose apart from motive or 
interest;? (6) power of execution, for what is known 
or thought to be impossible or unpreventable is not a 
matter of choice;? (c) external environment and per- 
sonal influence, whether of men or of unseen spirits;* 
(d) heredity; (e) divine determination, and grace, 
although grace is not irresistible;> (f) character and 
habits,® which within their sphere tend to become 
more and more difficult to alter;’ (g) bodily condi- 
tions, e.g., need of food and sleep, sexual cravings, 


1W. G. Ward, Essays on the Philos. of Theism, distinguishes be- 
tween spontaneous impulse and the effort often made to resist such 
impulse. The fact that we can thus resist, and choose action which 
is contrary to spontaneous impulse, affords clear proof that the will 
is free and not merely the register of antecedent causes and motives. 

2N. Porter, op. cit., parag. 28, §§ 2, 4; H. Calderwood, of. cit., 
Ill, ii, 3; J. Caird, Fundamental Ideas of Christianity, vol. II, pp. 
53-56. 

3J. J. Elmendorf, op. cit., I, ii, 36; R. Hooker, op. cit., I, vii, 5. 
Compulsion may leave the will unaffected, but relieves of responsibil- 
ity for the act, when not consented to. 

4N. Porter, op. cit., ch. xiv. On angels and their influence, see 
F. J. Hall, Creation and Man, ch. v. 

5 F, J. Hall, op. cit., ch. i; H. Calderwood, op. cit., Metaphysic of 
Ethics, ch. v, div., II; J. J. Elmendorf, of. cit., pp. 18, 20; St. Thomas, 
I. xxiii. 3 ad tert. 

6 Habits are either infused by grace or acquired; and may be good 
or evil. See Koch-Preuss, op. cit., vol. I, pp. 275-284. 

TN. Porter, op. cit., parag. 34, and ch. vi. 


gz MORAL PHILOSOPHY, SYSTEMATIC ETHICS 


disease. These limitations circumscribe or influence 
the will more or less, but do not determine it abso- 
lutely or nullify it.! 

One is responsible only when free and within the 
divinely ordered sphere of freedom. But avoidable 
limitations, such as those imposed by habit and char- 
acter, or vincible ignorance, wittingly and freely 
incurred, do not exempt from accountability; which 
also somewhat depends in degree upon the amount of 
mental deliberation in choice. 

The will never acts apart from the mind and the 
feelings. Yet these should be carefully distinguished. 
The mind and the emotions are the sources of motives. 
Thus desire affords a motive of choice, but the will 
chooses,? sometimes against strong desires and 
impulses. The mind affords reasons for choice 
and the judgments of conscience have authority, 
but the will is free to choose contrary thereto. Yet 
there is no such thing as non-intelligent choice; and 
what is so described is really an instinctive act? 
Choice is an act of will in a given case. Purpose 
or intention is a state of will with reference either 
to future action or to an end designed to be subserved 
by such action.4 


1 Koch-Preuss, op. cit., vol. I, pp. 86-90, gives three chief individ- 
ual determinants of free will: age, temperament, talent; and, pp. 
91-97, three social determinants: sex, education, society. Lom- 
broso exaggerated the strength of this last factor and made it mechan- 
ically and absolutely determinative. 

2H. Calderwood, op. cit., ITI, i, 2. 

3 Ibid., III, ii, 6. 

*N. Porter, op. cit., §§ 33-34. 


THE AGENT rR 


The will is momentary or habitual. A habitual 
will is one which has become more or less disposed to 
similar choices between similar alternatives, so that it 
acts with slight deliberation, almost spontaneously.! 
Personal character is constituted by the habitual will. 

Liberty means personal success in the sphere of 
choice, or the power of self-control and of realizing 
one’s purpose in action. License means choice with- 
out reference to moral principles and ends. It is 
fatal to liberty because opposed to the will of God, 
which cannot really be thwarted. Experience shows 
also that license gradually subjects the will to the 
passions, thus narrowing its freedom.” 


Pot enos, Lo LL, iexvil) 75. 7.) Slater, op. /ct., Vol. Ly p20, 218 
the power of deliberation is wholly wanting, the act which follows 
cannot be sinful, however wrong objectively; if the act is semi- 
deliberate, however grievously wrong in itself, it will be imputed to 
the agent only as a more or less serious venial sin. These principles 
are of great importance for forming an estimate of the moral guilt of 
children, of habitual drunkards, of persons long habituated to sins 
of the flesh, and persons with weak intellect.” Jbid., vol. I, p. 36, 
Acts of this sort become sinful only ‘when consent is yielded to them 
after advertence to their malice.” They lack the consent of the 
will which is essential to make an act sinful. Such acts are said by 
theologians to proceed from antecedent concupiscence or mono- 
* mania, ib7d., vol. I, p.35. The agent, however, is bound to use every 
precaution, and the means of grace, to prevent their recurrence and 
especially to avoid occasions. Moreover the responsibility for 
falling into inveterate evil habits must be reckoned with and empha- 
sized. 

2See H. Calderwood, op. cit., III, iv, 1; H. P. Liddon, Unio. 
Sermons, 1st Series, iv, pp. 78-81; N. K. Davis, op. cit., p. 55. The 
thought is pre-Christian, Seneca said Parere Deo libertas est; but 
the dynamic is found only in the Christian dispensation. Koch- 


74 MORAL PHILOSOPHY, SYSTEMATIC ETHICS 


Sin has weakened and enslaved the human will. 
Divine grace operates to emancipate it, by impelling 
towards righteous ends and actions. But the bene- 
ficial efficacy of grace depends upon the will’s response, 
and the cure of sin is gradual; for grace does not take 
the place of practice in self-control or self-discipline, 
but assists us in such practice. The will’s response 
to, or use of, grace consists in this practice—practice 
in obeying higher motives, and in thwarting lower 
impulses and motives, even when these motives do 
not directly pertain to sinful ends or actions. The 
essence of self-discipline lies in this thwarting of 
impulses that are not in the given instances sinful? 


Preuss, op. cit., vol. I, p. 8, “true liberty, i.e., ‘the liberty of the chil- 
dren of God’ (sanctity, 2 Cor. iii. 17-18) is not the beginning but the 
end and object of morality and religion.” It is “victory over sin 
and passion, the result of a constant and patient codperation with 
grace.” As St. Anselm points out, if liberty meant the ability to 
sin or not to sin, neither God nor the angels would possess it. Koch- 
Preuss, op. cit., vol. I, p. 149, “Christian liberty means order in con- 
formity with the law of God, not license.” 

1See Koch-Preuss, op. cit., vol. I, pp. 102-112, the friends or foes 
of the will are the instincts, affections, passions. Affections belong 
to the rational appetite, passions to the sensual. ‘The will is respon- 
sible only as it consents and codperates wittingly. It is not respon- 
sible for their origin. ‘They are ours not to annihilate, as the Stoics ~ 
taught, but to control by the aid of grace and by the training of the 
understanding. The passions and affections are listed somewhat 
differently from the list here given: (a) love and hate; (6) joy and 
sorrow; (c) desire and repugnance; (d) hope and despair; (e) fear 
and daring. 

2H. Calderwood, op. cit., Pt. V, 9, points out that the laws of moral 
victory are those of (a) attention, selecting dispositions and motives 
with which to concern one’s self; (b) habit, directed to establishing 


THE AGENT 75 


§ 5. Man has a composite nature, and his moral 
faculties are conditioned and influenced in their 
operation by the bodily organism. The mind is 
determined in its operation by the condition of the 
brain and nervous system, which means practically 
by the condition of the whole body. An unhealthy 
physical condition tends to induce dulness of mind, 
and even to pervert the moral judgment. Unneces- 
sary carnal emotions and passions tend to debase the 
mind and will, and are frequently either caused or 
increased by bodily disorders. Even the healthy 
appetites and normal propensities of the body require 
discipline and self-control, if they are to be kept in 
line with moral interests. The will itself is often 
weakened and made inert by physical weakness, 
excessive weariness, and disease.} 

Bodily conditions are most apt to influence the 
moral faculties when they themselves have been 
caused by moral antecedents, because they then 
express, crystallize, and perpetuate such antecedents. 
Thus the physical results of intemperance and lust 
render these vices more difficult to remedy, and their 
evil effects may even be perpetuated in offspring. 
Physical heredity and other native physical condi- 
tions have effect upon the moral faculties, and tend 
to develop corresponding moral habits. For example, 


this concern. He adds that philosophy alone cannot solve the prob- 
lem of enabling the will to persevere along such lines. He refers to 
an essay on Moral Dynamic in Shairp’s Studies in Poetry and Phi- 
losophy, p. 348. 

1Cf. F. J. Hall, Creation and Man, pp. 190-194. 


76 MORAL PHILOSOPHY, SYSTEMATIC ETHICS 


men have what we call passionate natures, and are 
impelled to unregulated passions accordingly. Physi- 
cal environment also has moral influence by calling 
forth bodily responses which are either favourable or 
unfavourable to moral interests. Fortunately the 
mind has some power to combat and even to improve 
bodily conditions and their effects upon moral inter- 
ests, and this power is susceptible of enhancement by 
self-discipline.t No bodily conditions can change 
the material quality of the moral actions resulting 
from them; although they may reduce the formal 
guilt to the extent of the individual’s lack of respon- 
sibility for their presence. 

§ 6. Man’s moral history is marked by a series of 
dispensations or covenants established with him by 
God: (a) a primitive dispensation of innocence and 
grace, nullified by sin; (6) the patriarchal and 
Mosaic dispensations, in which, by reason of sin, 
men had to assume a propitiatory attitude towards 
God—one which in itself was symbolic, and ineffective 
for the remedy of sin,—and in which they were placed 
under revealed laws that could not secure obedience 
and thus made their sinful inclinations more manifest; 
(c) the Christian dispensation, grounded in the pro- 
pitiatory death of Christ,? and affording means of 
sanctifying grace, with the assistance of which grad- 


1 This is illustrated by the phenomena of mind healing, Christian 
Science, etc. The grace of Unction of the Sick assists the mind in 
exercising this power. See F. J. Hall, The Sacraments, pp. 320-324. 

22 Cor. v. 14 (R.V.). 


THE END 77 


ually the body can be brought under control, the 
conscience illuminated, the affections purified, and 
the will strengthened, for the fulfilment of man’s 
chief end through the attainment of everlasting life 
with God. This cannot be achieved, however, 
except through life-long discipline and a progress 
which continues after death.! 


II. The End 


§ 7. The end of every act, so far as it is rational 
and free, is some good, whether higher or lower, real 
or apparent.2_ By the good is meant the desirable. 
It is of three kinds: (a) the useful; (6) the pleasur- 
able; (c) the morally desirable. The last men- 
tioned constitutes the true end of moral conduct. 
The useful and the pleasurable often minister to the 
moral good, and then take on moral value;? but 
they are not moral goods either in themselves or under 
all circumstances. 

Utilitarianism,* which identifies moral good with 

1F, J. Hall, Creation and Man, pp. 220-223 and ch. x. 

2 J. J. Elmendorf, of. cit., I, ii, 3; St. Thomas, I, I, x, x. 

3N. Porter, op. cit., § 130. 

4 Treated historically and critically by H. Calderwood, op. cit., 
div. II, ii, ff. He does not clearly distinguish Hedonism, which is 
concerned indiscriminately with pleasure, whereas Utilitarianism 
stresses higher and social well-being and lasting happiness, distin- 
guishing values of pleasures. J. 5S. Blackie, Four Phases of Morals, 
searchingly criticizes Utilitarianism; also W. E. H. Lecky, op. cit., 
vol, I, ch. i. Cf. H. Sidgwick, op. cit., pp. 236 ff. The practical 
idealism of our day is essentially a species of Utilitarianism in its 
tremendous emphasis upon efficiency for immediate results and upon 
the perfecting of human welfare in this world 


78 MORAL PHILOSOPHY, SYSTEMATIC ETHICS 


well-being or happiness, and Hedonism, which iden- 
tifies it with pleasures of the moment, are absolutely 
to be rejected. They both substitute inferior for 
higher good, and this is the distinctive mark of evil 
aims. It is man’s duty to seek the morally good, 
and, when alternative goods are involved, the high- 
est one. Progress in attaining moral ends is, indeed, 
attended and to some degree conditioned by present 
pleasure, and results necessarily in ultimate happi- 
ness. If it were not so, we would have reason to 
suspect our whole philosophy and the justice of the 
universe. Pleasure and happiness are none the less 
incidental to moral good, and at times have to be 
sacrificed in its interest. Moreover, beatitude is not 
happiness in the abstract, but that form of it which 
we obtain through making our chief objective end 
to be life with God.! 

The moral ends of conduct are immediate and 
remote. The immediate ends are duties? and vir- 
tues—present obligations to be discharged, and habits 
to be cultivated and maintained. The chief end, or 
summum bonum, is “to glorify God and enjoy Him 
forever,” that is, perfected divine communion and 
fellowship? As essential to the realization of this, 


1 See F. J. Hall, ‘This Miserable and Naughty World,” in Anglican 
Theol. Rev., Oct., 1920. 

2 Duties in the comprehensive sense of what we ought to do under 
existing conditions—including the promotion of others’ present wel- 
fare, when legitimate opportunities occur. 

3 J. J. Elmendorf, op. cit., I, i; Westminster Catechism, 1st answer; 
R. Hooker, op. cit., I, xi, 1-2; St. Thomas, I, I, i-v. 


THE END 79 


personal perfection in virtue and character is also a 
necessary remote end of moral life. This means per- 
sonal assimilation of character to that of God, the 
only possible basis of either divine pleasure in us or 
our enjoyment of God. Such personal perfection is 
also needed for unqualified and lasting enjoyment of 
mutual human fellowship. The communion of saints 
obtains its fruition in common life with God, and is 
the only communion between human beings which is 
unattended by disappointment. Thus true brotherly 
love looks to the future, and seeks mutual sanctifi- 
cation, as the necessary condition of its realization. 
Personal sanctification is also the road to self-realiza- 
tion, or to what Aristotle described as ‘‘ perfect activity 
in a perfect life,” attended by perfect happiness. To 
seek such self-realization is not selfish, for it does not 
require or permit us to make the attendant happiness 
of self our aim. Thus Christian love when satis- 
fied is pleasing, but is by nature unselfish. To be 
pleased with what is righteous makes the pleasure 
righteous. And the self thus realized is what God 
created after His own likeness.! 

Christian Ethics is both individual and social. 
‘Men are placed under social conditions by God, 
and are by nature social beings.2, A man must realize 
himself because he is a moral individual, and his per- 


1Gen.i. 26. Cf. J. Caird, op. cit., vol. I, pp. 56 f. 

2 God places us in the world society as the sphere of our probation; 
and He gathers those who respond to His call in the Church, which 
is the inception of that blessed society which in its perfection will 
enter into the full joy of God in the world to come. 


80 MORAL PHILOSOPHY, SYSTEMATIC ETHICS 


fection is essential to the common good, as well as 
to a fulfilment of his personal obligation to please 
God. But his achievement of this is conditioned by 
the love of others, and by seeking the welfare of 
others. One is to love his neighbour as himself 
Altruism and egoism, as usually conceived, are 
alike inadequate. Both of the ends which these 
systems severally emphasize exclusively are vital, 
and neither may be sacrificed to the other. 

§8. The final causes or ends of moral choice 
become moving causes, when subjectively considered, 
and are embraced within the motives of action. The 
term motive ? describes whatever immediately moves 
and consciously influences the will from within. 
Motives spring either from intellectual or emotional 
sources. The intellectual motives are reasons for 
action or non-action. They are either directive or 
prohibitive, taking the form of practical judgments 
upon the ends and results of actions, whether in the 
sphere of utility, of pleasure, or of morality. They 
have as sources: (a) experience;? (6) reflection on 
experience; (c) intuition and a priori considerations. 
Emotional motives impel or restrain. They may arise 
from (a) immediate excitement; (0) subsequent’ 
imagination; (c) temperament. They take the 


1 God alone may be loved with all one’s heart and soul and mind. 

2See H. Calderwood, op. cil., Pt. If; J. J. Elmendorf, op. cit., 
I, ii, 4-5. 

3 Conceived of as including the reception of divine revelation and 
moral education at large. 


THE END 8x 


form of pleasure or pain, desire or aversion, love or 
hate, and of hope or fear.! 

The motives are always mixed, being both intel- 
lectual and emotional; and are often conflicting ?— 
making both for and against the pursuit of the highest 
good. The question sometimes asked, whether the 
will is inevitably determined by the strongest motives, 
is ambiguous. If ‘‘strongest’”? means the motives 
which in fact prevail, the question is idle and has an 
affirmative answer, of course. If it means the most 
rational or the most excitingly felt, these do not in 
fact invariably determine choice. The will really 
determines, and is no mere register of the inherent 
strength of the motives involved. 


1Cf. § 3, init., above. On the last, see T. Slater, op. cit., vol. I, 
PP. 37-39. 

2 Per contra, Bishop D’Arcy, op. cit., p. 33, “A conflict of motives 
is impossible. What is called a conflict of motives is properly a 
conflict of desires.”” The motive is “that which moves to action,” 
tbid., p. 80 (cf. pp. 80-83). The motive is the desire which prevails; 
it is helpful to remember that motive and motion come from the same 
root. Dewey and Tufts, op. cit., p. 237, ““A ‘mere’ motive which 
does not do anything, which makes nothing different, is not a genuine 
motive at all, and hence it is not a voluntary act.”” There is a con- 
fusion here in terminology between motive and act; but the thought 
is that the motive can hardly be conceived as a determinative which 
does not strongly tend to realize itself in act. Hence it is possible 
to speak disparagingly of the “‘good’’ man, that is, the man whose 
motives are good, but who rarely expresses them in act. Ibid., 
p. 238, ‘The man with a truly benevolent disposition is not the one 
who indulges in indiscriminate charity, but the one who considers 
the effect of his gift upon its recipient and upon society.” Kant, we 
may note, in his theory of the “good will” over-emphasizes the 
motive. 


82 MORAL PHILOSOPHY, SYSTEMATIC ETHICS 


Motives and choices are inseparable although dis- 
tinct phenomena of personal activity,! and the person 
is simplex. Motives do not determine the will from 
without, as separate factors, but from within as 
personal considerations and feelings? The will 
exhibits personal attitude, while motives exhibit 
personal conditions of that attitude. The will 
expresses self-determination, and nothing else is 
really meant when we say loosely that motives deter- 
mine the will. We should not confuse determina- 
tion as thus used with compelling conditions, nor 
forget that the will can so direct attention and reason 
as to modify the motives? The will itself is the 
personal faculty by which the choice of action is 
made. ‘The will ought to be influenced by the high- 
est motives—i.e., by those which make for holiness 
of life and character, and for the attainment of the 
summum bonum. 

The highest of all motives is the love of God or 
desire of union with Him—a motive which grows out 
of true and adequate faith and knowledge, and which 
is sustained by the hope of realization. This love 
in its perfection is the result of much moral and spir- 
itual development. Owing to our sins, the sense of 
guilt, and the expectation of penal consequences, the 
earliest motive which makes for better things is nor- 


1H. Calderwood, op. cit., III, iii, 5-14, treats of the relation of 
motives to the will. Cf. R. Hooker, of. cit., I, vii. 

2 J. Caird, op. cit., vol. II, pp. 44-45; R. Hooker, op. cit., I, vii, 3. 

3H. Calderwood, of. c#t., ITI, iii, 14-19. 


THE ACT 83 


mally the fear of punishment—‘ servile fear.” This 
fear, in those who seek an escape, leads to aversion 
to sin and to desire of its opposite; which in turn 
induces love of Him in whom the opposite is clearly 
to be found. All this, including the desire to escape, 
is contingent upon the illumination and prompting 
of grace. Thus it appears that, while servile fear is 
not an adequate motive or worthy of heaven, it is a 
necessary “‘beginning of wisdom,” and the motive 
of heavenward repentance. Repentance signalizes 
the birth of “holy fear” or loving anxiety lest we dis- 
please God.! 

The conscience judges with authority, and there- 
fore the motives afforded by its judgments ought to 
govern the will in every instance. It is true that the 
divine will is the supreme standard to which the 
human will should be conformed. But the con- 
science is the faculty by which we judge whether 
given acts are in accord with the divine will.? 


Ill. The Act 


§9. The moral quality of actions is ultimately 
determined by their relation to our attainment of 
the summum bonum, and for Christians this makes 
supernatural religion with knowledge, love and ser- 
vice of God, central.2 No act is moral which does 

1F, J. Hall, Eschatology, pp. 220-222; F. H. Hallock, in Amer- 
scan Church Monthly, June, 1921, pp. 346-355. 


2F, J. Hall, zdem, p. 185. 
8F, J. Hall, Creation and Man, pp. 229-232; J. J. Elmendorf, 


84 MORAL PHILOSOPHY, SYSTEMATIC ETHICS 


not either immediately or remotely pertain to this. 
The possibility of moral acts depends upon the pos- 
session by their agent of a moral nature. Such acts 
have to be rational and free. Moral actions include 
the operations of psychical faculties, and the use of 
language, as well as physical movement—that is, 
“thought, word, and deed.” 2 

The causes which may make materially moral 
actions to be formally non-moral are: (a) invincible 
ignorance;? (6) necessity or compulsion.* If, how- 
ever, these conditions are due to previous fault of the 
agent,® they do not have this effect; and in any case 
actions which under normal conditions have moral 
quality are likely to be followed by moral conse- 
quences. Man is a responsible agent. He will be 
held to account by the supreme Judge for any witting 


op. cit., I, iii; J. P. Gury, op. cit., Pt. I, §§ 22 ff; Koch-Preuss, op, 
cit., vol. I, pp. 264-274; T. Slater, op. cit., vol. I, pp. 41-55. Koch- 
Preuss, vol. I, p. 264, ‘“By the morality of an act is understood its 
intrinsic relation to the moral order and to reason. Every human 
act, in concrete, is either good or bad. It is good if it conforms to the 
moral law; it is bad if it violates that law. The sources of morality, 
i.e., the factors or principles which determine the relation of an act 
to the moral law, are: (¢) the object or matter of the act; (iz) its 
form, intention, or end; and (iii) the attending circumstances. 
Generally speaking, an act is good if all three of these factors codp- 
erate in making it conformable to the right order; it is evil if any 
one of them is wrong or sinful.” 

1H. Calderwood, op. cit., Pt. I, div. I, i, 3. 

2F, J. Hall, Eschatalogy, pp. 175-178. 

3 J. J. Elmendorf, of. cit., I, vi,6; T. Slater, of. cit., vol. I, pp. 30-34. 

‘T, Slater, op. cit., vol. I, p. 40. 

6 E.g., the failure of the priest to obtain the knowledge which he 
needs for his work, a matter of obvious obligation. 


THE ACT 8s 


and avoidable failure to use his faculties to their 
best advantage for attaining the swmmum bonum, 
that is, within the limits of his providential opportu- 
nity and available knowledge.! 

Duty, in the concrete, is an action or series of 
actions which ought to be done. In the abstract 
it is the quality or relation which is common to such 
actions, and which distinguishes them from all else— 
their oughtness.2 The sense of duty is universal and 
necessary. It teaches every man that he ought to 
do right, and also to seek his highest end. It implies 
in every normal mind the distinction between right 
and wrong, or between what he ought and what he 
ought not to do. The reality and nature of duty 
are grounded in the nature of God and of man; and 
its contents are measured by the standard of the 
divine will. But we cannot explain why men ought 
to seek any end. Yet all men know that they ought, 
however grotesque and mistaken their notion of the 
particulars of duty may be.? 

The ultimate source of morality is the divine nature; 
but it is also grounded in human nature, and is made 
known to us by the will and law of God.* Subor- 


1OQn the imputability of human acts see Koch-Preuss, of. cit., 
vol. I, pp. 256~263. 

2.N. Porter, op. cit., §§ 2-3. 

3H. Calderwood, of. cit., I, i, 5. In ch. vi he shows that duty 
implies a natural and inherent right to act according to duty in spite 
of all hindrances. Cf. N. Porter, op. cit., § 5. 

4H. Calderwood, op. cit., div. I, ch. v; J. J. Elmendorf, op. cit., 
pp. 35-36; N. Porter, op. cit., §§ 128-129; N. K. Davis, op. cit., 


86 MORAL PHILOSOPHY, SYSTEMATIC ETHICS 


dinately and in particulars, the will of God is deducible 
from the laws of nature, and from humanly created 
law and social convention. These last two factors 
we shall consider later. The relation of the sover- 
eignty of God’s will to the permission of evil con- 
stitutes the most baffling of all problems. We can 
only maintain that God’s will is righteous, and the 
standard of righteousness; and that somehow, 
unknown to us, the existence of evil can be reconciled 
with this.! 

Many actions are seen to be right without conscious 
consideration of their ends, but it is always to be 
assumed that they do in fact pertain to man’s chief 
end. This assumption may arise either from the 
natural constitution of the mind, or from previous 
moral culture; and can be brought to light by sub- 
sequent reflection. Some actions are normally right 
or wrong because their effect upon the attainment of 
the swmmum bonum is normally in the same direction? 
The moral quality of actions, however, is also depend- 
ent upon circumstances; and grave problems may 
arise, calling for the judgment of learned and trained 
casuists.? 

§ 10. Acts are either moral or non-moral, and 


PP. 202-204. By the will of God is meant the “will of signs,” or 
what He makes known that we should do and should not do. St. 
Thomas, I, xix, 11-12; F. J. Hall, Creation and Man, pp. 246 f. 

1F, J. Hall, Being and Atirib. of God, pp. 187-193; and Creation 
and Man, ch. iv. 

* They afford the sphere of moral law. 

*N. Porter, op. ctt., §148 and ch. xvii. 


THE ACT 87 


moral acts are either virtuous or vicious as they con- 
form or fail to conform to the requirements of moral- 
ity. Non-moral, spontaneous, or reflex acts may be 
produced by the will without due knowledge or at- 
tention; and to this class belong also those acts in 
which the will has no part, as in sleep, in disease, 
or under compulsion; also, and more generally, acts 
which are morally indifferent.! 

A moral act is a free and rational one, to which 
moral judgment is applicable, whether in relation to 
the divine law or to the summum bonum. It must pro- 
ceed from the will with knowledge and deliberation, 
in which case it is truly voluntary; but, if the knowl- 
edge and deliberation are not complete, it is imper- 
fectly voluntary, although still moral. The consent 
of the will may be implicit or explicit. Virtuous acts 
agree with the divine will and conduce to our attain- 
ment of the summum bonum, while vicious acts disa- 
gree therewith. Virtues and vices are the habits 
which issue respectively in virtuous and vicious acts. 

A vicious act is called sinful in relation to the divine 
law. Sin? strictly defined, actual sin, signifies con- 
scious disobedience of the divine law, but applies 
practically to any conscious violation of God’s will. 
Original sin, a symbolic use of terms, is the sin breed- 
ing state of nature when deprived of grace, caused by 

1 Koch-Preuss, of. cit., vol. I, pp. 113-118. 

2On sin, J. J. Elmendorf, of. cit., I, vi; H. V. S. Eck, Sin, Pts. 
J-II; J. P. Gury, op. cit., Pt. I, §§ 143 ff; W. W. Webb, The Cure of 


Souls, pp. 71-90; F. J. Hall, Creation and Man, pp. 247, 290-297: 
Hastings, Dic. of Bib., s.v. “Sin.” Cf. ch. ix, below. 


88 MORAL PHILOSOPHY, SYSTEMATIC ETHICS 


the first man’s disobedience and universally inherited 
by natural birth. It is called sin because its existence 
is due to sin and its results are sinful.! 

Actual sin is distinguished as material and formal. 
It is material in so far as the act, as such, is wrong; 
and formal in so far as the agent acts freely and with 
knowledge of the sinfulness of his action. By formal 
sin the agent incurs formal guilt and penal respon- 
sibility for the act. Sins of ignorance are material 
only, but become formal when either persisted in or 
not repented of after their sinfulness is perceived.” 

Actual sins are distinguished also as venial and 
mortal or deadly. They are called venzal when they 
have not become so grave as of themselves to be fatal 
to the spiritual life, being without wilful deliberation 
and concerned with relatively light matter. They 
are called mortal when of themselves they are fatal 
to the spiritual life, unless remedied by repentance 
and pardoning grace; either because due to deliberate 
wilfulness or because concerned with grave matter? 
The distinction between venial and mortal sins is 

1F, J. Hall, Creation and Man, ch. ix. 

2 Jas. Skinner, A Synopsis of Moral and Ascetical Theology, p. 11, 
gives the causes of sin as: (a) ignorance; (6) weakness; (c) wilful- 
ness; (d) habit; (e) contempt. 

3J. J. Elmendorf, op. cit., I, vi, 11; W. W. Webb, of. cit., p. 75, 
“The gravity of sin is the measure of its maliciousness, whether 
it be more or less offensive to God, and is more or less worthy of 
punishment.” P. 76, “Three things are necessary to make a sin 
mortal: (a) grave matter either in itself or on account of the cir- 


cumstances; (0) Full intention to commit a malicious act; (c) A 
perfect consent of the will. 


THE ACT 89 


relative, and no exact boundary line can be drawn 
between them in practice. No sin, known to be 
such, can be treated as outside the scope of need of 
repentance; and to console one’s self with the thought 
that one’s sins are venial is most dangerous. By 
being cherished venial sins become mortal! The 
divine covenant provides remedies for every form of 
sin on the basis of Christ’s death, and under the con- 
dition of sincere repentance; and every sin causes 
the need of repentance and remedy. But sin may 
crystallize in habit, and in that form may reach sucha 
climax of obstinacy in conscious rebellion as to 
become irremediable and unpardonable—the sin 
against the Holy Ghost. 

§ 11. Analysis of righteous conduct in the light of 
nature and revelation brings to the surface certain 
fundamental principles of action which lie behind all 
moral laws. Taken together these constitute an 
eternal law or order which is grounded in the divine 
nature. ‘They constitute fundamental premises of a 
right conscience. So far as they have become dis- 
positions favourable to righteous conduct they are 
called virtues, as are also the habits of action conform- 
ing to them. To define, virtues are the regulative 
principles or habits of conduct which when fully 
observed produce perfect righteousness of life and 
character.” 


1Qn the comparative guilt of sins, see J. J. Elmendorf, of. cit., 
I, vi, 3; Jeremy Taylor, Doctrine of Repentance, III, ii, 5. 
2J. J. Elmendorf, op. cit., I, v; Bishop D’Arcy, op. cit., Pt. IT; 


90 MORAL PHILOSOPHY, SYSTEMATIC ETHICS 


Virtues are generalized under the two heads of 
cardinal and theological virtues. The cardinal or 
earthly virtues pertain to the natural order and to 
earthly relations, and fall under four heads: wisdom 
or prudence, temperance, fortitude and justice. 
Wisdom is seated in the intellect, temperance and 
fortitude in the emotions, justice in the will! The 
theological or heavenly virtues pertain to the super- 
natural order and are directly and expressly related 
to the attainment of the summum bonum. ‘They are 
faith, hope and charity.2 They supplement and 


Koch-Preuss, op. cté., vol. I, p. 277; A. Alexander, op. cit., ch. xi; 
Dewey and Tufts, op. cit., ch. xix. N. K. Davis, op. cit., p. 140, 
“Virtue is the conformity of the will to the law discerned by practical 
reason or conscience.”” W. W. Webb, op. cit., p. 91, “‘ Virtue is the 
habit of doing right.” He distinguishes virtues as natural or super- 
natural; infused or acquired; theological or moral. Virtue is some- 
times derived from vis, strength; but usually from vr, man. Soc- 
rates held that it wasa kind of knowledge, and that no one does 
wrong knowingly; but this removes the responsibility for sin and 
the possibility for blame, and is inadequate as resting upon only 
one side of man’s nature. 

1J. J. Elmendorf, op. cit., I, v, 4, and Pt. III; T. B. Strong, Christ. 
Ethics, Lec. iv. 

2j. J. Elmendorf, op. cit., I, v, 5-7; J. B. Strong, op. cit., Lec. iii; 
J. P. Gury, op. ci#., Pt. I, §§ 185 ff; W. W. Webb, of. cit., pp. 92-115. 
Bishop Webb distinguishes faith as (z) habitual or actual; (i) 
explicit or implicit. Explicit faith must extend to the Creed, the 
doctrine of the Sacraments as taught in the Catechism, the Deca- 
logue, and the Lord’s Prayer. Implicit faith may suffice for other 
truths of revelation; (i) Exterior or interior; exterior involving an 
open profession of our faith, and duty to God, to our neighbour, and 
to ourselves. Solemn profession is prescribed when certain sacra- 
ments are received; (iv) Living (bearing fruit in charity and good 
works) or dead (not joined to sanctifying grace). Koch-Preuss, 


THE’ ‘ACT. or 


transfigure the cardinal virtues, giving them a per- 
tinent relation to the attainment of the swmmum 
bonum which is otherwise lacking; that is, the car- 
dinal virtues are made to serve supernatural pur- 
poses. Faith elevates wisdom, hope elevates justice, 
and charity elevates temperance and fortitude; but 
in a complex interaction and mutual dependence. 
Vices are principles and habits which produce un- 
_ righteousness of life and character. They have been 
summed up under seven heads, called capital sins; 
pride, covetousness, lust, anger, gluttony, envy and 
sloth. Every sin can betraced to one or more of them.} 


op. cii., vol. I, p. 279, “Faith furnishes certain supernatural prin- 
ciples, which the intellect perceives by a divine light. Hope directs 
man to his supernatural end. Charity unites the will with God.” 
On faith in general see Heb. xi. T. Slater, of. cit., vol. I, pp. 165-176. 
P. 165, “It is an act of the intellect assenting to the truth of a propo- 
sition, not because it is evident to reason, but because its truth is 
vouched for by some one who knows and whom we can trust.” By 
it, p. 166, “we believe all that God has revealed and the Church 
proposes to our belief on the authority of God Himself.” This faith 
must extend to all that God has revealed. The detailed treatment of 
it belongs to dogmatic theology, but it has also a place in moral 
theology, for it is a necessary means to the attainment of our super- 
natural end, and without it the divine precepts of the Decalogue 
could not be accepted, except upon such authority as natural reason 
supplied. The chief sins against faith are infidelity, heresy and 
apostasy. Material heresy is not necessarily a sin, for one often falls 
into it through ignorance; but either formal heresy (the knowing and 
wilful rejection of revealed truth, proposed for our acceptance by the 
Church) or wilful doubt of such truth is sin. Apostasy is the aban- 
donment of the faith in its entirety. On hope and charity, see 
T. Slater, of. cit., vol. I, pp. 177-206. 

1W. W. Webb, op. cit., pp. 79-90. For a more detailed treatment, 
see ch. ix, § 6, below. 


92 MORAL PHILOSOPHY, SYSTEMATIC ETHICS 


§ 12. It has been assumed in these outlines that, 
in order to fulfil his chief end, man must practice true 
religion, and that this can be done normally only in 
the Catholic Church. True religion brings us into 
authentic relations with God.2 Thus it secures a 
knowledge of the nature of, and means of attaining, 
the summum bonum, without which we may indeed 
seek after God, but can hardly expect to find Him. 
The summum bonum cannot be won by unassisted 
human wisdom and power, but is the gift of God. 
And it is promised only to those who seek it in His 
appointed way, with the use of His ordained means of 
grace. The Catholic Church is the sphere within 
which this way and these means are provided; and 
the death of Christ is the necessary basis and war- 
rant for the bestowal of these benefits upon sinful 
man. 

Justification signifies a state of acceptance by God 
which makes available the opportunity and means of 
salvation from sin and of attainment of the summum 
bonum. It signifies that a man is reckoned righteous 
because he has been put in the way of becoming so 
with divine help. ‘That is, the child of God is valued 
at the outset for the fullgrown man of God into which 
he is to grow—the condition being presupposed, how- 
ever, that he will achieve this growth with the help of 
grace. In order thus to be justified we must have a 


1Cf. F. J. Hall, Creation and Man, ch. vii, esp. § 6. 
2On religion see H. P. Liddon, Some Elements of Religion, Lec. i; 
F. J. Hall, op. cit., ch. vii, §§ 1-4. 


THE ACT 93 


living faith in Christ and be born anew of water and 
of the Holy Spirit.t 

For the growth in the righteousness which justifica- 
tion initiates, certain means of sanctifying grace, 
called sacraments, are provided in the Church, the 
use of which, in their several applications, is necessary. 
The result of sanctification is personal merit, or 
moral fitness to enter upon divine fellowship. With- 
out such merit or fitness of personal character we can 
neither be pleasing to God nor find pleasure in the 
personal fellowship with Him, wherein the crowning 
joy of heaven consists and upon which our future hap- 
piness depends. This merit should not be confused 
with wage-merit. No works of ours can earn the 
summum bonum. ‘The value of such works lies in 
their making us worthy, and in showing that we are 
worthy, to receive it as a gift. The earning of it 
was achieved by Christ.? 

The practice of religion has for its central purpose 
to bring us into touch with God and to develop our 
relations with Him. Therefore its central action is 
worship, and this requires habitual performance. 
The fundamental element of worship is sacrifice or 
self-oblation; and this has to be expressed and per- 
formed objectively, for what is not thus expressed 
soon ceases to have vitality within ourselves. The 


1F, J. Hall, of. cit., pp. 343-345; and The Church and the Sacra- 
mental System, pp. 259-263. 

2F, J. Hall, The Church and the Sacramental System, pp. 271-278; 
Creation and Man, pp. 348-352. 


904 MORAL PHILOSOPHY, SYSTEMATIC ETHICS 


appointed method of this expression is the formal 
offering to God of a representative gift of sufficient 
value to be acceptable to Him. This has been 
made possible by the death, resurrection, ascension, 
and perpetual heavenly oblation of Christ; and it is 
performed by us in the Holy Eucharist. In this 
service men both express and perpetuate the rela- 
tions necessary for keeping in touch with God and 
for making progress towards their chief end.1 

The chief defect of modern systems of Ethics is 
their neglect of the central place which religion and 
its sacraments occupy in true righteousness. 


1F, J. Hall, The Incarnation, pp. 283-293; and The Sacraments, 
ch. v, esp. §§ 11-12. 


CHAPTER IV 
MORAL THEOLOGY PROPER: LAW 


I. The Law of God 


§1. Moral Theology Proper is the practical branch 
of our subject, and treats of specific obligations and 
duties. Inasmuch as the standard of righteousness 
is the will of God, it treats of the application of the 
will of God to human conduct, whether considered 
at large or in relation to particular estates and con- 
ditions.1 The will of God here meant is technically 


1QOn the history and literature of Moral Theol. (cf. p. 20, note 1, 
above), see Schaff-Herzog Encyc., s.v. ‘Theology, Moral;” ‘Thos. 
Slater, Short Hist. of Moral Theol.; Koch-Preuss, op. cit., vol. I, 
pp. 41-73; Cath. Encyc. s.v. “Theology,” pp. 604-611. 

Anglican works (more frequently contributory than systematic), 
W. W. Webb, Cure of Souls; J. J. Elmendorf, Elem. of Moral Theol. 
(follows St. Thomas); Bp. Sanderson, Lec’s on Conscience and Human 
Law (trans. by Wordsworth); Jeremy Taylor, Ductor Dubitantium; 
and Holy Living; James Skinner, Synop. of Moral and Ascetical Theol. 
(rare, needs reprinting); V. Staley, The Practical Religion (popular); 
R. L. Ottley, The Rule of Life and Love; T. B. Strong, Christian 
Ethics (Bamp. Lecs.); Chas. Gore, Christ. Moral Prin’s; A. J. Hum- 
phreys, Christ. Morals; K. E. Kirk, Some Prin’s of Moral Theol. 


95 


96 MORAL THEOLOGY PROPER: LAW 


called the ‘‘ Will of Signs,” or the revealed will of God 
with regard to our conduct. Its revelation may be 
either natural or supernatural, but supernatural reve- 
lation is primary, in so far as it is more definitive of 
the manner in which we must fulfil our chief end. In 
applying the will of God to our individual actions we 
judge in terms of conscience, therefore conscience has 
authority from which there is no earthly appeal. 
In brief, our primary guides are: (a) the will of God 
as objective standard; (6) the conscience as subjective 
interpreter. 


tn their Applic’n; W. W. Williams, Moral Theol. of the Sac. of Pen- 
ance; F. G. Belton, A Man. for Confessors; and Present Day Problems 
tn Christ. Morals; Cyril Bickersteth, The Min. of Absolution; A. H. 
Baverstock, The Priest as Confessor. 

Roman works (more complete and systematic, necessary for con- 
sultation but requiring cautious adaptation to Anglican conditions), 
Thos. Slater, Manual of Moral Theol., 2 vols.; A. Koch (ed. by A. 
Preuss), Handbook of Moral Theol., 5 vols.; J. P. Gury, Compend. 
Theol. Moralis; Aug. Lehmkuhl, Theol. Moralis, 2 vols.; St. Thomas, 
Summa Theol., Pt. II; A. Tanquerey, Brev. Synop. Moralis et Past. 
St. Alphonsus’ Theol. Moralis, 4 vols. is historically important, but 
needs cautious reading. 

A. Alexander, of. cit., p. 22 says, ‘‘ Christian Ethics presupposes 
the Christian view of life as revealed in Christ, and its definition must 
be in harmony with the Christian ideal. The prime question of 
Christian Ethics is, How ought Christians to order their lives? It is 
therefore the science of morals as conditioned by Christian faith; 
and the problems it discusses are, the nature, meaning and laws of 
the moral life as dominated by the supreme good which has been 
revealed to the world in the Person and teaching of Christ.” The 
Roman distinction between General and Special Moral Theology 
corresponds roughly to what is here designated as Moral Philosophy 
and Moral Theology Proper: Koch-Preuss, vol. I, p. 74. 


THE LAW OF GOD 97 


§ 2. The “Will of Signs,” as we have seen, includes 
commands, prohibitions, permissions, counsels and 
example. These five branches may be conveni- 
ently reduced to three: (a) Law, including commands 
and prohibitions; (6) Expediency, including permis- 
sions and counsels; (c) Example, embodying the 
Christian ideal in concrete form. Commands and 
prohibitions are included in what is called law, and 
they are treated as the primary and immediate 
basis of Moral Theology Proper; but the funda- 
mental principles of love and expediency have 
also to be reckoned with, and the example of 
Christ throws needed light upon many problems 
of duty. 

Law signifies that which is fixed or set, but has many 
forms and applications outside the moral sphere. In 
Moral Theology it means formal requirement or 
authoritative definition of what ought to be done 
and what ought not to be done. All law is ulti- 
mately grounded in the eternal law of Divine Nature.! 
The various branches of law by which this eternal 
law gains expression and fulfilment are exhibited in 
the following table: 


1Rich. Hooker, op. cit., I, xvi, 8; Koch-Preuss, op. cit., vol. I, 
p. 120, “Law is but another name for the divine will recognized as 
the standard for human conduct.” Jbid., p. 141, “The moral law 
of the New Testament is the purest and most perfect expression of 
the divine will.” Its superiority to the moral law of the Old Testa- 
ment appears from its character as: (c) a new law; (0) a law of the 
spirit; (c) a law of grace and liberty; (d) a law of love. 


98 MORAL THEOLOGY PROPER: LAW 


Of ( Internal ee Divine Processions, Rela- 





Divine | and tions, and Character. 
Opera- | Essential 
tions : 
External { Of Causation—natural law. 
and Vol- \ Of Progress—supernatural. 
Eternal Healy, 
Law of the 
divine 
nature, gov- 
erning all Of Innate—of Reason. 
Human 
Actions | Super- Revealed—Will of Signs, etc. 
_imposed 
Human Ecclesiastical. 
Dispensa- Civil. 
tions Conventional.! 


Moral Theology Proper treats of the laws of human 
actions. ‘These laws may be either (a) universal and 


1 Koch-Preuss, op. cit., vol. I, p. 156, “ Human law is in every respect 
subordinate to the natural and to positive divine law, and its pre- 
cepts have binding force only if they agree with both. . . . Christ ex- 
pressly bestowed legislative power upon HisChurch (St. Matt. xvi. 19; 
xviii. 17; St. Luke x. 16), and furthermore Himself acknowledged the 
laws of the State and exhorted His disciples to obey them (St. Luke 
xx. 25; Acts xv. 28; xx. 28). St. Paul says that all power is from 
God and that the ordinances of legitimate authority bind in con- 
science (Rom. xiii. 1 ff.; cf. St. John xix. 11).’”’ Human law is an inter- 
pretation and application of the general principles of the natural and 
revealed divine law. Jbid., p. 157, ‘Every human law is mediately 
and by derivation a divine law.”’ J. Skinner, op. cit., p. 7, gives the 
heads of law: in genere, (2) Cause; (b) Object; (c) Subject; (d) 
Promulgation; (e) Acceptation; (f) Obligation; (g) Interpretation; 
(4) Dispensation; (7) Cessation; in specie, (a) Natural and divine; 
(b) Positive and divine; (c) Ecclesiastical; (d) Civil; (e) Penal; 
(f) Ineffective; (g) Custom; (4) Privilege. 


THE LAW OF GOD 99 


naturally revealed;! (6) covenantal and_ positive, 
made necessary by the fall, and for the attainment of 
man’s supernatural end. Covenantal law may be 
either immutable or mutable, this distinction being 
ordinarily indicated by the terms moral and ceremonial. 
The ceremonial law is also subject to many excep- 
tions, according to necessity and enlightened discre- 
tion.2, Even moral law has exceptions, although 
they are rare and of a nature to prove the rule; for 
it is impossible to define moral obligations in human 
terms that will accurately describe duty under all 
possible circumstances. 

§ 3. We shall treat of our subject in the following 
order: (a) innate moral obligations, or the law of 
reason; (b) superimposed law,? this being sub- 
divided under the heads of the Decalogue, inter- 
preted in the light of our Lord’s summary of love, 
and so treated as to include ecclesiastical, civil and 
conventional requirements; (c) virtues and vices. 
It will be necessary to supplement these comprehen- 
sive divisions by special treatment of (d) social and 
individual aspects of duty, (e) economic obligations, 

1 Koch-Preuss, op. cit., vol. I, p. 122, “By the moral law of nature 
is understood the sum-total of those ethical precepts which God has 
implanted in the rational nature of man.” It is fundamental, and 
no other law can abrogate it. 

2Cf. St. Matt. xii. 1-8; St. Mark ii. 27. 

3T. Slater, op. cit., vol. I, p. 83, “Divine law is either natural or 
positive. The natural law is promulgated in the rational nature of 
man, and is a participation in human reason of the eternal law of 


God, which bids us observe right order, and forbids its disturbance. 
Positive divine law is made known by revelation.” 


too MORAL THEOLOGY PROPER: LAW 


(f) voluntarily incurred obligations, (g) expediency, 
(hk) example. 


II. The Law of Reason 


§4. The law of natural reason teaches certain 
obligations which are capable of being ascertained 
and recognized by all who seek to do right, whether 
they are Christians or not. They may be divided 
into individual and social obligations. 

Of individual obligations the general law is that we 
should live according to nature as it comes from the 
hand of God. Todo this means to maintain a perfect 
activity of our faculties and to preserve them in the 
fulness of their capacity. The aim of all education, 
properly conducted, is to lead out, educere, all our 
faculties in just proportion and relation, in order that 
we may be emancipated from every unnecessary 
hindrance to do and be what we ought to do and be. 
(a) It is a natural duty to obtain good and nourish- 
ing food, and to partake of it in the quantity and 
manner which available knowledge shows to be con- 
ducive to the preservation and development of physi- 
cal, mental, and moral capacity. (0) Sufficient sleep 
should be taken at regular times and without excessive 
indulgence, the amount being controlled by the laws 
of health and efficiency. (c) Habitual work is essen- 
tial to good morals, but also needs to be regulated. 
We ought to exercise our powers as fully as possible, 
but without overstraining any of them. This requires 


THE LAW OF REASON IOr 


that labor should be systematic, and that hurry as 
well as worry should be banished as much as possible. 
Work of high quality is more valuable, morally as 
well as otherwise, than a large quantity of work poorly 
done. (d) Recreation is a closely related obligation, 
the form and quantity of which ought to be deter- 
mined by its value in improving the efficiency of our 
work, and in facilitating our personal development. 
The word “‘recreation”’ itself signifies the true end of 
all righteous forms of pleasure—to re-create our facul- 
ties. This does not mean that we should take our 
pleasures solemnly, for that would be to defeat their 
moral function. The point is that we should deter- 
mine the manner and duration of play with reference 
to the general purpose of increasing the value of our 
lives and characters. (e) All other rules of health, 
such as outdoor exercise, fresh air, reasonable clean- 
liness, etc., pertain to natural moral obligations. 

§ 5. Man is by nature a social animal, and it is 
part of natural law that he should adjust himself 
to his social environment. The law of natural evo- 
lution teaches that utility depends upon adjustment, 
and that natural selection works against those who 
disregard this requirement. This adjustment may 
be described in moral terms as the duty of recognizing 
and protecting the rights of others: (a) The right 
to enjoy life and happiness, which includes oppor- 
tunity to earn one’s living, under suitable conditions, 
and with proportionate results; (0) The rights of 
kinship as between parents and children, brothers 


102 MORAL THEOLOGY PROPER: LAW 


and sisters, husband and wife, and others. Nature 
teaches that the obligations between husband and 
wife normally include propagation of the species; 
(c) The rights of strangers, including those whom 
we meet in public, and especially those who are com- 
pelled to depend upon our hospitality; (d) The rights 
of enemies to be treated as human beings; (e) The 
general duty of advancing the greatest good of the 
greatest number. The fallacy of utilitarian ethics 
is that it makes this the sum and substance of morality, 
and in effect repudiates the probationary relation of 
this life to eternal life. All natural obligations can 
be reduced to the heads of prudence or wisdom, tem- 
perance, fortitude and justice, the so-called cardinal 
virtues.! 


III. Superimposed Moral Law 


§6. The revealed law of God is described in 
Deuteronomy as consisting of statutes and judgments. 
Statutes define forms of conduct, which are either 
commanded or forbidden; and judgments determine 
particular cases and constitute authoritative prece- 
dents. In Christian application many of these prece- 
dents cease to be valid because of the new dispensa- 
tion and the change of conditions.2 Divine statutes 

1 Cf, ch. ili, § 11, above. 

2R. L. Ottley, Aspects of the Old Testament, p. 171, “It would be 
misleading to speak of Mosaism as if it embraced a formal system of 


ethics. It did, however, prepare the way for a system by a gradual, 
but in the long run effectual, elucidation of two great ideas which a 


SUPERIMPOSED MORAL LAW 103 


contain two elements: (a) moral and permanent; 
(b) ceremonial, pertaining only to the dispensation in 
connection with which they are given. Some statutes 
are exclusively moral and some are exclusively cere- 
monial, but others, such as the fourth commandment 
of the Decalogue, contain both elements and have to 
be interpreted accordingly! The ceremonial ele- 
ment may cease to apply either because of counteract- 
ing necessity or by reason of a new divine dispensa- 
tion. But some ceremonial laws, in particular that 
of tithing, reveal degrees of moral responsibility of 
abiding validity; and these retain a certain moral 
value even when the law as law has ceased to bind. 
The revealed moral law is found primarily in two 
documents, the Old Testament Decalogue and our 
Lord’s twofold summary in the Gospels. The former 
consists of specific rules, the latter defines the deter- 
minative principle of righteousness which should 
control their interpretation and the practical appli- 
cation of all rules of conduct. The law of the Old 
Testament was binding in its letter only upon the 
Chosen People; whereas the Christian summary, 
given by Christ, is for all men, and is permanently 
binding upon all who have learned of it.2 The older 
must be Christianized by the newer. The provisions 
religious system of morals seems to presuppose: first, the idea of holi- 
ness; secondly, the idea of the worth and dignity of personality.” 
1Tbid., p. 215, The Decalogue ‘“‘defines in broad outlines the con- 
ditions of a right relation to God and to all that He has made.” Cf, 
St. Iren., adv. Haer., IV, 15, i; IV, 16, iii; St. Thos. of. ctz., I, I, c. 3. 
2St. Matt. xxii. 36-40; xxviii. 19-20. 


104 MORAL THEOLOGY PROPER: LAW 


of the older are rightly criticized as largely negative 
and external, regulating outward conduct; but 
Christianized they_ stand for positive principles 
regulating thought as well as word and act.! The 
Decalogue is not exhaustive, although it gives 
leading and representative examples of how we ought 
to conform to the divine will. Its requirements pre- 
suppose the binding force of the laws of human dis- 
pensations, whether ecclesiastical, civil or conven- 
tional, and afford guidance in their fulfilment. They 
will here be treated in this light and as including (a) 
ecclesiastical application (growing out of the sacra- 
ments, canon law and ecclesiastical precepts); (0) 
civil law; (c) social customs and institutions. 

The several commandments constitute so many 
methods by which the principle of love ought to be 
applied Godward and manward. ‘This is also true 
of all special statutes and judgments of God.2 The 
Decalogue is divided into two tables, concerned 
respectively with duties to God and duties to man. 
The division between these is usually drawn between 
the first four and the last six; but it is more scientific 
to include the fifth in the first table, because it has to 
do with obedience to authority, and every legiti- 


1 Chas. Gore, Christian Moral Prin’s, Serm. ii-iii, and pp. 110 ff. ‘ 

2Qn the Commandments in general, see W. W. Webb, op. cit., 
ch. v; R. L. Ottley, The Rule of Life and Love; T. Slater, op. cit., 
vol. I, pp. 207-473; Hastings, Dic. of Bib., s.v. “Decalogue”; J. P. 
Gury, op. cit., §§ 257-472. Gury says, “Sicut Symbolum epitome 
est credendorum, sic decalogus agendorum.” 


SUPERIMPOSED MORAL LAW 105 


mate authority represents, in ultimate analysis, the 
authority of God.t 

§ 7. The general principle embodied in the First 
Commandment is that of entire and exclusive allegiance 
to the one and only true God.? In practice this 
allegiance ought to be shown in four directions: (a) 
The profession of a true faith, not only in God Him- 
self, but in all that He has revealed concerning our 
relations to Him, His purpose for us, and what He 
has done and is doing in and for us. The truths 
which we ought to believe consist of those which are 
known to have been revealed, and we may not make 
exceptions because some of the truths do not appear 
to us to be vitally important. Our allegiance to 
God is violated by rejecting even the slightest authen- 
tic revelation from Him. Moreover, the acceptance 

1In Roman use, the first two are counted together as the first; 
and the tenth is broken into two, the ninth being, ‘Thou shalt not 
covet thy neighbour’s wife.” 

2 The first commandment may be summed up as defining the duty 
of worship and prayer, faith being presupposed. The opposed vices 
are: (a) superstition, magic and divination; (the last including telling 
of fortunes by palmistry, cards, etc., reliance upon dreams, the use of 
the Ouija board, consulting of mediums). ‘These need not be thought 
of as sins when the motive is light, but become such when they are 
taken seriously; (0) Irreligion; (c) Tempting God by our failure to 
use ordinary means to secure an end, as neglect of remedies in sick- 
ness (Christian Science); seeking a miracle for the support of one’s 
faith; the ordeals of the Middle Ages, which the Church condemned 
as superstitious; (d) Sacrilege, the irreverent treatment of sacred 
persons, places, and things dedicated to the service of God. Under 
this head is included receiving or administering sacraments in a state 


of mortal sin. A more common offence is that of joking or light | 
speaking in religion. 


106 MORAL THEOLOGY PROPER: LAW 


of revelation carries with it the duty of professing 
our faith, so far as our circumstances afford suitable 
occasions for such profession, and whenever the 
Church of God requires. 

(b) The practice of religion is necessary to this 
allegiance, for in its practical aspects religion is all 
one with a conformity of our lives to the relations in 
which we stand to God. The duty of taking part in 
public, especially Eucharistic, worship rests upon the 
individual as a member of the group from which cor- 
porate worship is due. The form which this wor- 
ship takes is determined by the authority of the 
Church; and public or common prayer may be con- 
ducted only according to the forms provided by eccle- 
siastical authority, whether by canon law or by 
bishops in the exercise of such jus liturgicum as is 
consistent therewith. Private prayer and the other 
‘notable duties” of religion.are considered below.! 

(c) This allegiance also involves the fulfilment of 
all the conditions of the covenant which God has 
given us. The duties involved may be summed up 
by saying that we ought to be faithful members of the 
Church and obedient to all ecclesiastical precepts.? 

(d) Observance of the covenant carries with it certain 
specific obligations pertaining to the sacraments.® 

§ 8. The Second Commandment has reference to wor- 
ship in the sense of /atreia, and requires that it should 


1In ch. vi, §§ 1-3. 
2 Treated of in § 11, below. 
3 Treated of in ch. v, below. 


SUPERIMPOSED MORAL LAW 107 


be paid exclusively to God and in the manner ap- 
pointed by Him. The use of images, as external aids, 
must be determined and controlled not by our device 
but by divine revelation. And this last principle 
applies not only to sensible images but to mental ones. 
Two leading classes of sin are, therefore, forbidden, 
external idolatry and false doctrine, so far as em- 
bodied in worship. Incidentally all superstitious ob- 
servances, such as we have already referred to under 
the first commandment, are forbidden here also, as is 
participation in schismatic worship. The latter is for- 
bidden because it violates Christian unity and substi- 
tutes for divinely appointed worship a modified and 
human substitute. The divinely appointed worship is 
the Holy Eucharist, and around this should be gath- 
ered and subordinated all our approaches to God. The 
lawfulness of any form of worship, therefore, can be 
tested by its agreement with, and capacity of min- 
istering to, the Holy Eucharist. Material art may be 
used to make worship more effectual, but not in such 
wise as to alter its object or divinely appointed 
method. This commandment also implies and reg- 
ulates the duty of prayer in all its branches. Fasting 
and almsgiving are usually grouped with prayer, 
because these three constitute what are called the 
“notable duties” of religion. These will be consid- 
ered below.! 

§9. The Third Commandment inculcates reverential 
piety, or that loving loyalty to God which moves one 

1Tn ch. vi, §§ 1-3. 


108 MORAL THEOLOGY PROPER: LAW 


to avoid treating anything divine or sacred in a 
thoughtless or careless manner. Among the obvious 
branches of its violation are: (a) irreverent use of the 
divine Name as an expletive, oath, or common 
exclamation, and of sacred things; (6) Tempting 
God by challenging His particular providence; (¢) 
Sacrilege, or the handling of sacred things for secular 
purposes; (d) Blasphemy, or the use of God’s name 
for purposes of sin. (e) Simony, or buying spiritual 
advantages;! (f/f) The facetious use of Holy Scripture 
and other sacred language; (g) Trifling in sacred 
places; (%) Careless ceremony in participating in 
religious services. 

One of the problems which arise under this com- 
mandment is, what constitutes a lawful oath or vow’? 


1 Acts. viii. 18. 

2 On oaths and vows, see W. W. Webb, pp. 131-137; J. J. Elmen- 
dorf, pp. 343-353. An oath is “the calling on God to witness to the 
truth of what we say,” T. Slater, op. cit., vol. I, p. 240. It may be 
either solemn, when attended by the ceremonies prescribed by law, 
as holding up the right hand, kissing the Bible, or simple, when these 
ceremonies are omitted. Such oaths are not only permissible, but 
are public professions of our belief in God, His omniscience, truth, 
etc. They are not forbidden by St. Matt. v. 34; cf. Jerem. iv. 2. 
A promissory oath is not binding when a change of circumstances 
makes it unlawful, useless, or an obstacle to a greater obligation. 
The obligation to fulfilment may be annulled, dispensed, commuted or 
relaxed, in the same way as a vow; but private judgment alone is not 
competent except in obvious necessity. 

A vow “is a contract with God, a deliberate taking on one’s self of 
a new obligation which binds the conscience,” T. Slater, op. cit., 
vol. I, p. 246. It differs from a mere promise of amendment. .To 
constitute a vow there must be full knowledge, complete use of reason, 
freedom from force, and physical and moral possibility of fulfilment. 
It may be either absolute or conditional. 


SUPERIMPOSED MORAL LAW 109 


The answer in brief is, that we ought to have a suf- 
ficiently grave reason, and should have in view the 
interests of truth and righteousness. A reverent 
manner and careful fulfilment are also necessary. 
The legal name for false oaths is perjury; and this is a 
double sin because including both the sinful use of 
God’s name and lying. A vow which cannot be ful- 
filled without sin is sinful and does not bind. In 
every Christian vow there is a qualifying assumption 
that competent authority may, for sufficient and law- 
ful reasons, either dispense from vows or overrule 
them. 

The spirit of this commandment cannot be ful- 
filled except by those who cultivate the moral and 
spiritual tone which lies behind reverence for holy 
things. High tone is of Christian obligation, and 
flippant vulgarity is a hindrance to the fulfilment of 
this commandment. 

§ 10. The Fourth Commandment requires the con- 
secration or appointing of regularly recurring times, 
sanctioned by religious authority, for the public 
worship of God and for the fulfilment of other relig- 
lous responsibilities.1 In form it is ceremonial, be- 
cause the selection of the seventh day and abstaining 
from all labour do not constitute morally necessary 
and permanent conditions of the fulfilment of its 
spirit. The Lord’s day has displaced the Sabbath, 


1See Vernon Staley, op. cit., Pt. II, ch. xi; F. G. Belton, Present 
Day Problems, ch. vi; J. A. Hessey, Sunday (Bamp. Lec.); H. R. 
Gamble, Sunday and the Sabbath; W. B. Trevelyan, Sunday. 


110 MORAL THEOLOGY PROPER: LAW 


Christian festivals have displaced the Jewish Calendar, 
and the question of labour on Sunday is not deter- 
mined by definite divine precept. 

Various problems arise under this commandment. 
They are determined by a very simple principle, that 
Sunday has its own proper business to be fulfilled. 
If under normal conditions that business is ade- 
quately and sincerely attended to, freedom remains 
as to what else is done or is indulged in, similar to 
that which we enjoy on other days of the week. In 
application, however, questions of expediency arise, 
as distinguished from law; and it is our duty to show 
reasonable regard for other people’s consciences and 
for our own moral and spiritual reputation. Public 
association of ideas causes a natural sense of incon- 
gruity between the appointed Sunday business and 
certain forms of self-indulgence. This limitation, 
however, is wholly extrinsic; and we may not raise 
to the level of legal requirement matters which per- 
tain to variable expediency.! 

The business of Sunday, or its positive obligations, 
include: (a) public worship, especially the Holy 
Eucharist; (0) the practice of religion in any and all 
of those elements for which other days of the week do 
not afford sufficient opportunity, reading of the Bible, 
spiritual books, etc.,—in short, making religion the 
day’s specialty; (c) works of mercy, both corporal 
and spiritual; (d) the religious instruction of the 
young. The sum of the matter is that to observe 

1See H. R. Gamble, Sunday and the Sabbath, passim. 


SUPERIMPOSED MORAL LAW IIt 


Sunday is to fulfil its positive business, in so far as it 
pertains to each individual; and in other respects to 
control Sunday occupations in such wise as not to 
reduce either the external fulfilment or the spiritual 
value of what pertains to Sunday duties, regard 
being had also to the effect of our example upon 
others. 

As we have said, questions of expediency come 
sharply to the front. We have, therefore, to con- 
sider in this connection what is permitted, on the one 
hand, and what is to be advised, on the other. Taking 
permissions first, it is intrinsically lawful to do and to 
enjoy any and everything that it is lawful to do and 
to enjoy on other days of the week, provided nothing 
is done that interferes with a reasonably adequate 
and habitual fulfilment of Sunday’s proper business. 
On the other hand, from the point of view of counsel, 
it is often inexpedient and may, in effect, become sin- 
ful under some conditions to take part in: (a) bois- 
terous and strenuous occupations of secular nature; 
(6) occupations which our neighbours consider sinful 
on that day; (c) amusements that offend weak 
consciences at all times. Like all positive precepts, 
this commandment may cease for the moment to 
bind when real necessity interferes with its fulfilment, 
e.g., (a) in sickness; (0) when one’s subsistence 
depends upon continuing work on Sunday; (¢c) when 
a Sunday’s outing is the only possible way of obtain- 
ing sufficient recreation. It is to be observed, how- 
ever, that we are responsible for planning our life 


112 MORAL THEOLOGY PROPER: LAW 


work, as far as possible, in ways that permit an 
adequate discharge of religious obligations. 

As regards absorbing occupation, ordinary servile 
work is forbidden except under unusual circumstances; 
but agricultural labor is allowable under necessity, as 
in harvest time, when grave loss might be occasioned 
if it were neglected; and the same liberty applies to 
foundry labour customarily, to transportation of all 
sorts, especially at sea, to preparing food and, in gen- 
eral, to any form of occupation which could not be 
interrupted for a day without grave loss or incon- 
venience. Admitting this liberty, there is in various 
directions much room for doubt as to whether what is 
customarily termed necessary is really so. It is 
plainly sinful for employers to require labour on Sun- 
day without real necessity.1 The broad principle is 
involved that every duty should have provided its 
appropriate time for attention, and that a life which 
is without plan or system is one that makes many sins 
inevitable. 

§11. The Fifth Commandment requires obedience 


3 This applies to such unnecessary recreations as involve the labour 
‘ofothers. Encyclical Letter of the Lambeth Conference, 1888, ‘‘The 
due observance of Sunday as a day of rest, of worship, and of religious 
teaching, has a direct bearing on the moral well-being of the Christian 
community. We have observed of late a growing laxity which threat- 
ens to impair its sacred character. We strongly deprecate this ten- 
dency. We call upon the leisurely classes not selfishly to withdraw 
from others the opportunities of rest and of religion. We call upon 
master and employer jealously to guard the privileges of the servant 
and the workman. In ‘The Lord’s Day’ we have a priceless heri- 
tage. Whoever misuses it incurs a terrible responsibility.” 


SUPERIMPOSED MORAL LAW 113 


to all divinely sanctioned authority, whether involved 
in providential circumstances at large or based upon 
specific divine appointments. Speaking broadly, its 
sphere is threefold: the family, the Church and the 
State. In each sphere the duties are twofold: of 
inferiors to superiors, and of superiors to inferiors. 
To-day the second class of duties is apt to receive a 
false emphasis because of reaction, inasmuch as the 
rights of inferiors were formerly insufficiently acknowl- 
edged. But emphasis upon rights gradually becomes 
forgetfulness of duties; and a crying need is a general 
revival of unselfish emphasis upon duties to others. 
(a) In the family } children owe obedience, love, and 
reverence to parents in all things lawful;? and the 
younger owe deference to their elders. On the other 
hand, parents and elders owe to the young teaching, 
both secular and religious, example, guidance, and 
discipline, along with physical support. The ful- 
filment of these obligations ought to be governed 


1A, Alexander, op. cit., pp. 220-229; N. K. Davis, op. cié., Pt. II, 
ch. ii; Dewey and Tufts, op. cit., ch. xxvi; F. G. Peabody, The Chris- 
tian Life in the Modern World, ch. i; W. F. Lofthouse, Ethics and 
the Family; Hastings, Encyc. of Relig., s.v. “Family (Biblical and 
Christian).” 

2St. Bernard, Ep. cxi, ‘‘There is only one circumstance in which it 
would be wrong to obey parents, and that is when God forbids it.” 
Cf. St. Matt. x. 37. Obedience only ceases to be obligatory when 
children attain their majority; and then arises the duty of supporting 
parents if needful. Parental authority during minority is supreme 
if rightly exercised. When abused the State may interfere; but the 
Church may not do s0, e.g., if parents refuse to permit their children 
to receive one of the sacraments. Parental responsibilities towards. 
illegitimate children are the same as towards legitimate offspring. 


114 MORAL THEOLOGY PROPER: LAW 


by a love which is neither backboneless amiability 
nor careless disregard of the rights of the young. 
Related to family obligations are those between 
teacher and pupil at school, and these relations are 
determined by parental consent and by the necessi- 
ties of real education. Within their recognized limits 
they involve parallel duties of authority and of obe- 
dience. 

(b) In the Church* the relationship which deter- 
mines duty is that between mother and mistress of 
souls and individual children of God. It isa relation, 
however, which is limited, on the one hand, by the 
authority of parents over minors, and on the other 
hand, by the authority of the State over temporals. 
In brief, it is a spiritual relation based upon the per- 
suasion of free agents and to be enforced only by 
spiritual penalties. Its branches are usually formu- 
lated in what are called the precepts of the Church. 
These precepts are either ecumenical or provincial. 
The word ‘‘precept”’ is here applied to every form of 
obligation known to be imposed by the Church, 
whether by canon, by liturgical, rubrical, or sacra- 
mental prescription, or by recognized custom. These 
precepts may not be dispensed by mere private 
caprice, and judicial decisions and decrees have 
authority in their interpretation. An individual 
Christian is bound both by ecumenical precepts and 
by those of his own portion of the Church. 


1T. B. Strong, op. cit., Lec. viii; V. Staley, op. cit., Pt. I, chh. 
x-xi; A. Alexander, op. cit., pp. 236-244; N. K. Davis, of. cit., Pt. 
II, ch. v. 


SUPERIMPOSED MORAL LAW 115 


The ecumenical precepts are reduced by moral 
writers to five or six heads, of which the following is a 
general summary:! (1) To observe the canon law and 
ecclesiastical judgments wherever applicable; (2) 
To take habitual part in the public services of the 
Church in the manner ecclesiastically and provin- 
cially prescribed, and to avoid schismatical worship; 
(3) To observe the holy days appointed, whether fes- 
tivals or fasts, in the manner directed;? (4) To give 
habitually and in proportion to our means for the 
support of the Church and her interests, whether 
parochial, diocesan, institutional, or missionary.? 
(5) To receive the sacraments in their appointed 
order and manner, and to promote their reception 
by others. (6) To repent habitually of sin, using 
the sacrament of Penance when ecclesiastical rules 
require, and at least as often as needed for rightly 
quieting the conscience. Underlying all these is the 
obligation of faith, of belief in the doctrines of the 
Trinity and the Incarnation, and in all the other chief 
articles of the Christian Faith as set forth by the 
Church. 

1Bp. Cosin, Works, vol. II, p. 121; vol. V, p. 523; Bp. Webb, 
op. cit., pp. 194-202; J. P. Gury, op. cit., §§ 473-516; T. Slater, 
op. cit., vol. I, pp. 564-581. 

2 Fasting, we may note, has the psychological value of aiding dis- 
cipline, keeping under the body and bringing it into subjection, and 
the moral value of aiding penitence. 

31 Cor. ix. 13-14. 

4St. John vi. 53-58 establishes the general obligation of commun- 


ion, the details of its application being left to the regulation of the 
Church. 


116 MORAL THEOLOGY PROPER: LAW 


(c) The authority of the State! pertains to the reg- 
ulation of those temporal concerns which require 
public control. Within that sphere and under the 
limitations of human constitution and law, the 
officers of the state are entitled to obedience; being 
themselves under obligation to avoid either tyranny, 
laxity or partiality. Men also owe loyalty to the 
State as an institution, and the virtue of patriotism 
is a Christian virtue.” 

Somewhat related to this sphere of authority is 
that of employer or master, over employee and ser- 
vant.? Like civil constitutions, these relations are 
subject to alteration and reformation; but existing 
laws and customs determine for the time being the 


1A, Alexander, op. cit., pp. 229-236; N. K. Davis, op. cit., Pt. II, 
ch. ili-iv; Wm. McDougall, An Introd. to Social Psychology, passim. 

2Rom. xili. 1-7. We treat of civil obligations in ch. vi, §§ 4-5, 
below. LEncyc. Letter of Pope Leo XIII, Jan. 10, 1890, “Law is of 
its very essence a mandate of right reason, proclaimed by a prop- 
erly constituted authority, for the common good. But true and 
legitimate authority is void of sanction, unless it proceeds from God, 
the supreme Ruler and Lord of all.” Some recent writers, e.g., 
Durkheim, Royce and Ames, have found the basis of all religion in 
social obligation. 

8 Of employees is required a faithful discharge of their appointed 
duties and a proper care for the interests of their employers. Morally 
they are bound to make restitution if they waste time or cause damage 
by their neglect. Of employers a fair wage, considerate treatment 
and good working conditions are required. Obviously the moral 
standard is higher than the legal. In the present confusion of social 
conditions Moral Theology must deal with broad and unquestionable 
principles, rather than enter into details concerning which practical 
sociology is still uncertain or perplexed. Reason is to be used and 
an undue intrusion of partisan emotion is to be guarded against. 


SUPERIMPOSED MORAL LAW 117 


nature of the obligations involved. The reason is, 
that to disregard existing institutions which have the 
sanction, whether formal or informal, of the com- 
munity, is to introduce disorder and to cause greater 
wrongs than the particular disobedient course can 
remedy. The right of revolution lies, not with 
private individuals, but with society as a whole. 

§ 12. The second table has reference to the manner 
in which love should control conduct towards our 
neighbours. Interpreted from the Christian stand- 
point, the love with which this table is concerned is 
determined primarily in form and reference by the 
prospective congenialities of a heavenly communion 
of saints, these congenialities being perceived to be 
already potential in our neighbours because of 
redemption and grace. ‘The fruition of love requires 
personal friendship and contact, but to snatch at this, 
here and now, is often to violate love and to sin most 
grievously. ‘The sum of the matter is that the second 
table requires such lines of conduct as will promote 
and ultimately secure the future fellowship which 
constitutes the joy of eternal life. Therefore no 
works of charity are really Christian unless they are 
religious in standpoint and quality; for although 
Christian love presupposes and exercises natural 
affection, the standpoint or aim is supernatural, and 
is determined in its reference and intended effect by 
consciousness of a supernatural destiny—one in which 
the highest welfare of all men alike is involved. 

The Sixth Commandment requires display of love 


118 MORAL THEOLOGY PROPER: LAW 


with reference to our neighbour’s person, in the popu- 
lar and physical sense of that term. Murder is the 
most conspicuous.form of its violation, and murder 
is to be defined as malicous or unlawful killing. But 
the principle involved obviously applies to all forms 
of physical injury, and to the malice which affords 
motives for such conduct. Suicide is self-murder.! 
Among the special forms of sin which come under 
this commandment are duelling, unlawful warfare, 
abortion,? bullying, hazing and every form of inhuman- 
ity, as well as anything which causes danger to the 
persons of others, e.g., reckless automobile driving, 
which the English law treats as manslaughter. 
Capital punishment is not forbidden by this com- 


1 See E. Westermarck, op. cit., ch.xxxv. For pagan views, W. E. H. 
Lecky, op. cit., vol. I, pp. 212-222; Virgil, Aeneid, vi, 434, mildly 
censures suicide. For the related modern problem of Euthanasia, 
see F. G. Belton, Present Day Problems, ch. xi. An interesting prob- 
lem in casuistry is afforded in W. R. Thayer’s Theodore Roosevelt, 
p. 393. In the Brazilian forest Mr. Roosevelt, sick and injured so 
that his condition retards the progress of the rest of the party towards 
safety, determines to shoot himself if his condition does not speedily 
improve. Sir Thomas Browne in his Religio Medici has an expression 
worth noting. ‘When life is more terrible than death it is the truer 
courage to dare to live.” One is not, however, bound to use extreme 
and difficult measures for the preservation of one’s life, as resort to a 
surgical operation when the outcome is uncertain, or to remove to a 
distant climate; but he is bound to use available and ordinary 
precautions for the preservation of life and health. A physician, or 
any one in care of the sick, may not omit anything that would prolong 
life, in order that the period of suffering may be shortened. 

2 See E. Westermarck, of. cit., ch. xxi; Cath. Encyc., s.v. “Duel.” 

3T. Slater, op. cit., vol. I, pp. 312-315; Cath. Encyc., g.v.3 C. 
Coppens, Moral Principles and Medical Practice. 


SUPERIMPOSED MORAL LAW 119 


mandment; Holy Scripture allows it,! and the 
Church has never legislated against it. It belongs 
to the State by natural reason, for the State must have 
liberty to act so as to secure and preserve its well-being 
and safety.2 The right of inflicting such punishment 
belongs to the properly constituted authority and 
cannot be exercised by any private individual or 
unofficial group of individuals. Therefore lynching 
is a violation of this commandment. “ Justifiable” 
homicide, likewise, is not forbidden. It may be 
defined as the killing of an assailant in order to protect 
one’s own life, limb, chastity, or property, including 
that of another; but it is not justifiable when less 
extreme measures will secure the end, nor is it war- 
ranted for insult or contumely. Lawful warfare is 
not forbidden, the legality of any particular war 
being dependent upon its being undertaken by the 
state to which obedience is due? 

§13. The Seventh Commandment requires us to 
have regard for the holiness of our neighbour’s body,in 


1 Rom. xiii. 4, 

2E. Westermarck, of. cit., vol. I, pp. 490-496. 

3G. L. Richardson, Conscience, Its Origin and Authority, ch. xix; 
and the various works on the Thirty-nine Articles under Art. xxxvl. 
E£.g., E. J. Bicknell, Theol. Introd. to the Thirty-nine Articles, pp. 
548-540, “As civilization advances the use of force is abated. Con- 
duct becomes moralized. Higher motives for obedience tend to 
supplant the lower. But at the bottom there must always be the 
appeal to force to put down disorder. . . . War is simply the result 
of human sin and self-seeking. It is a symptom of the depravity 
of the human heart. Christianity sets itself not to abolish the 
symptom only but to root out the cause of the evil.” 


120 MORAL THEOLOGY PROPER: LAW 


the older sense of its consecration to God. It implies 
the obligation of preserving the same holiness of our 
own bodies.! 

The text of the commandment names a most obvi- 
ous external violation of its principle, but there are 
at least five principal lines of external sin involved: 
(a) with the married, adultery; (6) with the unmar- 
ried, fornication;? of these two the most aggravated 
form being incest in which relationship either of 
blood or of marriage is involved; (c) Intemperate 

d unnatural use of marital privileges; (d) Unnat- 
aral sexual actions between members of the same sex,* 
or between human beings and the lower animals; 
(e) Sins against one’s own body.5 

The principle of the commandment covers purity 
of thought and speech, as well as of physical action, 
and every sphere of conduct which is connected with 
the preservation of purity. The following lines of 
conduct are therefore sinful, although in varying 
degrees: (a) immodest dress, including any form of 
dress which because of its violation of convention 
obtrudes immoral suggestion; (0) any departure in 

1W. W. Webb, o?. cit., pp. 169-176. A full treatment of the whole 
subject will be found in St. Thomas, IJ, II, cliii ff.; A. Vermeersch, 
De Castitate. See also Koch-Preuss, of. cit., vol. II, pp. 73-77; T. 
Slater, op. cit., vol. I, pp. 324-339. 

2 Ephes. v. 5. 

3St. Aug., de Bono Mair. 8, expresses in strongest terms the evil 
of incest, ‘Adultery will be good because incest is worse.” 

‘See Koch-Preuss, of. ci#., vol. II, p. 88; E. Westermarck, of. cit., 


ch. xliii. 
5 z Cor. vi. 9-10, 15-20; cf. Gal. v. ro. 


SUPERIMPOSED MORAL LAW 12 


conduct from social conventions that involves such 
suggestion; (c) undue intimacies, whether between 
the sexes or between those of the same sex; (d) 
loose conversation, especially scandalous gossip, 
suggestive witticisms and dubious stories; (e) giving 
rein to the imagination in relation to sexual indul- 
gence;! listening to foul conversation and looking at 
pictures which are either obscene or suggestive; (g) 
reading trashy stories, or attending plays which 
exploit sexual problems and affect realism in the 
alleged interest of more perfect information concern- 
ing human life; (%) high living, that is, a life of habit- 
ual self-indulgence in the comforts and luxuries which 
wealth and modern invention place at our disposal; 
(i) taking part in, or sanctioning in any way, dances 
which are suggestive or tend to give rise to impure 
thoughts and desires; (7) slothful physical habits; 
(k) unnecessary meddling with one’s own body; (/) 
marriage contrary to the law of God.” 

There are four lines, among others, along which 
antecedent protection against the sins of which we 
have spoken is to be sought: (a) preoccupation, 
both of body and of mind; (6) cultivation of a 
wholesome atmosphere, both in relation to compan- 
ionship and to reading and thought;? (c) the main- 

1 This includes the custody of the eyes; St. Matt. v. 28. “For it 
is all one with what part of the body we commit adultery, and if a 
man lets his eye loose and enjoys the lust of that, he is an adul- 
terer;” Jeremy Taylor, Holy Living. 

2 Cf. ch. v. § 7, below. 

3 Philip. iv. 8. 


122 MORAL THEOLOGY PROPER: LAW 


tenance of good health and the avoidance of nervous 
exhaustion; (d) in some instances marriage! The 
one immediate way of resisting temptation when it 
comes is flight.2 This may be either interior, by 
change of attention, or exterior, by physical removal. 
The effectiveness of this flight will depend upon imme- 
diate resort to prayer. If one undertakes to reason 
with this kind of temptation he is almost certain 
to yield to it, because the temptation does not per- 
tain to reason but appeals to the imagination, and 
to argue is to keep the imagination fixed upon the 
subject. Diversion*of mind is what is needed. 

§14. The Eighth Commandmeni inculcates love in 
reference to care of our neighbour’s possessions.2 It 
forbids three principal things: (@) unjust appropria- 
tion of another’s goods, e.g., by secret theft, open 
robbery, fraud, or embezzling; * (0) failure to give to 
each his dues, e.g., defaulting in matters of debt, legal 
injustice, personal extravagance to the injury of 
dependents and the poor, delaying the payment of 
debts, mutual injustice between capital and labour, 

1 As indicated by St. Paul in 1 Cor. vii. 9. 

2St. Aug. Serm. 350, “If you want to win a victory against the 
temptation of lust, flee.” 

3°W. W. Webb, op. cit., pp. 177-187; J. P. Gury, op. cit., § 436, 
‘‘prohibet omnem injustitiam externam in bonis fortuna proximi. ... 
Decimum vero peccata etiam interna seu concupiscentiae, i.e., 
desiderii bonorum proximi et actiones injuste vetat.”’ 

4J. P. Gury, op. cit., §§ 605-625, treats of the species of theft: 
(a) furtum; (6) rapina (with violence); (c) fraus et dolus; (d) sac- 
rilegium; (e) peculatus. For the causes excusing from theft, see 
§§ 615-625; and on restitution, §§ 626 ff. 


SUPERIMPOSED MORAL LAW 123 


and violation of contracts; (c) all private practices 
and habits which create a personal disposition unfav- 
ourable to keeping this commandment.! This last- 
mentioned head includes: (a) undue wealth, which 
stimulates avarice and disregards the interests of 
employees and smaller capitalists; (6) substitution of 
the maintenance of rights for the Christian ideal of 
doing justice to others; (c) extravagant habits, which 
preclude just administration of wealth, whether this 
wealth is one’s own or is administered in behalf of 
another; (d) living beyond one’s means, which induces 
temptation to secure greater means by illegitimate 
methods; (e) waste and needless destruction of what 
might be useful to others; (/) overcharging for 
services, commodities, etc., that is, profiteering; (g) 
all forms of failure of employees adequately to render 
the services for which they are paid. 

In offences of this sort the mark of genuine repent- 
ance is effort, whenever possible, to make sufficient 
reparation. So far as is possible restitution must 
be made for whatever damage has been caused. The 
same applies to one who either assists in or sinfully 


1T, Slater, op. cit., vol. I, p. 339, ‘‘Directly and explicitly it for- 
bids theft, but implicitly it commands us to observe justice in our 
dealings with others;” 7.¢., to give to every one his due or right. 
Moral theologians in speaking of one’s right to do as he will with his 
own, e.g., to throw away his money, disregard the important principle 
of stewardship, which is a corrective of the plea, “‘Shall I not do what 
I will with mine own?” 

2T. Slater, op. cil., vol. I, pp. 398-453, gives a fuller treatment. 
See St. Thomas, I, II, xii. 


124 MORAL THEOLOGY PROPER: LAW 


benefits by an act of injustice. The offender is 
released either if the offended does not wish restitu- 
tion, or if there is either physical or other legitimate 
incapacity to make it; but this release ceases when 
the incapacity ceases, even though there be no legal 
obligation, as, e.g., in bankruptcy cases.! 

Questions of title to property, etc., are legal 
rather than moral. Presumably the pertinent civil 
laws are in harmony with sound morality; and, inas- 
much as these laws are complex and differ in various 
states, it is not to be supposed that any one except a 
legal specialist can make expert determinations con- 
cerning them. 

§15. The Ninth Commandment requires love in 
relation to our neighbour’s name and mind. The 
common forms of its violation are evil speaking, lying, 
and slandering. In the sphere of thought we may 
include rash judgments, which arise from malice and 
violate Christian charity.2 Reporting evil of another, 
except when required by duty, is always sinful. Its 
most frequent form is ill-natured gossip. A lie? 


17T, Slater, op. cit., vol. I, pp. 438-451, gives authorities pro and 
con and concludes to the contrary. 

2St. Matt. vii. 1-3; Rom.ii.1. On this commandment, see W. W. 
Webb, oP. cit., pp. 187-192; T. Slater, op. cit., vol. I, pp. 456-473. 

$ Col. ili. 9; Eph. iv. 25. Durant Drake, Problems of Conduct, 
ch. xix, Truthfulness and its Problems. St. Augustine says it is 
never under any circumstances permitted to falsify. This is not 
universally accepted; but Roman casuists and Jeremy Taylor allow 
too many exceptions to the general principle, e.g., in the form of men- 
tal reservations. gsA lie may be told by either gestures, other signs, 
_ tone of voice, or silence, as well as by word of mouth. St. Augustine, 


SUPERIMPOSED MORAL LAW 125 


means an unjust falsehood, but falsehood is so rarely 
just that in normal practice the qualification should 
be left out. Yet there are cases in which duty requires 
falsehood, e.g., to the insane in dangerous emergencies. 
The burden of proof always lies on him who would 
falsify, and it is almost always the case that the ele- 
-ment of doubt is practically absent. The reason why 
truth-telling must be observed, even when its neces- 
sity is not apparent, is that the general welfare of 
mankind, as well as the virtue of the individual speak- 
ers, depends upon the ability of one man to trust 
another. <A justifiable falsehood will not occur often 
in any normal lifetime, and in many cases never.? 


de Mendac. 3, “He tells a lie who has one thing in his mind and says 
something else by word or by any sign whatever.” 

1° W. Hermann, oP. cit., p. 128, “We must not conceal from ourselves 
that under certain definite circumstances the use of untrue speech is 
not only permitted but may be our duty.” He instances an actor in 
case of a fire in a theatre telling an untruth to prevent mad flight from 
the building, and a man meeting a criminal on his way to commit a 
crime; St. Augustine used the last illustration and drew the opposite 
conclusion. The Jesuit Cathrein charged the German philosophers, 
Paulsen, Wundt, and Ziegler, and the theologians Martensen and 
Harless, with making lies permissible (which Hermann concedes), 
and rejected the permission 7m toto—a curious reversal of tradition. 
Kant, in his Uber ein vermeintes Recht aus Menschenliebe zu Liigen, 
strongly opposed all justification of falsehood. 

2 Expressions are often used which have two senses, true in one, 
untrue in the others; e¢.g., a servant may reply that her mistress is 
not at home, meaning not that she is away from home, but that she 
does not wish to see callers—a convention] usage. A physician, 
lawyer or priest, questioned about professional secrets, may reply 
that he does not know, meaning that he has no knowledge which he 
may either communicate or betray his possession of. These instances 


126 MORAL THEOLOGY PROPER: LAW 


Slander consists in evil-speaking falsely. It has 
double guilt, and is the worst form of sin under this 
commandment. . 

We should include under the above heads all forms 
of action or inaction by which we knowingly convey a 
false impression. And, apart from the leading forms 
of sin against this commandment, certain incidental 
and connected kinds of wrong-doing are involved: 
(a) unnecessary judging, because predisposing to evil 
speaking; (b) suspicion, when based upon lack of 
charity, or nourished in violation of it; (c) violation 
of secrets, which puts the party concerned in the 
wrong light; because we cannot hope to reproduce 
first-hand information in a form that will produce a 
correct impression. In any case the secret is our 
neighbour’s, and we have no right to betray it; (d) 
flattery, as involving deceit and fostering conceit; 
(e) perjury, or false oaths; (f) self-deceit, as depriv- 
ing one’s self of the knowledge of himself which he 
ought to acquire; (g) false representation of one’s self, 
which is either hypocritical or the cause of self-deceit 
and pride; () exaggeration; (z) rash and unconsid- 
ered assertions. 

§ 16. The Tenth Commandment requires love in 
relation to our neighbour’s estate, especially as com- 


hardly fall in the class of ‘‘mental reservations.” Clerical vows can- 
not be reduced in effect by such reservations, for these vows register 
obligations which in any case are binding on those ordained, and are 
also violations of veracity. Cf. J. N. Figgis, Fellowship of the Mys- 
tery, pp. 263-271; H. Sidgwick, Practical Ethics, pp. 142-177. 


SUPERIMPOSED MORAL LAW 72% 


pared with our own. In a sense it also recapitulates 
the second table in interior aspects, since it largely 
determines our whole moral attitude, and when prop- 
erly kept, is likely to insure the keeping of the four 
previous commandments. 

Covetousness involves setting up our own welfare 
as an idol in the place of God, and constitutes rebel- 
lion against the conditions of our state of probation. 
For this reason it is called idolatry, because it sub- 
stitutes inferior good for God. This command- 
ment does not prohibit temperate desire for earthly 
good, but requires that it shall be a branch of our 
desire to attain our chief end, and that its forms 
shall be capable of ministering to that end.2 The 
principal sins are (a) covetousness; (0) envy; (c) 
discontent with one’s earthly estate, or such ambition 
as 1s inconsistent with acceptance of providential 
conditions and with hearty recognition of the nghts 
and welfare of others; (d) idleness, especially when 
caused by envy and discontent. The most prominent 
and characteristic form of sin under this command- 
ment to-day is the race to get rich, and the inevitably 
resulting war between capital and labour, which 
cannot be effectually remedied by mere external 
adjustments of industrial relations. The problem is 
primarily moral, and should be so regarded by the 
clergy and other Christian workers. This is not to 
deny either the need of industrial adjustments or 


1 Ephes. v. 5; Col. iii. 5. 
2St. Matt. vi. 19-213 xvi. 26; 1 Tim. vi. 9-11. 


128 MORAL THEOLOGY PROPER: LAW 


their value in correcting certain forms of current 
injustice; but it presupposes that without a reforma- 
tion of selfishness and covetousness this value will 
be seriously limited and temporary. 


CHAPTER V 
SACRAMENTAL OBLIGATIONS 


§ 1. The sacraments, in so far as they are divinely 
instituted for our use, involve obligations connected 
with our employment of them in their proper place 
and connections. The duty to use them involves 
the duty of observing the rubrics and other canon 
laws which regulate the manner, occasion and fre- 
quency of their use. The Prayer Book constitutes 
the chief source of information on the subject for 
Anglicans, but regard is to be had for the force of 
catholic tradition in details not there covered. 

The sacraments are efficacious ex opere operato, 
because their efficacy depends solely upon the pledged 
operation of God. ‘Therefore we cannot receive them 
without spiritual results of some kind. This is de 
fide. If we receive them worthily, with faith and 
penitence, we obtain their intended benefits. Other- 
wise, and until the proper subjective conditions are 
present, their effects are injurious. All that is 
required for their administration is a proper minister, 
possessing jurisdiction, using the proper matter and 
form, with the ostensible intention of doing what the 

1F, J. Hall, The Church, etc., pp. 321-323. 
129 


130 SACRAMENTAL OBLIGATIONS 


Church does.! Attention, however desirable, is not 
essential to validity, although carelessness is irreve- 
rent. It isa grave sin for one not in a state of grace 
to administer any sacrament. Accordingly, in view 
of the fact that sacramental ministrations pertain 
regularly to his God-given duties, and may have to be 
fulfilled suddenly and unexpectedly, a priest is under 
peculiar obligation to live habitually in a state of 
sanctifying grace. 

It is sinful for a minister unnecessarily to refuse the 
administration of a sacrament, when he is lawfully 
and reasonably called upon for such administration 
by one who is qualified to ask for it. Peril to health 
or, in case of grave necessity, even to life itself does 
not exempt him, e.g., in the case of one dying of con- 
tagious disease. ‘This responsibility normally belongs 
only to one having actual pastoral jurisdiction over 
the person concerned; but in grave emergencies it 
extends to any competent minister who is available. 
On the other hand, a priest sins gravely in adminis- 
tering a sacrament to one who is known to be un- 
worthy of its reception and impenitent. Such 
administration is forbidden for two reasons: (a) 
our Lord’s prohibition to give that which is holy to 
dogs or to cast pearls before swine;? (0) resulting 
scandal to the faithful. If the knowledge by which 
the priest is here guided has been obtained in the con- 

1 Idem, pp. 319-320. 


2St. Matt. vil. 6; 1 Tim. v. 22. First rubric of the Communion 
Office, American Prayer Book. 


BAPTISM 131 


fessional, it may not be used for public refusal of 
sacraments, because this would violate the seal. But 
he may use such knowledge in private refusal of 
the sacrament! As regards matter and form, a 
strict obligation to use those prescribed by the Church 
rests upon the minister; but a slight accidental vari- 
ation in language does not affect the validity of the 
sacrament unless it occurs in a vital part, e.g., in the 
words of consecration in the Eucharist. 

§ 2. By Baptism the soul is cleansed from all the 
stains and guilt of sin, original and actual, sanctifying 
grace is imparted, and character is imprinted. Al- 
though of universal obligation,? Baptism requires for 
its safe and righteous reception, the removal of exist- 
ing barriers to its beneficial effects. Therefore adults 
should not be baptized without sufficient evidence 
of real faith and of repentance; and the sponsors for 
infants should be neither incompetent nor careless. 
Parents are bound to have their children baptized 
as soon as may be after birth. When private Bap- 
tism has been administered it should be followed, 

1See Koch-Preuss, op. cit., vol. II, pp. 108-114; and especially 
T. Slater, op. cit., vol. II, pp. 27-40. ‘These references apply to the 
minister. On the obligations of recipients, see Koch-Preuss, pp. 
115-117; Slater, pp. 41-45. 

2 The “‘necessttas medi” is found in St. John iii. 5, the “‘mecessttas 
preceptt” in St. Matt. xxviii. 19. Baptism must be received either 
actually, i re, or, at least, by intention, 77 voto; but nothing can 
release from the necessity of reception in re except the positive inabil- 
ity thus to receive it. On baptismal requirements, see F. J. Hall, 


op. cit., pp. 323-327; D. Stone, Holy Baptism, ch. ii, ix-x; St. 
Thomas, ITI, Ixvi-lxviii; Cath. Encyc., s.v. “Baptism,” passim. 


132 SACRAMENTAL OBLIGATIONS 


whenever possible, by public reception in the Church. 
It is a mortal sin avoidably to allow an infant to die 
unbaptized, although ignorance may qualify this con- 
clusion. Moralists generally hold that it is a mortal 
sin to postpone Baptism for more than a month. 

As the rubrics give dipping the preference over 
pouring, a priest may not refuse to baptize by immer- 
sion without sufficiently grave reason in the particular 
instance; but any application of water to the head is 
valid. Any person may administer Baptism in case 
of necessity; and some one should do so immediately 
after birth, if there appears to be reasonable doubt as 
to whether the child will live until a priest, the proper 
minister, can arrive. Those apparently stillborn, 
and abnormally formed infants (monstra) should be 
baptized sub conditione, “‘If thou art able to receive 
baptism,” etc. Certain abnormal cases may be 
briefly referred to. Uterine Baptisms should be admin- 
istered when any part of the child appears in process 
of delivery and there is grave doubt of the delivery of 
a living child being completed. In the case of an 
unknown and unconscious person, im extremis, Bap- 
tism under a double condition 2? may be administered, 
the supposition being that one who has omitted the 
reception of the sacrament would ask to receive it 


1 Koch-Preuss, op. cit., vol. II, pp. 119-120; A. E. Sanford, Pas- 
toral Medicine, p. 93. 

2 “Tf thou art not already baptized” (if there be uncertainty as to 
the fact) ‘‘and art capable of receiving Baptism.” In such cases, it 
may be noted, the giving of a name is no essential part of the service. 


CONFIRMATION 133 


in extremis if he were capable of expressing his desire. 
Baptism may also be administered to those appar- 
ently dead under the same condition! We say 
‘“‘apparently dead” for there is considerable uncer- 
tainty as to the moment of death, the beginning of 
putrefaction often being the only certain sign of its 
occurrence. 

After the Baptism of children the parents, god- 
parents, or guardians are bound to provide Christian 
education for the child, and to prepare him for his 
later sacramental privileges. 

§ 3. Confirmation? in the West, is required to be 
received when the baptized child reaches the age of 
discretion, which means the age at which the child 
can distinguish between right and wrong and can 
perceive the broad lines of Christian obligation. 
It does not mean that he should be a theologian, a 
philosopher, or a scientist, or even that he should be 
able rightly to control his future life without the 
guidance of his elders. Incidentally, parents and 
sponsors are under obligation to bring children to 

1A, E. Sanford, op. cit., pp. 223-235. The Roman Church allows 
twenty-four hours to elapse before death is to be taken as certain. 
This seems an extreme period; and an hour would, probably, be quite 
sufficient under normal circumstances to determine whether death 
has occurred. But abnormal cases, especially those of coma and 
drowning, have to be reckoned with. 

2 See Acts viii. 17-18; xix. 6. On its requirements, see F. J. Hall, 
op. cit., pp. 327-330 and The Sacraments, pp. 45-48, 61-68; A. C. A. 
Hall, Confirmation, ch. iii-iv; A. T. Wirgman, Doctr. of Conf., 


ch. v. Their history: Hastings, Encyc. of Relig., s.v. “Confirma- 
tion.” 


134 SACRAMENTAL OBLIGATIONS 


Confirmation unless impediments emerge, and in that 
case the obligation of hastening their removal is 
incurred. The following impediments have to be 
reckoned with: (a) the authority of parents or 
guardians over minors, which may not, in ultimate 
issue, be overruled;! (6) a state of impenitence; (c) 
unbelief; (d) insanity;? (e) the Church’s rule that 
none shall be confirmed but such as can say the Creed, 
the Lord’s Prayer, and the Ten Commandments, and 
are sufficiently instructed in the other parts of the 
Church Catechism.” As this is a positive rather 
than an intrinsic impediment, cases may occur in 
which failure to exact full literal obedience would 
violate in no way the real mind of the Church; (/) 
Unwillingness of the child. The authority of the 
parents extends to bringing their children to be bap- 
tized and confirmed, but it is the duty both of 
parents and of pastors, not to press the matter in the 
face of continued unwillingness. All who are able to 
recelve this sacrament are in duty bound to do so; 
but 1f neglect on the part of one instructed is inspired 
by known contempt of the sacrament, its adminis- 

1'The Roman Church has determined (T. Slater, op. cit., vol. II, 
p. 56, giving the decree) that children of seven years and upwards 
may determine for themselves and receive Baptism in spite of the 
opposition of their parents. If we are sound in our interpretation of 
the Fifth Commandment this is not true—certainly not under Angli- 
can conditions. 

2 This prohibition, including also cases of imbecility and idiocy, 
does not extend to Baptism; the latter sacrament is “necessitas medit,”’ 


of receiving supernatural life, extending to every living soul; whereas 
Confirmation is “necessitas pracepti.” 


HOLY COMMUNION 135 


tration becomes plainly sinful. Bishops are bound 
to give those within their jurisdiction opportunity at 
reasonable intervals of receiving the sacrament.! 

There is no obligation, on the part of either minister 
or recipient, to receive either Baptism or Confirmation 
fasting; but St. Thomas says ‘‘where it can con- 
veniently be done, it is more becoming.’? Nor may 
sacramental confession be required canonically as a 
normal condition of Confirmation. It is often, how- 
ever, highly desirable; and the circumstances of a 
given case may make the need of it so obvious that 
the pastor will be justified in demanding the evidence 
of readiness for Confirmation which such confession 
in the given instance can alone afford. A pastor is 
also entitled, if the general condition of his cure 
appears to justify it, to urge upon his classes for Con- 
firmation the desirability of the use of confession. 

§ 4. Holy Communion? being generally necessary 
for salvation, is obligatory upon all who can fulfil its 
conditions,* viz.: (a) previous Baptism; (6) Confir- 


1 The new Roman Codex Juris Can., can. 785, §§ 3 ff., says at least 
once every five years; but within our own communion the canon law 
requires once in three years: Engl. Canons of 1603, lx; American 
Digest, Canon 17, § II. 

2 Summa Theol., III, lxxii, 12 ad 2. 

8 On its requirements, see F. J. Hall, The Church, etc., pp. 330-333) 
and The Sacraments, pp. 182-188; D. Stone, Holy Communion, 
ch. xii-xiv; St. Thomas, IIT, Ixxiv, Ixxviii, lxxxii. 

4T. Slater, op. cit., vol. II, p. ror, ‘‘The sacramental reception of 
the Eucharist is not a necessary means of salvation, for it is a sacra- 
ment of the living and supposes the grace of God in the soul, and a 
soul in the state of grace has everything which is necessary for salva- 


136 SACRAMENTAL OBLIGATIONS 


mation, or at least readiness and desire to be confirmed. 
In case of serious illness some latitude may be wisely 
used in the interpretation of this condition; (c) faith 
and repentance; (d) lawful opportunity; (e) fasting, 
when no law of necessity interferes. As fasting is a 
ceremonial precept, it cannot be rightly applied in 
such wise as to excommunicate people who are sin- 
cerely desirous of obeying the law of the Church. It 
is an act of devotion.! As to frequency of reception, 
one of the fundamental desires of the Anglican 
Reformers was that communions should be made more 
frequently, and an English Prayer Book rubric re- 
quires parishioners to communicate “at least three 
times in the year, of which Easter is to be one.” ? 


tion.”” We hold, however, that, while reception is not possible for 
all and is not invariably necessary absolutely, it is so in normal cases 
for those having the use of reason and the opportunity of reception. 
Our Lord’s words, St. John vi. 53-58, make reception necesstias 
precepti, and, under the conditions noted above, necessitas medit. 
The priest is morally bound to do all he can to provide that the qual- 
ified shall receive the viaticum; see First Council of Nicea, Can. xiii, 

1 It is, of course, a very important one, and should be treated nor- 
mally as a serious obligation. Cf. ch. vi. § 2 fin., below. 

2 There is much to be said for daily reception, as was customary in 
the early Church. See, e.g., St. Aug., Ep. 54.4. The Roman Church 
(Conc. Lat., IV, can. 21; Conc. Trent, Sess. xiii. can. 9. CE. 9, BP 
Gury, op. cit., vol. II, §§ 218 ff.) requires reception at least in Easter- 
tide, or, if this is physically impossible, as soon after as it may be 
possible, anticipating the time, if that can be done, when it is known 
that Easter reception will be impossible. In America this is now con- 
strued to mean between the First Sunday in Lent and Trinity Sunday. 
It is presupposed (see proposition condemned by Innocent IX, 
Denzinger, Enchirid, § 1205) that this means worthy reception. In 
recent days the Roman Church has sought to increase the frequency 
of communion, cf. Decree promulgated by Pius X, Dec. 20, 1905. 


PENANCE 137 


Preparation is usually divided into two parts, that 
of the soul and that of the body. That communion 
may be received worthily the soul must be free from 
mortal sin;! to insure which the sacrament of Penance 
may be used, or an act of perfect contrition made. 
There should be also such use of prayer, meditation, 
etc., as will predispose one towards a beneficial recep- 
tion. The preparation of the body lies mainly in 
observance of the precept of fasting, which forbids 
the taking of food or drink after midnight.? It is 
expedient, although not commanded, that the married 
should abstain from the marital privilege immediately 
before and after receiving? As to intention, the 
recipient should have the purpose of pleasing God, 
of becoming more closely united to Him, and should 
seek this heavenly provision as food for his soul and 
as medicine for its weaknesses. 

The priest is the minister of the consecration; dea- 
cons may assist in the administration to the people, 
and in case of necessity administer the reserved sac- 
rament. In the early Church the latter privilege 
was sometimes exercised by laymen, and would prob- 
ably be lawful now; but occasions would practically 
never arise. 

§ 5. As to Penance, the American Church directs 
sinners to come to the priest whenever they cannot by 


Ax) Cor, xi. 27 ff. 

2 And for at least six hours previous to communion. See St. Aug. 
Ep. 54, 8; St. Thomas, III, lxxx, 8 ad 5. This obligation does not 
in the Roman Church bind invalids, Cod. Jur. Can., can. 858, § 2. 

§ Cf. Exod. xix. 14-15. 


138 SACRAMENTAL OBLIGATIONS 


private methods of repentance quiet their consciences, 
but require further comfort and counsel.! As the 
English exhortation makes clear, the comfort referred 
to includes priestly absolution.” ‘The vagueness of 
this language, a concession to Protestant prejudice, 
ought not to lead us to anti-catholic inferences. 
Nothing is more certain than that an appeal to an- 
tiquity was the ostensible and formal principle of 
the Anglican reformation. Therefore we ought to 
interpret the Prayer Book references to this subject, 
in spite of their shunning certain technical expressions 
of medizval origin, and abandoning the rule requiring 
an annual Confession, as intended to preserve unal- 
tered the ancient catholic doctrine and precept con- 
cerning Confession. There were variations in the 
rigourand method of discipline in the ancient Churches; 
but all were agreed as to the necessity and obligation 
of confession to a priest for Christians who had 
become guilty of the graver forms of sin. Accordingly, 
although Anglican discipline leaves the sinner free 
to judge for himself whether he has sinned gravely 
enough to need this remedy, he is still under precept 
to confess to a priest when such need arises, that is, 


1 See the first of the longer Exhortations in the Communion Office. 
On the requirements of this sacrament, see F. J. Hall, The Church, 
etc., Pp. 333-336, and The Sacraments, pp. 235-245; W. W. Webb, 
op. cit., ch. ii; W. W. Williams, Moral Theol. of the Sac. of Penance, 
passim; F. G. Belton, Manual for Confessors, passim. 

2 Cf. The denial in the Preface of the American Prayer Book of in- 
tention “to depart from the Church of England in any essential 
point of doctrine, discipline, or worship.” 


PENANCE 139 


when in Prayer Book language he cannot otherwise 
‘quiet his conscience.” Obviously to “quiet’’ here 
means to secure assured pardon of God by really 
effectual repentance. The duty of Confession Is not 
left wholly optional. What is left to private judg- 
ment is, whether the conditions which make it one’s 
own duty have actually arisen. 

In technical terms it is said by catholic theologians 
that ‘“‘mortal” sin makes sacramental Confession 
necessary and obligatory.1 But we ought to remem- 
ber that the distinction between ‘mortal’ and 
“venial” sin is less precisely determinative of par- 
ticular cases than it is often thought to be. Mortal 
sin means fatal sin, a question of degree that calls for 
discriminating judgment in each case; and to say 
that mortal sin makes confession necessary ought to 
be understood as a technical way of punctuating the 
broad proposition that one may fall into a degree of 
guilt which will in all probability prove spiritually 
fatal, unless the sinner resorts to the sacramental aid 
of Penance, provided for this very emergency. The 

1F, G. Belton, Manual for Confessors, pp. 8-9; A. H. Baverstock, 
The Priest as Confessor, ch. i; Koch-Preuss, op. cit., vol. I, p. 135. 
The Council of Trent, Sess. xiv, ch. v, can. 6, describes this sacrament 
as a necessitas medit. 

2 To teach an ordinary congregation in a baldly technical way that 
“mortal sin’? makes the sacrament of Penance a necessity, coupled 
with equally bald assertions that certain sins are “mortal” (no 
intimation being given that the sins called ‘“‘venial’? may be ‘mor- 
tal” in their malicious deliberateness, and that the so-called “mortal” 


sins may be venial because of ignorance and lack of deliberation), 
is to impart a mechanical aspect to the whole subject; and is to run 


140 SACRAMENTAL OBLIGATIONS 


further proposition follows that the perceived possi- 
bility that one has sinned thus gravely makes it 
imprudent and unsafe to neglect the use of this sacra- 
ment. 

The American Office for the Visitation of Pris- 
oners authorizes the use of the form of absolution in 
the Communion Office. On the other hand, we Amer- 
icans inherit the form still found in the English Office 
for the Visitation of the Sick; and this form is not 
only better suited for private absolution, but is 
also widely used in the Catholic Church at large and 
for that reason strongly recommended to our use. 

Inasmuch as repentance includes what is technically 
called “satisfaction” and this includes acts of penance 
to God, both custom and the nature of things require 
that a priest should impose some form of penance, 
readiness to fulfil which should be a condition of 
granting absolution. But the penance should not be 
so severe as to challenge resistance or to suggest the 
notion that it is in any sense an offset to sin. Its sole 
value lies in its function of expressing and completing 
repentance; and this value depends upon the dutiful 
spirit of its performance rather than upon its quanti- 
tative and intrinsic importance. The customary 


a grave risk of causing misconception and revolt. It is usually safer 
to use untechnical language that will be understood, and that will not 
soothe people’s consciences with regard to their smaller sins—as if 
they required no repentance. Orthodoxy does not lie in rigid 
technicalities, but in the truths which catholic technicalities are 
designed to preserve among teachers and pastors, presumably capable 
of rightly understanding them. 


PENANCE I4I 


penance is a brief prayer or meditation, chosen with 
reference to the ascertained moral state of the peni- 
tent, with a time assigned for its fulfilment.1 Both 
priest and penitent are bound by the so-called seal; 
that is, what is said in the confessional is official and 
privileged, and may not be revealed even on the wit- 
ness stand without mutual consent.? 

The matter of the sacrament, or the things to be 
confessed, includes all post-baptismal sins not pre- 
viously brought to sacramental Confession, so far as 
they can be recalled by dutiful and careful self-exam- 
ination.? For the integrity of Confession it is espe- 
cially necessary that every species of mortal sin as 
above defined should be confessed, with reasonably 
intelligent indication of the gravity and frequency of 
each. And, since repentance is not sufficient unless 
it has reference to all forms of sin of whatever degree 
of gravity, no species of sin which can be recalled 
should be concealed; although a complete catalogue of 
venial sins is practically impossible, and is unnecessary 
provided one’s besetting sins and their frequency are 
acknowledged. In brief, a good confession means 
one in which the penitent sincerely makes a “clean 
breast” of his wrong-doings. An incidental reason 


1 On suitable penances, see E. B. Pusey, Advice . . . Abbé Gaume’s 
Manual of Confessors, ch. v. art. ix; F. G. Belton, op. cit., Pt. I, 
ch. vi; A. H. Baverstock, op. cit., ch. vi. 

2On the seal, W. W. Williams, op. cit., pp. 112-125; F. J. Hall, 
The Sacraments, pp. 240-243. 

3See F. J. Hall, op. cit., pp. 239 f.; W. W. Williams, op. cit., pp. 
12-18. Technically it is called guasi matter. 


142 SACRAMENTAL OBLIGATIONS 


for this requirement is that the priest’s part in judg- 
ing, instructing and comforting the penitent is thereby 
made more intelligent and effective for the soul’s 
guidance and help in attaining his appointed goal of 
entire sanctification. Moreover, dutiful faithfulness 
of the penitent in doing his part will remove the 
danger of mechanical and unprofitable use of the sac- 
rament. In order to receive it beneficially, one must 
fulfil the several parts of repentance as adequately 
as he can. To this end he must cultivate genuine 
contrition, a firmly fixed purpose of amendment, and 
readiness to accept and perform whatever penance 
may be imposed.! 

On the part of the priest there is need here for 
greater preparatory study than in the case of any 
other sacrament. He forgives or retains not accord- 
ing to his pleasure, but according to the moral con- 
ditions which he perceives in the person making, 
Confession. He cannot hope to judge these rightly, 
to give wise counsel, and to assign penance justly, 
without the knowledge which the study of Moral 
Theology and Casuistry affords.? 

§ 6. In Holy Orders, the obligations involved per- 


1 These matters are treated of more fully in ch, ix, below. 

2K. E. Kirk, op. cit., ch. i; F. G. Belton, Present Day Problems in 

3Samuel Wilberforce, Addresses to Candidates for Holy Orders 
(covering the Ordination vows); John Gott, The Parish Priest in the 
Town; P. V. Smith, The Legal Position of the Clergy (in England); 
H. P. Liddon, Clerical Life and Work; W.C. E. Newbolt, Speculum 
Sacerdotum; Koch-Preuss, op. cit., vol. II, pp. 197-200; T. Slater, 
op. cit., vol. II, pp. 241-250. 


HOLY ORDERS 143 


tain respectively to candidates, to ordained minis- 
ters and to laymen. 

It is the duty of candidates to acquaint themselves 
with the canon law touching ordination, and to fulfil 
its requirements at the stated times and in the stated 
manners. The candidate should have pure motives, 
i.e., a desire to promote the glory of God in loyal 
conformity to the faith and discipline of His Church, 
and to codperate in the salvation of souls and in the 
extension of the Kingdom of heaven. He should 
be wholly free from carnal ambition and from dis- 
turbing desire for worldly position or gain. A two- 
fold preparation is required for the state to which he 
believes himself called, intellectual and_ spiritual. 
This preparation he is morally bound to use every 
effort to secure as thoroughly as he can;! and the 
responsibility of enlarging this equipment continues, 
of course, throughout his life. 

Ordained ministers come under the specific obliga- 
tions which are defined in the so-called ordination 
vows of the Ordinal,? and under those canons which 


1S$t. Thomas, III, suppl. xxxvi, 1-2. 

2 Current arguments of “Liberalism” justify calling specific atten- 
tion to the “material” dishonesty of disregarding the contract and 
vow before God and the congregation “‘always so to minister the doc- 
trine . . . of Christ, as the Lord hath commanded, and as this 
Church hath received the same.” The minister is ordained to take 
official part in a propaganda defined by the Church. His pledge is 
unambiguous, and his obligation either to fulfil the pledge or to 
renounce his office is too clear rationally to be combated. What 
“this Church hath received” is obviously determined by its 
formularies, understood substantially in the sense in which they 


144 SACRAMENTAL OBLIGATIONS 


describe the content and limitations of their duties 
and privileges. In addition to these canonically 
defined obligations are those which obviously inhere 
in the relations in which they stand to superior min- 
isters, on the one hand, and to those to whom they are 
sent, on the other hand. Among the latter should be 
mentioned, as liable to be overlooked by those who 
have had no previous business experience, the con- 
tract obligations involved in their acceptance of a call 
or appointment and their obligation to maintain visi- 
ble financial integrity in all their relations. 

Lay officials, of course, have official obligations 
beside those which pertain to the lay estate in general. 
The office of /ay-reader carries with it no other priv- 
ileges and powers, and no other permanency, than are 
defined in the canons and are explicitly given by the 
bishops. Deaconesses are subject to the same limita- 
tions and, officially speaking, are entirely under the 
authority of the ministers under whom they are 
licensed to work. ‘Their office is a lay office and is not 
to be compared with the diaconate. Allowing for 
differences of conditions, the same holds true of the 
members of religious orders, whether male or female. 
Such members are not ministers unless they have been 
ordained to be such inthe appointed manner. Official 
positions in a parish do not abrogate or qualify minis- 
terial authority over the services and their music, 
and over the teaching and spiritual discipline within 


were originally imposed. It is not at all determined by current 
unofficial opinion and speculation. 


HOLY ORDERS 145 


the parish. The vestry has authority as a body over 
the temporal concerns of the parish; but the rector 
is ex officio chairman of the vestry, and cannot canon- 
ically be excluded. Organists, choir officers, Sunday 
School helpers, masters of ceremony, etc., are all sub- 
ject in the manner of their discharge of duties to the 
rector or priest-in-charge.! 

Every layman is under obligation to be canonically 
connected, when possible, with some recognized parish 
or mission, preferably where it is most natural for him 
to attend public worship. If he moves from one 
parish to another, he ought to secure a formal letter 
of transfer; and it is the duty of the minister not only 
to furnish this letter, but to use legitimate influence 
to have it presented. No layman may disregard 
excommunication by his pastor, unless it has been 
reversed by competent episcopal authority. A lay- 
man should contribute to the support of the parish 
to which he belongs, and may not in this particular 
assume a seditious attitude towards his canonical 
pastor. His relations to his pastor are not nullified 
by clerical folly, but either by his removal into another 
parish or by canonical removal of the pastor. 

To the laity also belongs the duty, often neglected, 
of providing for a supply of clergy: (@) by prayer, 
especially at Ember seasons, that God will ‘‘send forth 
labourers” into His harvest; (0) by contributions 
towards the support of seminaries or theological 


1 We follow here the American canon law. On English conditions, 
see P. V. Smith, op. cit., ch. iv. 


146 SACRAMENTAL OBLIGATIONS 


schools and of those colleges in which candidates are 
especially trained for admission to them; (c) by sug- 
gesting the vocation to their sons and others for con- 
sideration, not placing any obstacle in the way of 
those who have felt themselves called; (d) by uphold- 
ing the dignity of the priesthood, not making it a sub- 
ject of captious criticism, but loyally supporting the 
priesthood in general, in spite of the imperfections of 
individual priests. 

§ 7. Holy Matrimony: A formal engagement to 
marry constitutes a contract, subject to the limita- 
tions in general of human contracts, and to such as are 
involved in established social custom. If it is due to 
compelling fear, or if either of the parties is a minor, 
it is not valid. Circumstances may arise which will 
nullify either explicit or tacit conditions of the con- 
tract; and if nullifying impediments are discovered 
or created, the contract ceases to bind. If others are 
aware of nullifying impediments, it is their duty to 
declare them before the intended marriage is at- 
tempted. The obligations connected with the dura- 
tion and conditions of an engagement may be deter- 
mined by: (a) prior obligations, such as the support 


1 On its requirements, see F. J. Hall, The Church, etc., pp. 339-342, 
and The Sacraments, ch. ix; W. W. Webb, op. cit., pp. 214-236; 
O. D. Watkins, Holy Matrimony, passim; W. J. Knox Little, Holy 
Matrimony (popular). Also, with allowance for considerable dif- 
ferences in Roman Canon law, prohibitory degrees, etc., Koch-Preuss, 
op. cit., vol. II, pp. 201-211; J. P. Gury, op. cit., vol. II, §§ 569 ff; 
T. Slater, op. cit., vol. II, Bk. viii; H. A. Ayrinhac, Marriage Legisla- 
tion in the New Code of Canon Law. 


HOLY MATRIMONY 147 


of parents; (6) temporal estate, or ability to support 
a family in a manner suited to the social rank of the 
parties concerned; (c) charity, when a protracted 
engagement is prejudicial to one of the parties; (d) 
preservation of purity; (e) convention. A betrothal 
does not constitute a nullifying impediment if one of 
the parties contracts a marriage with a third party, 
although such marriage is sinful unless the betrothal 
referred to has been justifiably terminated. The 
publishing of banns, while regulated as to its form, 
is not required in the American Church; but a revival 
of the practice would help to discourage hasty and ill- 
considered marriages. 

The spiritual benefits of the sacrament depend upon 
faith and repentance in those who participate in it; 
and careful spiritual preparation for Matrimony is 
obviously needed. This may necessitate use of the 
sacrament of Penance; and reception of the Holy 
Eucharist is plainly a desirable accompaniment of 
marriage. To be sacramental, Matrimony must be 
lawfully complete and have baptized persons for its 
subjects; and no nullifying impediments ! must exist. 
Non-sacramental unions become sacramental by sub- 
sequent Baptism of both parties. 

Matrimonial impediments? are of two kinds: (a) 

1 Impediments which are declared to be nullifying by the express 
law of God or by the Church are here included as well as those of 
civil law. 

2On impediments, see F. J. Hall, The Sacraments, pp. 294-306; 


O. D. Watkins, oP. cit., pp. 103-107, 336 f. ef passim; J. J. Elmendorf, 
op. cit.. pp. 629-640; W. W. Webb, op. cit., pp. 240-251. The 


148 SACRAMENTAL OBLIGATIONS 


impedimentia impedientia, those which without nulli- 
fying make marriage unlawful or undesirable; (0) 
impedimentia dirimentia, those which nullify it ab 
initio. No lists’ of impediments have ecumenical 
authority in all their particulars, and the Roman list 
of nullifying impediments is from our standpoint 
excessive.! We therefore give a list more in accord 
with Anglican conditions. The nullifying impedi- 
ments include: (a) error as to identity of one or other 
of the parties to the marriage; () compulsion, or fear 
equivalent thereto; (c) consanguinity and affinity, 
or mutual relationship, whether by blood or by mar- 
riage, within degrees prohibited either by the law of 
God, by the Church or by the state. The list of pro- 
hibited degrees given in the English Prayer Book 
has force in the American Church so long as this 
Church enacts no substitutionary legislation; (d) 
physical impotence of either party, if it be initial 
and irremediable; (e) immaturity of age, prior to 
puberty; (f) in the case of minors, the withholding of 
consent by parents or legal guardians; (g) previous 
valid marriage while both parties thereto are living. 
Among impediments which make a marriage either 
irregular or inexpedient are: (a) disparity of social 
status or culture; (b) elopement; (c) clandestinity, 
even where the law does not make this a nullifying 
impediment; (d) previous vow of chastity, without a 


Roman Church has a larger list: St. Thomas, III, suppl. I-Ixii; 
Cath. Encyc., q.v. It does not bind Anglicans. 
1Tn particular, in including certain species of spiritual affinity. 


HOLY MATRIMONY 149 


proper dispensation therefrom; (e) disparity of cult 
or religious divergence; (/) the solemn seasons within 
which the Church discourages marriage except in 
necessity.} 

The nullifying impediments (a) and (0) obviously 
cease to be nullifying if both parties to the marriage 
subsequently and with sufficient knowledge freely 
consent to the union. But the impediment of pre- 
vious marriage can be removed, while both parties 
thereto are living, only by pronouncement from legally 
competent authority that the said previous marriage 
was null and void ab initio. To Christians, divorce, 
as distinguished from a decree of nullity, affords no 
moral liberty to remarry while the other party lives. 
Even when a nullifying impediment to the previous 
union has been discovered, the right to remarry does 
not arise until a lawful decree of nullity has been pro- 
nounced. But, of course, such discovery makes the 
continued exercise of marital privileges sinful. 

The obligations of the marriage estate include: 
(a) the procreation of offspring—an obligation which 
obvious necessity alone can abrogate; (6) temperance 
in marital intercourse, the health and spiritual interests 
of both being preserved and brutal tyranny being ex- 
cluded; (c) avoidance of each and every method 
of interference with the natural consequences of mari- 


1 Bishop Cosin specifies: (a) from Advent Sunday until eight 
days after Epiphany; (0) from Septuagesima until eight days after 
Easter; (c) from Rogation Sunday until Trinity Sunday. All these 
days are inclusive. 


150 SACRAMENTAL OBLIGATIONS 


tal intercourse, whether by preventing conception,! 
by abortion ? or by any other method such as Onan- 
ism,? etc.—the only righteous way of avoiding pro- 
creation, when such avoidance is legitimate, being the 
exercise of self-restraint or abstinence at those seasons 
when conception is liable to occur; (¢d) mutual fidelity, 
the sins of adultery and fornication being equally 
grave for both parties; (e) cultivation of mutual regard 
and affection, that the union may agree in its loving 
quality with that between Christ and His Church; 
(f) the common enjoyment of available earthly goods 
and advantages, both being equally bound also by the 
principles of stewardship; (g) mutual recognition of, 
and adherence to, the complementary relations of 
man and wife—the headship of the man and the glory 
of the wife and mother being alike protected from 
degradation and subversion; (/) parental obligations, 
as previously set forth.4 

§ 8. Unction of the Sick, subject to the right of the 
Church to determine and regulate its administration, 
is a blessing to which the sick are entitled, on the basis 
of Scripture and Catholic consent.° Circumstances 


1F, W. Foerster, Marriage and the Sex Problem, Pt. I, ch. vii. The 
whole book is a valuable contribution to sane ideas concerning sex 
problems. 

2On abortion, see Cath. Encyc., q.v.; Hastings, Encyc. of Relig., 
s.v. “Foeticide;”? C. Coppens, Moral Prin’s and Medical Practice. 

8 Gen. xxxviil. g—I0. 

4In ch. iv, § 11 (a), above. 

5 St. James v. 14-15. Cf. St. Mark vi. 13; xvi. 18; St. Matt. x. 8. 
On its lawfulness and desirability in the Anglican Communion, see 
F. J. Hall, op. cit., pp. 315-317, 329 ff; F. W. Puller, The Anointing 
of the Sick, ch. ix. Legislation is in process in the American General 


UNCTION OF THE SICK 151 


may even make it the duty of the sick to claim the 
right, but certain conditions qualify it. The Angli- 
can Church makes no definite provision for it; and 
in many dioceses the oil is not available, and episcopal 
authority is exercised against its use. Peace and 
charity may demand self-denial by the sick. The 
use of ostensible substitutes, however, such as Chris- 
tian Science treatment, is not justifiable. In view 
of the rapid growth of modern healing cults the 
advisability of a general restoration of Unction is 
obvious. But the use of natural remedies is obliga- 
tory, because grace is not designed to displace nature 
but to supplement and perfect it. 

Unction may be administered in any serious illness, 
before an operation, or in cases of nervous disorder. 
The authority of the physician in particular cases 
may not be disregarded without sufficiently grave 
reason. When all the sacraments suitable for the sick 
are administered at the same visit the order should 
be Penance, Communion, Unction. Spiritual as well 
as physical benefits ought to be expected, for the 
physical effect is itself a work of grace, and we may 
not think that any religious instrument appointed of 
God in His Church can fail of spiritual results when 
rightly employed. But the habit of confining the use 
of Unction to the moment of death is an abuse.} 


Convention which will probably provide in the American Prayer 
Book an authorized form for Unction. 

1Qn the whole subject, F. J. Hall, of. cit., ch. x; A. P. Forbes, 
XXXIX. Aris., pp. 465-474; F. G. Belton, Manual for Confessors, 
Pt. VI, ch. iv; St. Thomas, III, suppl. xxix-xxxiii; F. G. Belton, 
Present Day Problems, etc., ch. vii. 


CHAPTER VI 
OTHER OBLIGATIONS 


I. Notable Duties 


4 §1. The Notable Duties are so-called because they 
are conspicuous elements of religion under all condi- 
tions: They are prayer, fasting and almsgiving.! It 
is sometimes said that Christ did not command them. 
He did more, for He gave rules for their observance as 
being too generally acknowledged to require specific 
command.? 

Prayer 3 has the two branches of public or corporate 
and private prayer, giving obligatory expression 
respectively to our social or ecclesiastical and our 
personal relations to God. ‘The former has already 
been considered elsewhere. The obligation of habit- 
ual prayer is elementary, among other reasons, be- 


1 Vernon Staley, The Practical Religion, Pt. II, ch. ii. 

2 Cf. St. Matt. vi. 2-18. 

3, J. Hall, Creation and Man, pp. 88-90; and Eschatalogy, pp. 
10-128; A. J. Worlledge, Prayer; H. P. Liddon, Some Elements of 
Religion, Lec. v; A. C. A. Hall, Christ. Doctr. of Prayer; W. J. 
Carey, The Life in Grace, pp. 113-127; and Prayer and some of its 
Difficulties. 

4JIn ch. iv. § 7 (0), above. 

152 


NOTABLE DUTIES 153 


cause unless we habitually express our dependent 
relations to God we soon cease to realize their central 
importance and fall away from God. Eucharistic 
worship affords the proper background and controlling 
principles of private prayer, which may be either oral 
or mental. 

Oral prayer, or prayer expressed in words, is possible 
for all and is of universal obligation. It contains 
several distinct elements, no one of which should be 
habitually neglected; although the proportions in 
which they are present in individual acts of devotion 
will necessarily vary widely. In its fulness it con- 
sists of acts of homage, self-oblation, penitence, 
praise, thanksgiving, petition for oneself and inter- 
cession for others. The minimum of private oral 
prayer, according to enlightened consent, should be 
every morning and evening. 

Mental prayer or meditation, although not required 
of all by specific precept, emerges as an inevitable 
and necessary step in Christian advance towards 
perfection! A mistaken impression exists that it is 
wholly out of the reach of ordinary Christians. The 
truth is that meditation is an act which can be prac- 
tised by all, but which has many degrees of perfection. 
Only those who practice it systematically can rise to 

1A. G. Mortimer, Helps to Meditation, vol. I, pp. xiii-xix; P. B. 
Bull, The Threefold Way, pp. 1-13; W. H. Hutchings, The Life of 
Prayer, Lec. v; A. Poulain, The Graces of Interior Prayer, ch. i-ii. 
Strictly speaking, meditation is only one of the forms of mental 


prayer; but it is practically the only one generally available. We 
are not in this treatise concerned with contemplative prayer. 


154 OTHER OBLIGATIONS 


its heights; but even in forms which lie within general 
capacity it constitutes the salt of religious life. This 
can be seen in its definition. Meditation is the appli- 
cation severally of all our mental faculties to the sacred 
lessons of our religion for the purpose of making them 
more effectual factors in our lives. Thus it may be 
either a rough and ready affair or a highly developed 
practice. Its parallel in everyday life may be sig- 
nified by the word brooding. When a man broods 
over anything that he feels inclined to dwell upon, he 
is meditating; and since every man broods, every 
man can meditate if he is vitally inclined to do so. 
In its developing form meditation employs rules and 
divisions just as any other practice does; and it is by 
means of these rules that practice is made perfect 
and more highly effectual for its purpose. But the 
rules are merely the grammar of meditation and cease 
to be felt restrictively after they have perfected one 
in the practice. 

§ 2. Fasting} is sufficiently universal among truly 
religious people, whether Christian or pagan, to be 
regarded as a natural mark of religion. Its present 
neglect is not the fruit of enlightenment, but of 
the great stress and luxury of modern life. The nec- 
essary connection between some measure of fasting 
and consistent religious practice remains unaltered. 
For the Christian its obligation is: (a) assumed 


1V,. Staley, op. cit., Pt. II, ch. vi; E. Westermarck, op. ctt., vol. 
II, pp. 292 ff.; Hastings, Encyc. of Relig., g.v.; St. Thomas, II, H, 
xlvi-xlvii; Cath. Encyc., s.v. “Fast.” 


NOTABLE DUTIES Iss 


in our Lord’s teaching; (b) required by universal 
ecclesiastical precept; (c) recognized to be a chief 
instrument of self-discipline; (d) having devotional 
significance in itself, and therefore invariably asso- 
ciated with any extraordinary act of religion. 

Ecclesiastical language is governed by the dis- 
tinction between fasting and abstinence. A day of 
fasting means a day of total refusal of nourishment 
until evening. A day of abstinence means one in 
which flesh-meat and luxurious diet will be abandoned. 
This Church imposes but two fasts, Ash Wednesday 
and Good Friday. According to the historical con- 
notation of terms, she requires abstinence from flesh- 
meat on all Fridays except Christmas Day, during 
the Lenten season, and on Ember and Rogation days. 
The definitive American formula is, “‘Such a measure 
of abstinence as is more especially suited to extraor- 
dinary acts and exercises of devotion.”’ Modern con- 
ditions make it impossible for many people to fulfil 
these rules according to their full letter. In such 
cases, however, the spirit of the law remains in force, 
and full observance ought to be approximated so 
far as conditions and circumstances permit. These 
considerations apply also to the precept of fasting 
Communion.! 

§ 3. Almsgiving? under Christian conditions has 


1Qn fasting communion, F. J. Hall, The Sacramenis, pp. 186-188; 
F. W. Puller, Concerning the Fast before Communion; J. W. Legg, 
Papal Faculties Allowing Food before Communion. 

2On almsgiving, see G. Uhlhorn, Christian Charity in the Ancient 
Church; E. Westermarck, op. cit., vol. I, pp. 548-569; V. Staley, 


156 OTHER OBLIGATIONS 


three ends: (a) to express our relation to God; (6) 
to support and extend the Church; (c) to express and 
fulfil brotherly love. 

In determining the measure of obligation in alms- 
giving it is to be noted that the Jewish law of tithes 
is no longer law, but still affords a revelation of what 
constituted the minimum of acceptable self-denial 
under Jewish conditions. It should be added that 
Christian love cannot normally be thought to express 
itself adequately or acceptably to God by a less onerous 
self-denial than God required of the Jews; but the 
onerousness and spiritual significance of self-denial 
cannot be measured accurately by the conditions of 
another race and age, or by unchanging mathematical 
ratios. The basis of estimate is, broadly speaking, 
the amount of money, or of any form of wealth, which 
the man has available for current personal expendi- 
ture. Thus the man who receives no revenue within 
a given period, but who is none the less in a position 
to spend $3000 a year for purposes of subsistence, is in 
the position, touching almsgiving, of enjoying a salary 
of $3000. 

It must be acknowledged that many people have 
no other mode of giving alms than by devoting time 
and labour to God’s service and to that of the poor. 
It is a subtle temptation to assume this fact without 


op. cit., Pt. Il, ch. iti; F. G. Peabody, Christian Life in the Modern 
World, pp. 147-163; St. Thomas, II, I, xxx-xxxiii. Weare not here 
concerned with the tithes of English law, which in current conditions 
belong to legal dues rather than to almsgiving. 


CIVIL OBLIGATIONS 157 


due warrant, and to salve one’s conscience by con- 
tributing fussy activity that is really a form of rem- 
edying ennui rather than of self-denial. 

In the matter of giving to the poor, careful judg- 
ment may be needed to avoid hurting instead of 
helping, and to escape the evil of wasting resources 
which should be administered to the best advantage. 
But in doing this we incur the danger, generally over- 
looked, of forgetting a vital Christian aim in alms- 
giving, which is to show personal love, and to win 
persons to God. Accordingly, we always incur a 
risk when we refuse to give money to persons because 
we do not feel sure that the gift will be properly used. 


II. Civil Obligations? 


§4. The civil authority is ordained of God? 
It is essential for public order and for common wel- 
fare, especially in temporal things. These things 
are not intrinsically the most important for man, 
but extrinsically they afford conditions which are 


1Bp. Butler, Three Sermons on Human Nature, serm. ii, “Because 
some are unworthy we cannot excuse ourselves from all giving.” 
Morally the position taken by the man who says “‘I never give to 
beggars” is apt to be very questionable. While we should observe 
the findings of sound sociological science, the requirements of visible 
Christian love may not give way to them, lest we become mere 
utilitarians. 

2 The subject of Ecclesiastical Precepts, logically taken up at this 
stage, has been given such treatment as our space permits in ch. iv, 
§ rx (b), above. 

3? Rom. xiii. 1-7. 


158 OTHER OBLIGATIONS 


normally necessary for fulfilment of the higher spirit- 
ual ends. Within the limits already indicated in 
treating of the Fifth Commandment,! Christians are 
under obligation: (a) to obey the civil law and civil 
authority; (b) to defend it against enemies, whether 
external or internal; (c) to serve it when occasions 
arise, whether officially or by exercising an intelligent 
suffrage; (d) to cultivate esprit du corps or patriotism. 

§ 5. The limits of obligation in these directions 
include: (a) natural rights, generally acknowledged 
to belong to individuals; (6) constitutional rights; 
(c) international rights and international laws; (d) 
conflict with spiritual jurisdiction; (e) violation of 
conscience. 

When a conflict of rights arises in relation to the 
state, two alternatives present themselves to citizens: 
(a) revolution; (6) passive obedience. The right of 
revolution does not belong to private individuals but 
to the people at large; although if individuals were 
not morally permitted certain forms of agitation, cal- 
culated to bring about revolution, no revolution would 
ever be justifiable. In practice, however, revolu- 
tionary agitation can never be condoned by the state 
except when it becomes successful. ‘The distinction 
between lawful revolution and seditious agitation is 
often difficult to draw; but the burden of proof lies 
always with the revolutionist, and his only method of 
shouldering that burden is to succeed in his agitation. 
Fortunately the question will rarely arise with a.sin- 

1In ch. iv, § 11 (c), above. 


CIVIL OBLIGATIONS 159 


cere Christian. Passive obedience means submission 
to the legal consequences of obeying one’s conscience 
contrary to civillaw. In certain instances a man may 
not only be permitted, but is morally obliged, to 
refuse to undertake positive acts and to violate pro- 
hibitions in defiance of civil law. But this does not 
exempt him from submitting to the legal consequences, 
except so far as the law itself provides him with means 
of resistance. 

Civil obligations involve and include so much study 
of civil institutions and of civil law as is necessary 
for a reasonably intelligent fulfilment of these obli- 
gations.! 


1 Our treatment of Civil obligations is necessarily lacking in detail. 
See, in general, N. Porter, op. cit., chh. xiv-xvi; T. Slater, op. cit., 
vol. I, Bk. 3, a good and full treatment; J. P. Gury, op. cit., §§ 81 ff., 
and on Law and Justice, §§ 517-589; N. K. Davis, op. cit., Pt. IT, 
ch. iv; Koch Preuss, op. cit., vol. I, pp. 119-181. St. Thomas, 
I, II, xc, 4, defines law as “‘a rational institution for the common 
good, promulgated by him who has the care of the public.” J. P. 
Gury says, ‘‘Lex est regula externa et remota actuum humanorum, 
sicut conscientia seu dictamen practicum rationis est eorumdem 
regula interna et proxima.” It begets in the subject an obligation, 
and therefore is of the nature of a precept, concerning that which 
ought to be done, rather than of a counsel. It is promulgated by a 
competent authority with the view of imposing an obligation; laws 
imposed by those who lack competent authority, e.g., the Germans in 
Belgium, do not bind the conscience. For the well-being and peace 
of society it is necessary that the power of imposing laws should be 
vested in some supreme authority, and authority to impose implies 
the power to secure obedience. 

The principle underlying the imposition of law should be that of 
allowing to the individual as much liberty as is consistent with the 
well-being of the community as a whole. The common good is 


160 OTHER OBLIGATIONS 


III. Sociological Obligations 


§ 6. By sociological obligations! we mean those 
which are involved in organized business and industry, 
in contracts, and in the conventions of social inter- 
course. In the field of organized business and indus- 


always to be had in view. Certain limitations have to be reckoned 
with: (a) Human laws can extend only to acts and words, not to 
thoughts. This is the greatest point of contrast between human and 
divine law. (0) As human laws are subordinate to the divine law, it 
follows that they can not bind Christians when contrary to it. If 
such a law is imposed, the duty of the individual is clearly to obey the 
higher law at whatever cost. ‘‘We ought to obey God rather than 
men,” Acts v. 29; cf. Acts iv. 19; Dan. iii. A law requiring some- 
thing morally wrong is not valid, but imposes a negative obligation, 
that of disobeying it. Divine law aims at securing justice, and when 
any human law clearly disregards this end it fails to bind. St. Aug., 
de Lib. Arb. I, 5, “A law that is not just does not appear to be a law 
at all.” Bp. Sanderson, op. cit., pp. 177 ff., asks the question, What 
certainty can a man have that a law is unjust? and answers that in 
case of uncertainty he is to obey as following the safer course, it 
being presupposed that there would be no uncertainty if the law were 
clearly in opposition to the higher divine law. Human law may add 
its explicit support to divine law, and may define and regulate its 
application. Civil laws have reference in many cases to things which 
are morally indifferent, e.g., laws regarding expectoration in public 
places; but when such laws are imposed they become morally bind- 
ing. This does not militate against the right to construe objection- 
gle sumptuary laws as narrowly as their letter will permit, and to 
agitate for their repeal or modification. An example is afforded by 
prohibitionary legislation, which often inflicts injustice and infringes 
on private right. If it forbade the use of true wine for sacramental 
purposes, it could not lawfully be obeyed by catholic Christians. 

1 Intelligent consideration of them presupposes some acquaintance 
with sociological science; on which, Hastings, Encyc. of Relig. 
and Cath. Encyc. q.vv. (with bibliog.); F. H. Giddings, Prin’s of 
Sociology. 


SOCIOLOGICAL OBLIGATIONS 161 


try, a multitude of serious problems arise, calling for 
the attention of expert sociologists and economists, 
and made difficult by the clash of mutually inconsist- 
ent propagandas and by continually changing circum- 
stances. We treat only of the chief moral principles 
involved and of a few illustrative applications. 

The more basic principles are: (a) the brotherhood 
of man and the implied obligation of brotherly love, 
exhibited in promoting common temporal welfare by 
all methods consistent with bringing men to God 
and to their chief end of eternal life; (6) the preserva- 
tion of just balance between the rights of society at 
large and those of private individuals; (c) the adjust- 
ment of mutually conflicting claims of different social 
and industrial classes in such wise as to promote 
mutual and efficient service on the part of all; (d) 
the protection of private individuals in their right to 
a fair chance to obtain reasonable subsistence and 
freedom in the management and enjoyment of their 
daily life. In an enlightened Christian community 
the personal emphasis will be placed upon one’s own 
duties and upon the rights of others, rather than upon 
one’s own rights and upon the duties of others.? 

“Socialism”? designates several mutually conflict- 


1 More comprehensively, what are called natural rights. See 
J. H. Hyslop, Elem. of Ethics, pp. 432-440; N. K. Davis, Elem. of 
Ethics, §§ 22-41. 

2 The two are interrelated and in adequate definition imply each 
other. 

3On Socialism, Hastings, Encyc. of Relig., g.v.; Schaff-Herzog 
Encyc., s.vv. “Christian Socialism” and “Socialism;” R. T. Ely, 


162 OTHER OBLIGATIONS 


ing theories, but tends unduly to submerge individual 
rights in those of society at large; to favour the labour- 
ing class, so called, at the expense of other classes; 
and to emphasize present welfare and comfort, to the 
exclusion of religion and man’s chief end. Theeffort 
to develop a ‘‘ Christian Socialism” which will escape 
these dangers does not appear to be successful. The 
reason is that every species of Socialism has for its 
basic principle an exaggerated emphasis upon the 
possibilities of ideal social adjustment in this world, 
accompanied by an inevitable tendency to drive man’s 
chief end into the background.! The indisputable 
obligation involved, one that is independent of all 
social theories and adjustments, is simply this, that 
we should seek to promote mutual unselfishness be- 
tween individuals and classes under all circumstances 
and social systems. that actually prevail. A classic 
illustration of this can be seen in the primitive Chris- 
tian treatment of slaves and slavery.2_ The Christian 
Church and its clergy are not charged with solving 
the problems of sociological adjustment, but with 
impelling competent leaders to bring Christian 
motives and principles to their solution, and with 


Socialism: Tis Nature, Strength, and Weakness; Thos. Kirkup, 
Hist. of Socialism; J. T. Stoddart, The New Socialism; A. V. Wood- 
worth, Christian Socialism in England; Robert Flint, Socialism. 

1F, J. Hall, “This Miserable and Naughty World,” in Angl. 
Theol. Rev., Oct., 1920. 

2 Hastings, Encyc. of Relig., s.v. “Slavery (Christian),” 3-4; J. B. 
Lightfoot, Epp. to Coloss. and Philem., pp. 316 ff. Cf. Philem; x Cor. 
Zr ay Gal aes) Col. irr. 


SOCIOLOGICAL OBLIGATIONS 163 


teaching all men to be governed by such motives and 
principles in whatever sociological situation they 
actually find themselves.! 

§ 7. Modern industrialism? is obviously in need 
of reform, and in its present form is a hindrance to 
the realization of Christian brotherhood. It has 
grown out of the invention of labour-saving machinery, 
the use of which requires capital and a species of 
organization of labour which centralizes its control 
in a few hands; deprives the individual worker of 
ownership and control of his tools; and reduces the 
security of his hold on profitable employment. The 
most evil consequence of all is the reduction of per- 
sonal relations and values. The individual worker 
becomes a mere cog of a wheel in vast machinery; 
and anything approximating personal relations be- 
tween himself and his employer is rarely possible. 
They are forced apart, and their interests are more or 
less mutually antagonistic. The labourers are prac- 
tically driven into self-defensive organizations, and 
intermittent warfare prevails between employers 
and labour-unions. 
js Some remedy for this situation is plainly needed, 
and the paternalistic schemes to which just-minded 
heads of industrial plants occasionally resort do not 


1¥, J. Hall, “The Church and Social Betterment,” in Angl. Theol. 
Rev., Dec., 1920. 

2 See Hastings, Encyc. of Relig., s.vv. “Industrialism,”’ “ Employers,” 
“Employment,” and ‘“Economics;” J. A. Hobson, Evolution of 
Modern Capitalism. 


164 OTHER OBLIGATIONS 


meet the real difficulty—the sense of abject depend- 
ence and insecurity to which the workers are reduced. 
The solution will probably come through some system 
of codperative ownership and management; but this 
must be worked out gradually by carefully conducted 
experiments, conducted by royal hearted leaders. 
In the meantime, the Church can only supply inspira- 
tion and emphasize the principles of righteousness 
which ought to be observed in all situations and under 
all systems—not failing to set forth the duty of effi- 
cient service in every walk of life. 

§ 8. Among the obligations which ought to be 
emphasized in all situations is that of the fulfilment 
of contracts,! in spirit as well as in letter. Contracts 
require: (a) fit matter, lawful, honest and possible; 
{b) permissible cause; (c) legally capable parties; 
(d) legitimate consent. This last constitutes the 
contract itself; and it must be mutual; must have a 
recognized external sign; and must be unconstrained, 
reasonably deliberate, and without deception. 

The obligations incurred by a lawfully made con- 
tract are determined and limited: (a) by its explicit 
terms; (b) by their necessary implications; (c) by 
relevant civil law, the force of which is implied in all 
contracts. 

These obligations are terminated: (a) by their 
complete fulfilment; (6) by mutual acceptance of a 
substitutionary contract; (c) by mutual consent to 


1On Contracts, Thos. Slater, op. cit, Bk. VII; F. Pollock, 
First Book of Jurisprudence, Pt. I, ch. viii. 


SOCIOLOGICAL OBLIGATIONS 165 


cancel the contract; (d) by allowed compensation; 
(ec) by voluntary concession from the other party; 
(f) by such counter obligations as, in lawful effect, 
fulfil or dissolve it; (g) by obligations which legally 
invalidate the contract; (4) by substantial mistake, 
for then there was no real agreement; (2) if the con- 
tract was made conditionally, by failure to fulfil the 
condition; (j) by impossibility of fulfilment arising 
from conditions which did not exist when the con- 
tract was executed; (%) in many cases, by the death 
of one of the parties. 

§ 9. Economic science ! exhibits certain laws which 
control exchanges, whether the things exchanged are 
commodities, services or money. They cannot be 
violated when profit is in view, and can be disre- 
garded only by substituting other ends, such as either 
robbery or charity. When such substitution occurs 
the consequences are sometimes morally evil and some- 
times morally good. We give four illustrations of 
economic laws. 

(a) The law of supply and demand is that economic 
values and prices are the result of an equation be- 
tween supply and demand. Prices fall with an in- 
crease of supply and rise with an increase of demand, 
invariably expressing the balance of these two in- 
fluences. Supply means what is available for ex- 
change, and demand means what is sought for in 
exchange. This law cannot be altered; but either 
supply or demand can be, and often is altered, either 

1 On economics, Hastings, Encyc. of Relig., g.v. (with good bibliog.). 


166 OTHER OBLIGATIONS 


in the interest of selfishness, as in a ‘‘corner,’’! or in 
that of charity, as when the available supply of goods 
is increased in order to cheapen them for the poor. 
But the interests of charity are violated when methods 
of manipulation are employed which upset the gen- 
eral stability of exchange and disturb the legitimate 
profits of established business or industry. 

(6) The law of profit in mercantile exchanges is to 
buy in a relatively cheap market, e.g., a wholesale 
market, and sell in a relatively dear one, e.g., a retail 
market. In the example given the profit represents 
remuneration to a commission merchant for facilitating 
the exchange of goods between producer and con- 
sumer. What are called speculative exchanges, how- 
ever, aim at profit through buying at one time and 
selling at another in the same market. This law of 
profit cannot be broken. Ina succession of exchanges 
profit cannot be obtained in any other way. Buta 
man may, for charity’s sake, decline to seek profit. In 
such case he withdraws from the sphere to which the 
law of profit applies. Such procedure, however, can 
only be exceptional; for if men generally refused to 
engage in economic exchanges a large portion of the 
community would be deprived of the means of sub- 
sistence, and no one could obtain them except either 
by producing them himself or by becoming an object 
of charity. 

(c) The law that every economic exchange involves 


1Qn the moral aspects of monopolies in general, see T. Slater, 
op. cit., vol. I, pp. 535-538. 


SOCIOLOGICAL OBLIGATIONS 167 


mutual service, a quid pro quo on both sides, is invio- 
late. The seller serves the buyer by furnishing him 
with what he values more than its price. The buyer 
serves the seller by giving him a price which he values 
more than what he sells. Similarly the employer 
gives wages which the employee values more than 
relief from work, and the employee performs work 
which the employer values more than what he pays 
for it. The difference between selfish exchange and 
Christian exchange lies in what is emphasized. 
Mutual service is unavoidable; but the selfish man 
thinks only of the service rendered to himself, while 
the Christian thinks of the service which he is in a 
position to render to the other. Justice works out 
in this way: the Christian derives happiness from 
service, and the selfish man gains the least satisfac- 
tion from his profit. 

(d) An economic exchange postulates freedom 
from compulsion and from any other restraints 
than those which the general conditions of human 
subsistence require. If, therefore, men are com- 
pelled to make disadvantageous exchanges, the 
difficulty is not due to the laws of political econ- 
omy but to some one’s selfish manipulation of the 
conditions under which they operate, as in profiteering 
and speculation. The moral quality of speculation 
requires discrimination to estimate properly. It 
consists of exchanges in which ultimate profit is con- 
tingent upon future market values. The speculative 
element is present in much necessary business, busi- 


168 OTHER OBLIGATIONS 


ness which it would be absurd to regard as wrong. 
The principle by which to distinguish between legit- 
imate and harmful speculation is the law of mutual 
service. It is true that every exchange constitutes 
for the moment a mutual service; but the question 
remains, Can a whole series of transactions of which 
a given exchange is a factor, afford profit to all parties 
concerned? If it obviously cannot do so, and profit 
on one side can only be gained at the cost of loss on 
the other, the exchange is rightly described as gam- 
bling; which includes not only games of chance in 
which values change hands, but also every form of 
venture in which it is known beforehand that one 
party’s profit involves the other party’s loss.! 

§ 10. (a) Gambling offers one of several moral 
problems which demand attention here. The prac- 
tice is justified on the plea that when the stakes are 
moderate the loser is merely paying a price which he 
can afford, and which he is willing to run the risk of 
paying, for recreation. As thus defined and limited, 
gambling cannot be said to be intrinsically wrong. 
The difficulty is that the practice tends in a large 
majority of instances to pass beyond defensible 
limits both of time consumed and of resources put to 
risk. At best it is a morally dangerous pastime, con- 
trary to Christian expediency. Personal pride, as 
well as the hope of a turn in the run of luck, prevents 
the loser from withdrawing when the amusement is 

1 On speculation, see S. J. Chapman, Transactions of the Statistical 
Society, June, 1906. 

z 


SOCIOLOGICAL OBLIGATIONS 169 


becoming too costly, and the other party may be led 
both by ignorance and eagerness of victory to bring 
disaster—even ruin—upon him. The principle of 
stewardship requires that every one shall protect 
his resources from unnecessary risk of loss, so that he 
may use them wisely in fulfilment of his responsi- 
bilities under God. In brief, while not every form 
and degree of indulgence in gambling is sinful, the 
practice is usually unsafe and morally inexpedient.} 
(b) Usury? means to-day the exacting of excessive 


1On gambling, Hastings, Encyc. of Relig., and Cath. Encyc., q.vv.; 
B. S. Rowntree, Betting and Gambling; W. D. Mackenzie, Ethics of 
Gambling; Thos. Slater, op. cit., pp. 557 ff. Durant Drake, op. cit., 
Pp. 242, says, ‘‘Even if a man be rich, he should steward his wealth 
for purposes useful to society. And he must remember that if he 
can afford to lose, perhaps his opponent cannot. Moreover, if many 
cannot afford to lose, no one can afford to win. Insidiously this 
getting of unearned money promotes laziness, and the desire to acquire 
more money without work. It makes against loving relations with 
others, since one always gains at another’s expense. It quickly 
becomes a morbid passion, an unhealthy excitement, which absorbs 
too much energy and kills more natural enjoyments.’”’ Games in 
which no money is put to risk are, of course, a perfectly righteous 
form of recreation; but their intemperate pursuit is sinful. The 
profession of affording amusement to others, whether by games or 
by the drama, is perfectly lawful if immoral elements are excluded. 
Cf. F. G. Belton, Present Day Problems, ch. v. 

2See T. Slater, op. cit., vol. I, pp. 512-519. P. V. N. Myers, 
op. cit., p. 155, “The loaning of money in ancient times was in gen- 
eral a very different thing from similar money transactions in this 
commercial and industrial age. Those seeking loans were the very 
poor, who were forced to borrow to meet domestic necessities. Under 
such conditions the taking of interest would naturally be denounced, 
and those who did so would come to be regarded as extortioners and 
robbers of the poor.’ There is an entire disregard of the changed 


170 OTHER OBLIGATIONS 


rates of interest on financial loans, in particular, rates 
higher than the law permits. Formerly it meant the 
exacting of any interest whatever on such loans, and 
the practice was regarded in Christian circles as always 
wrong. ‘The reason was that money was then re- 
garded exclusively as a fungible, a loan of it being not 
a commercial service im se but an act of philanthropy. 
To require pay for philanthropy rightly seemed sinful. 
Under modern capitalistic conditions, however, the 
use of money has value in the production of wealth, 
and to lend is not only to postpone its use for oneself 
but to reduce one’s resources for the increase of 
wealth. We lend at cost to ourselves—a cost not 
remedied by repayment merely of the sum lent. The 
exacting of interest is therefore a lawful form of 
securing remuneration for productive service. The 
fact remains, of course, that excessive interest—the 
present meaning of ‘‘usury’”—may not be exacted 
without sin. It is a species of robbery. 

(c) Business combinations and trusts * are inevitable 
and to a degree necessary means for effectively organ- 
izing and cheapening production, marketing and 
other forms of economic service. They cannot rightly 
be considered as wrong in themselves. Rightly built 


circumstances by those who insist upon literal interpretation of Old 
Testament passages, ¢.g., Deut. xxili. 19-20; and to regard the lan- 
guage of the Fathers in this matter as binding us is wholly to mis- 
take their application. Cf. Hastings, Encyc. of Relig., s.v. “Usury 
(Christian).”’ 

1Qn which, R. T. Ely, Monopolies and Trusts; Cath. Encyc., 
s.0. “Monopoly”’; Thos. Slater, op. cit., vol. I, pp. 535-538. 


SOCIOLOGICAL OBLIGATIONS 171 


up and used, they are beneficial to the public and are 
to be welcomed. But they afford opportunities 
and temptations to wrong-doing on a large scale; 
and therefore require watchfulness on the part of all 
concerned, along with regulative legislation. The 
wrongs that are apt to appear are those of driving 
smaller concerns out of business, of monopolistic 
manipulation of prices and profiteering. Incidentally 
the wrongs inflicted by capitalists on labour are apt 
to be intensified, and made more difficult to remedy. 
Of course, the labouring classes have also the right 
to combine for self-protection, and labour unions are 
perfectly lawful. But they too are susceptible of 
abuse. They may inflict irreparable damage on 
industry and, by increasing the cost and difficulty of 
production, on the consuming public as well. Not 
being legally incorporated, they cannot be effectively 
restrained by suits for damages. These evils cannot 
be permanently remedied except by the development 
of social unselfishness in the community at large. 
Without this, the most reasonable laws and external 
adjustments fall short of adequate and abiding results. 

(d) Poverty! is not invariably due to the fault of 
others, or to the existing conditions of productive 
service. A certain amount of it and of pauperism 
arises from incompetence and inability of adjustment 
having natural and unescapable causes. After every 
effort to improve general conditions, poverty, while 


1 Cath. Encyc. and Hastings, op. cit., g.vv.; B.S. Rowntree, Poverty; 
R. Hunter, Poverty. 


172 OTHER OBLIGATIONS 


it may be lessened in extent, cannot be wholly abol- 
ished. So it is that, after all has been done in obe- 
dience to Christian principles to reduce the reducible 
causes of poverty, the duty of philanthropic charity 
and almsgiving remains, whether to meet special 
emergencies or to help the incurably inefficient. 


IV. Obligations Voluntarily Incurred 


§ 11. Moral obligations are incurred not only by 
contracts, as above indicated, but also by vows and 
by choice of vocation in life. 

Vows are promises made to God, and are dis- 
tinguished as (a) solemn and simple, the former being 
such as are made with the formal sanction of religious 
authority, e.g., monastic vows; (6) personal and real, 
according to whether they affect personal conduct 
only, or property; (c) temporary and permanent, in 
no case exempting from prior moral obligations. 

In order to be valid, a vow (a) must have true 
intention, voluntary, deliberate, with understanding 
of the matter, and seriously expressed; and such 
expression is not nullified or reduced in effect by men- 
tal reservations; (+) must have in view something 
morally lawful and morally possible. An invalid 
vow, if followed by evil consequences to others, 
creates the obligation to do what is possible to remedy 

1 Hastings, op. cit., and Schaff-Herzog Encyc., g.vv.; St. Thomas, 


IT, II, Ixxxviii, clxxxiv, 4; Thos. Slater, op. cit., vol. I, pp. 246-256; 
J. P. Gury, op. cit., §§ 319-336; W. W. Webb, op. cit., pp. 139-143. 


OBLIGATIONS VOLUNTARILY INCURRED 173 


the evil. <A “personal” vow binds only its maker; 
but a ‘‘real”’ vow binds one’s heirs, that is, within the 
limits of the inherited estate. 

A vow may be nullified (a) by certain intrinsic 
causes such as fulfilment when permanent action is 
not required; expiration of the time in case of tem- 
porary vows; failure of the conditions expressed; 
and physical or moral impossiblity of fulfilment; 
(6) by prohibition of competent authority, as in the 
case of minors; (c) by ecclesiastical dispensation, 
which is possible in the case of any vow that has not 
obtained legal and civil force. 

It is sinful to make vows of trivial nature and to 
make any vows whatever for light reasons, impul- 
sively and without serious deliberation. The reason 
is that they have a religious nature, and enlarge our 
moral responsibilities—a consequence which may not 
be invited without earnest forethought and prayer. 

§12. The obligations connected with personal 
vocation or life-work come under the head of obliga- 
tions voluntarily incurred, because normally each one 
chooses or voluntarily accepts his or her own vocation. 
In any case, each vocation involves distinctive obli- 
gations pertaining to its proper fulfilment, falling 
mainly under the following heads: (a) The choice of 
vocation should be governed not only by personal 
bent and natural gifts, but also by spiritual and moral 
expediency, especially if a proposed occupation will 
involve loss of religious privileges and exposure to 
temptations to which the person concerned is pecu- 


174 OTHER OBLIGATIONS 


liarly liable to yield; (6) Preparation and training 
for one’s life-work, especially if it is of highly special- 
ized nature, is plainly of obligation, for vocational 
duty is not concerned with getting a living merely, 
but also with efficient service; (c) Regular and pains- 
taking attention to one’s several vocational duties, 
with the limitation that these duties shall not dis- 
place the prior and common obligations of Christians; 
(d) Proper relations towards, and coéperation with, 
those who share in the same vocation or who have to 
be reckoned with in its fulfilment; (e) Cheerful 
acceptance of, and obedience to, the laws and authori- 
ties under which the business of one’s vocation is 
organized and carried on. 


CHAPTER VII 
EXPEDIENCY AND EXAMPLE 


§1. We have been considering thus far those 
branches of Christian obligation which are contained 
or implied in the first two parts of the divine “‘will of 
signs,’ commands and prohibitions of laws and pre- 
cepts. For the purpose of avoiding actual sin, and 
for dealing with penitents, we have therefore covered 
the necessary ground. But to stop here would be to 
encourage legalism and to neglect in considerable 
measure those higher Christian obligations which 
have to do with attaining spiritual character and 
fitness for the eternal life that constitutes our ap- 
pointed destiny and the organizing principle of all 
our obligations. It is true that the attainment of 
perfection belongs in Moral Science to Ascetic The- 
ology, rather than to Moral Theology Proper; but 
the danger of a legalistic conception of human obliga- 
tions, on the part of the clergy as well as of the laity, 
is grave and ever present. We are therefore con- 

1In the confessional a priest is immediately concerned with sin, 
and must be governed in judging by laws and precepts. But both 
for the penitent and for himself he is finally concerned with acquisi- 


tion of positive holiness; and his success in dealing with sin will be 
conditioned by remembering this. Mere freedom from sin is also a 


175 


176 EXPEDIENCY AND EXAMPLE 


strained, before taking up the subjects immediately 
connected with a priest’s work as confessor, to deal 
with the other and more inspiring parts of the ‘‘will 
of signs,’’ viz., permissions, counsels and example. 
These are best understood in the light of a prelim- 
inary consideration of virtues, and of the external 
graces of a Christian gentleman. 

§ 2. Personal character, wherein worth and merit 
in God’s sight primarily consist, determines whether 
one is fit for, and capable of enjoying, heavenly beati- 
tude. The acquisition of perfect character, there- 
fore, is the organizing subjective end of all enlightened 
Christian conduct and effort. Perfection is indeed 
rarely attained even approximately in this world, 
that is, in the strict and ultimately required sense. 
In another sense, however, that of whole-hearted 
devotion to progress in virtue and spiritual congenial- 
ity to God, it is both practicable and obligatory 
in this life; and the completion of our progress after 
death is dependent upon our having initiated this 
progress on earth—at least by sincere repentante, and 
by such practice of holy virtue as our present oppor- 
tunities permit. Our progress consists in our advance 
in the several virtues which constitute the character 
that is pleasing to God. 

These virtues! are all summarized under the four 


mere preliminary of such holiness. Cf. F. J. Hall, Eschatology, 
pp. 82-83, 178-180. 

1On virtues, W. W. Webb, od. cit., ch. iv; J. R. Illingworth, 
Christian Character, chh. iv-vi; J. B. Scaramelli, Directorium Ascet- 
tcum, vols. III-IV. 


VIRTUES AND CHARACTER 177 


“cardinal” virtues of prudence or wisdom, temper- 
ance, fortitude and justice; and the three heavenly 
virtues of faith, hope and love—the last-named being 
the crown and glorifying element in all perfect virtue 
whatsoever. The cardinal virtues emerge in the 
natural order of this world, and include those dispo- 
sitions and habits which perfect our natural manhood 
for all the responsibilities, individual and social, of 
this natural life. They pertain to the moral life as 
that is understood in secular thought, a life which has 
many creditable illustrations even in non-Christian 
circles. ! 
But the natural man is not, even in the noblest 
examples, fit for God, unless elevated by grace to the 
supernatural order of sainthood, and brought by the 
practice of true religion into transforming contact 
with God. The heavenly virtues are those which 
emerge in true religion, which pertain specifically to 
man’s heavenly destiny, and which differentiate the 
saint from the natural man, however perfect in his 
native order. They both elevate the cardinal or 
natural virtues by giving them a higher organizing 
principle and supernatural dynamic, and supplement 
them with direct reference to equipment for life with 
God and for the communion of saints. The differ- 
ence can well be illustrated by indicating the distinc- 
tive meaning of love, considered as a heavenly virtue. 
There is a natural virtue of love, but if purely natural 
it is also purely utilitarian in its fruit, concerned with. 
the extension of welfare in this world’s sense of that: 


178 EXPEDIENCY AND EXAMPLE 


term. But heavenly or Christian love is centred 
in God. It indeed shines forth in manward mani- 
festation; but the organizing principle and trans- 
figuring aspect of it even in manward demonstration 
is the conscious and patient effort which it inspires 
to bring men to God for the blessed joy of mutual 
fellowship in the communion of saints. 

§ 3. There is a certain finish and external grace 
in the social life of a truly virtuous man or woman 
which we have in mind when, without regard to 
ancestry or social rank, we designate one as a “‘gen- 
tleman” or a “lady.” Such an one practices good 
manners, and does so without effort by reason of a 
species of culture which goes along with good breed- 
ing, but which has its roots in kindness and consider- 
ateness for others. That is, it is a fruit of virtue and 
@ practically important branch of virtuous conduct. 
Like spiritual unction, good manners are sometimes 
put on for occasions, but then betray their artificiality 
and do not please. Only when practised for the sake 
of kindness and true courtesy are they truly virtuous. 

Good manners have conventional standards or 
rules of etiquette, rules that vary in different social 
circles and ranks, but which ought to be normally 
conformed to as being the accepted methods of kindly 
and courteous intercourse. This is the legalistic 
aspect of the matter and may not be disregarded 
without boorishness, that is, lack of kindness. But 
a true gentleman or lady, while not forgetful of rules, 
is not enslaved by them, but seeks to fulfil their pur- 


PERMISSIONS 179 


pose even more than their letter. Accordingly, such 
an one exercises discretion, and adjusts his or her 
conduct to each and every one and to every occasion. 
And the final test of good breeding—of kindness—is 
seen in the manners practised towards those of 
another social rankswhether inferior or superior. Itis 
seen in considerate and kind regard for the manners 
of other circles than our own, however uncouth, on 
the one hand, or artificial, on the other, they may seem 
to be when we estimate them unkindly. Truly 
Christian gentlemen and ladies, in the sense above 
indicated, constitute the highest nobility on earth, 
although belonging to every social rank. Their 
nobility is supernatural—made possible by grace. 

§ 4. To a Christian who has an adequate sense of 
his vocation and implied responsibilities, we have 
seen, the observance of laws and precepts, vital as it is, 
is only an initial stage of duty, Over and above all 
legalistic obligations is the principle of spiritual 
expediency, of always aiming to conduct oneself, 
whether in action or in avoidance of action, in the 
manner that best expedites Christian aims for oneself 
and for others alike! It is in this light that he inter- 
prets the “will of signs” ? in its branches of permis- 
sions and counsels—in all matters not specifically 
either commanded or prohibited. 


1x, Cor. vi. 12; x. 23-33. On various meanings and bearings of 
“‘expediency,” see Hastings, Encyc. of Relig.,g.v. Cf. H. L. Goudge, 
First Ep. to Cor., on ch. vi. 12. 

2 Cf. ch. iv, § 2 init., above. 


180 EXPEDIENCY AND EXAMPLE 


Permissions consist of things which are neither 
commanded nor advised, but which are not prohibited. 
Permission does not in this connection mean positive 
sanction or license. Permissions come to the front 
especially in relation to practices which are liable to 
abuse. The fundamental principle involved is that 
we are given discretion, accompanied by responsibility 
for doing what is expedient from the moral and spir- 
itual point of view.! Christians are released from the 
slavery of legalism, but not from the obligation to 
apply the principles which lie behind the law of God 
to the pursuit of Christian perfection both in them- 
selves and in others.2 In final effect, the so-called 
permissions are provisional, the proviso being that no 
liberty be taken which is inconsistent with the pur- 
suit of our chief end. The following branches may be 
mentioned: (a) Christians are released from every 
legal or ceremonial obligation which was originally 
imposed in a dispensation and under conditions no 
longer existing. (0) The privileges which enlight- 
enment of conscience bring, inevitably have to be 
exercised in a society containing many who are unen- 
lightened and cannot rightly enjoy these privileges. 


! Puritanism, found in promoters of reformatory legislation who in 
many instances would repudiate the theory in terms, tend to place 
practices liable to abuse among things prohibited. In this they 
revert to Judaic legalism and tamper with Christian liberty. 

2 Christian liberty does not signify a lowering or lessening of obli- 
gation, but the substitution of mature judgment for the external 
rules of immaturity. 

3 F.g., legalistic sabbatarianism. 


COUNSELS 18 


Thus age emancipates from parental authority and 
from many obligations pertaining to the young. 
Education frees from many restraints imposed by 
narrow-minded consciences. Illness removes many 
obligations. Dispensations by competent authority 
release those who receive them, while others remain 
bound. In any case, the duty remains to avoid as 
far as practicable any obtrusive exhibitions of priv- 
ilege which are likely to make it more difficult for 
the unprivileged to obey their consciences. (c) 
The development of science and invention, and 
changes in social life, bring new practices into vogue 
which are not covered by any existing precepts, and 
concerning which differences of moral judgment 
emerge, ¢.g., smoking. In relation to such practices 
we have to apply the principles of discretion above 
described. 

§ 5. Along with permissions we have to consider 
counsels. These may be either divine or human, and 
may have reference either to heavenly perfection or to 
earthly conduct. Technically speaking, it is not sin 
to reject any particular counsel, but the habit of 
rejecting counsel is certainly sinful, and in many 
cases the rejection of a particular counsel will breed 
sin. In brief, counsels afford needed help in moral 
judgment, but do not extend the scope of moral law. 
The obligation which they presuppose, and with ref- 
erence to which they should be considered, is that we 
should endeavour to advance towards the perfection 
of Christ, and enlist prudent judgment in doing so. 


182 EXPEDIENCY AND EXAMPLE 


The so-called counsels of perfection really pertain 
to one among other methods of advancing towards 
perfection. ‘They.are given only to those who are 
called to initiate in this life certain extrinsic condi- 
tions of the future life of heaven, viz., poverty, chas- 
tity, and obedience. To follow these counsels is said 
to pertain to a higher life, but this is true only in an 
external and relative sense, as just explained. The 
call to interior perfection, or the full development of 
spiritual character, is of obligation upon all; and is 
within the reach of every truly Christian type of voca- 
tion.! 

It is to be noticed: (a) The counsels of perfection, 
technically so-called, are not to be confused with 
canonical discipline. Roman priests are under invari- 
able obligation, except in Uniat Churches, to be celi- 
bates, not because all priests have received counsel 
to that effect, but because the canon law so requires. 
A call to the priesthood is one thing, and the counsel 


1On counsels of perfection, St. Matt. xix. 16-29 and parallels; 
St. Thomas, I, II, cviii; Cath. Encyc., s.v. ‘“‘Counsels’”’; Hastings, 
Encyc. of Relig., s.v. ““Counsels and Precepts.’”’ Many writers treat 
these Counsels as offering a short road to perfection, but this needs 
to ‘be accepted with great caution. To those who are called to a 
“religious” vocation, the acceptance and practice of such vocation 
certainly carries them upward; but to others the “religious” life is 
likely to be a hindrance. It is needful to remember also in this 
connection that Christianity offers but one standard of final attain- 
ment for all. Those who are backward, especially those handi- 
capped by ignorance, have indeed to be given “milk for babes”— 
not because they are exempt, but because they are at an early stage 
of progress. No one, however, can remain at the legalistic stage and 
enjoy Christian beatitude. 


COUNSELS 183 


to celibacy in that connection is another thing. (6) 
Vows in this connection create the obligations of vows 
generally, whether justified by genuine counsel from 
God or not. Therefore the greatest caution needs 
to be exercised in making them. (c) The religious 
life, so-called, has no intrinsic superiority over any 
other life which has a divine call behind it. No con- 
ditions in this world afford intrinsic superiority in 
Christian character except the sacraments of salva- 
tion. (d) The life of a religious does not bring escape 
from carnal temptation in its coarser forms. To 
resort to it, therefore, as a safeguard against lust is a 
frightful blunder. The divinely appointed safe- 
guard against lust is marriage. (e) Those who are 
married may receive counsel to practice temporary 
approximations to the celibate life, but that the mar- 
ried life should be or normally can be permanently 
lived after the manner of celibacy is a very dubious 
proposition. 

The principle of counsels is of much wider applica- 
tion than that which we have been considering. 
Counsels pertain generally to the choice of methods 
and practices which are favourable to spiritual ad- 
vance, although not specifically required by precept. 
The general obligation of seeking and weighing the 
best advice available is certain, whether its supposed 
excellence is based upon the official or upon the intel- 
lectual superiority of the adviser. Thus the advice 
of priests, of parents, of teachers, and of moral and 
spiritual writers, may become of the greatest impor- 


184 EXPEDIENCY AND EXAMPLE 


tance. The terms of advice, as such, however, do 
not constitute law, and their disregard is not of itself 
sin. But we are verily bound by our convictions of 
what is best to do, and advice may constitute an 
important factor in attaining to intelligent convic- 
tions. The need of advice is especially apparent 
when we perceive that if we fail to seek and follow 
it we are likely to fall into material sin. Probability 
is often the only rule by which we can guide our 
moral conduct, and knowingly to do what appears 
probably either sinful in itself, or inevitably tending 
to sin, is sinful. We should distinguish between 
the obligation of seeking our chief end and that of 
employing means and methods of doing so. In so far 
as these means and methods are imposed by law, 
whether divine or human, our conscience is bound; 
but in other directions we have to depend upon fallible 
judgment, and there is not the same strict and tech- 
nical basis of responsibility. The emphasis to be 
placed upon counsel is of course increased when there 
is a divinely recognized relationship of superiority in 
the position of him who gives advice. 

Many individual Christians are troubled by 
“scrupulous” consciences, that is, they are unable to 
arrive at a determinate judgment, even when suf- 
ficient data are available to warrant decision.!. More 
often than not the cause is that most difficult of dis- 
eases to cure, spiritual pride. Such persons ought to 
be governed implicitly by the best advice that they 


1 On scrupulous consciences, see ch. vili, § 7 (b), below. 


EXAMPLE 185 


can obtain. The reason is that determinate conduct 
is necessarily more safe than vacillation. | 

§ 6, Example exhibits in the concrete, whether in 
its fulness or in its process of formation, the charac- 
ter which God wills that we should assimilate and 
into which we should grow. This character is the 
character of God.! (a) It is partly exhibited in cre- 
ative and providential operations of the natural order. 
Really to live according to nature is, to some degree, 
to imitate God. (0) It is given the most articulate 
exhibition, and is translated into the terms of human 
conduct, by the life and character of Christ. There- 
fore the ideal of Christian life is to imitate Christ. 
This cannot be done indiscriminately, for many of 
His actions were justified only by His mediatorial 
office and by conditions which are not repeated in our 
lives. The imitation of Christ means growth in 
the character which was exhibited in His life, the 
manner of this growth being determined by our own 
providential circumstances. His character repre- 
sents the goal of our development, and His life trans- 
cends our immediate possibilities; but His example 
is effective because of the power which He communi- 
cates to us in His Body, which enables us both to 
imitate His character and to persevere in develop- 

1 “Be ye therefore imitators of God,” Ephes. v. 1. Cf. St. Matt. 
v. 48. No example binds us by its own right except that of God— 
of Christ because He is God. F. J. Hall, Incarnation, p. 126. ITfno 
example of moral perfection, recognizable as such, were available, 


we should be deprived of a most powerful incentive and of final 
proof of the reality of right. 


186 EXPEDIENCY AND EXAMPLE 


ment after His likeness.1 (c) The example of Christ 
has to be supplemented by examples of progress out 
of sin into righteousness. Christ could not afford 
such example. Therefore the example of the saints 
constitutes a factor in our imitation of God. The 
value of saintly lives is due to their exhibiting illus- 
trations of the practical possiblity of growth of sinners 
in the perfection of Christ.? 

§ 7. Summarizing the distinctive marks and obli- 
gations of truly Christian conduct, as set forth and 
implied in all that has been said in this manual: (a) 
Its controlling end and organizing principle is to 
glorify God and to enjoy Him forever. (6) Its fun- 
damental law is love toward God, a love abounding 
also because of its nature and object toward man, 
and determined in its specific branches by the Deca- 
logue and by the terms of the Christian covenant; 
(c) Its expediency requires an exercise of enlightened 
discretion, both in interpreting the letter of the law 
and in meeting the problems of conduct not deter- 
mined by the law—resort to the best available counsel 
in doubtful cases being gladly adopted; (d) Its liberty 
is an emancipation from servile legalism and scru- 
pulosity;—not license or the lowering of moral require- 
ment, but the outcome of Spirit-guided insight, 

1F, J. Hall, of. cit., pp. 259-267 (gives further refs. on p. 260). 
Some of the more important texts are St. Matt. xi. 29-30; St. John 
xiv. 6, 12; Rom. vili. 29; xv. 2, 3, 5; Ephes. v. 1-2; Phil. ii. 5-11; 
x St. Pet. ii, 20-21; 1 St. John iii. 3. 


2 Hugh F. Blunt, Great Penitents, passim; F. J. Hall, op. cit., pp. 
262-263. 


CONCLUSION 187 


enlightened judgment and an aim that is both ade- 
quate and sincere. (e) Its distinctive earthly mark is 
the habitual practice of repentance—‘‘the Way of 
Purgation.’”’ (f) Its concrete example and objective 
standard is the human life and character of God- 
incarnate, Jesus Christ, the imitation of whom com- 
pletely summarizes what a Christian should endeavour 
to become; (g) Its supplementary examples are the 
lives of Christian saints, as illustrating manners and 
possibilities for sinners in the imitation of Christ on 
earth; () Its indispensable conditions and aids are 
the sacramental means of regenerating, sanctifying 
and enabling grace, and the established methods of 
spiritual culture—“‘the Way of Illumination.” (2) Its 
ultimate result is a realization of personality by at- 
tainment of perfection and by union with God—‘‘the 
Way of Union’’—this introducing us to the com- 
munion of saints, and bringing that form of abiding 
happiness wherein true beatitude consists. 

The rest of this volume is concerned with matters 
related to a priest’s responsibilities in dealing with 
penitent sinners, that is, with the problem of admin- 
istering the dispensation of divine mercy. If this is 
kept in mind by the reader, he will not make the 
blunder of treating its distinctions and allowances as 
in any way modifying the standard of Christian 
responsibility above set forth. They have to do with 
the oft experienced emergencies arising from human 
ignorance and weakness—not with the aims to which 
reconciled penitents need to be recalled. We may 


188 EXPEDIENCY AND EXAMPLE 


not forget that escape from sin, on the one hand, is an 
essential preliminary of Christian progress in which 
mercy to penitents is prominent; but, on the other 
hand, is merely a beginning. Sinlessness is not 
Christian perfection, although essential to it. 


CHAPTER VIII 
THE SACRAMENT OF PENANCE 


§ x. Casuistry is literally the science of cases.? 
More largely, it may be made to deal also with the 
methods, principles and rules to be observed in dealing 
with moral and spiritual problems, such as are 
brought to priests for solution, whether in the con- 
fessional or elsewhere. It is preéminently designed 
to assist the conscience in its judgments and to equip 
those to whom pertains the guidance of souls in dif- 
ficulty. Its scope may easily be, and here is, ex- 
tended also to include treatment of the qualifications 
needed by one who hears confessions, and of the 
principles and methods to be observed in hearing 
them. 

The value of casuistry for a priest depends upon no 
theory as to the degree of necessity of confession, or 

1J. M. Baldwin, Dic. of Philos., g.v. Casuistry is “(x) The sys- 
tematic discussion of the application of moral law to particular 
cases (called ‘cases of conscience’) in which such application is 
not clear and certain. (2) The over-subtle or verbal discussion of 
the moral quality of particular acts or sentiments, especially when 
tending toward greater moral laxity than is permitted by the dom- 


inant moral opinion of the time or by the unsophisticated individual 
conscience.” 


189 


Igo THE SACRAMENT OF PENANCE 


as to its desirable frequency. It arises from the 
simple fact that, whether in or out of the confessional, 
priests are called’ upon to give help in solving moral 
and spiritual difficulties which cannot be solved by 
mere common sense, even when sound knowledge of 
the general laws of Christian conduct is possessed. 
Their solution often demands much skill, and that 
kind of knowledge which comes from the study of 
precedents and of well-tested and matured results 
of the experience of casuists of past ages. Casuistry 
seeks to present these results in logical order for con- 
venient mastery. 

Two causes have brought casuistry into discredit: 
(a) the abuse of the principle of probabilism; (6) 
the minimizing of sin associated with such abuse. 


1 Bp. D’Arcy, op. cit., p. 79, Casuistry is ““a complicated system of 
laws for the breaking of laws, a system which, whatever its value, 
could never be a complete system on account of the indefinite variety 
of circumstances”’; also zbid., p. 218. This is typical of innumerable 
sweeping condemnations which fail entirely to notice the first defini- 
tion given above by J. M. Baldwin, and to allow for the inevitable 
necessity of casuistry of some sort whenever men attempt to put into 
practice the laws of moral life, All sound moralists would agree 
with Bp. D’Arcy that casuistry “can never be a complete system”; 
for if it became such it would be a dead system, out of relation to 
ever-changing conditions of life. Dewey and Tufts, of. cit., pp. 327- 
329, enumerate the dangers of casuistry; “ (a) It tends to magnify 
the letter of morality at the expense of its spirit. (0) This ethical 
system also tends in practice to a legal view of conduct. (c) Prob- 
ably the worst evil of this moral system is that it tends to deprive 
moral life of freedom and spontaneity”; but, as they continue, 
‘‘All fixed rules have the same tendencies,” and to go on without 
rules reduces us to a state of pure individualism, intuitionalism in its 
extreme form, where every man does that which seems right in his 


ITS REQUIREMENTS IQI 


But there is a sound casuistry, and perverted science 
should not be the ground for condemning science. 

We make no attempt here to deal comprehensively 
with the subject of Casuistry. But after a résumé of 
the parts of the sacrament of Penance, our treatment 
will cover—in brief outline—(a) The duty and profit 
of Confession; (6) The priest’s qualifications and 
methods; (c) Types of consciences to be reckoned 
with; (d) The sick and dying; and, in a concluding 
chapter, (e) Sin, and its distinctions. 

§ 2. As to the “matter” of the sacrament, the 
Thomistic and generally accepted view regards it as: 
(a) Proximate, or the confession itself with all neces- 
sarily involved in it, z.e., contrition and satisfaction; 
and (b) Remote, or the sins committed, necessarily 
including every mortal sin, with mention of any ag- 
gravating circumstances—the “free”? remote matter 
being venial sin! Scotists hold that the ‘‘matter” 
is the absolution. 


own eyes. We must remember that casuistry, though quite dif- 
ferently applied, is as firmly implanted in the Puritan system as in 
the Jesuistic, and ultimately goes back in its evil form to the Phar- 
isaic. H. Sidgwick, Practical Ethics, p. 17, “the odium which in 
the seventeenth century overwhelmed the systematic discussion by 
theologians of difficult and doubtful cases of morals—though unde- 
niably in part deserved—went to an unreasonable length, and ob- 
scured the real importance of the study against which it was directed.” 

1See T. Slater, of. cit., vol. II, pp. 148-153. Mortal sin already 
confessed may be confessed again when sorrow for it is renewed; 
such confession and the absolution received confirms the older and 
infuses fresh grace into the soul. Besetting sins, even though venial 
in specie, ought to be confessed in genere. 


192 THE SACRAMENT OF PENANCE 


(a) Four essential parts are found in the sacra- 
ment: Contrition, Confession, Absolution and Satis- 
faction! Contrition is a hearty sorrow for one’s 
sins as such, and because by them the love of God has 
been outraged. It involves the will and the intellect 
as well as the emotions. In fact it must originate in 
the will, because sin itself originated there. It in- 
cludes as necessary elements a thorough detestation 
of the sins committed and a firm resolution, by God’s 
help, to sin no more. All is summed up in the Ash 
Wednesday Collect, “Create and make in us,” etc. 
Whether or no the sacrament of Penance is used, con- 
trition is a necessary stage in the salvation of all who 
have fallen into grievous sin. Contrition may be 
either perfect or imperfect. Perfect contrition springs 
from a profound hatred of sin and has for its motive 
the loveof God. Imperfect contrition, or ‘‘attrition,”’ 
springs also from a hatred of sin, but is dominated by 
some other motive than love of God, such as either 
the fear of hell, or the desire for heaven. The dis- 
tinction between attrition and imperfect contrition 
is not easily made, but rests upon the fact that 
attrition is mere remorse, having its source in 
motives which are purely natural? In any case, it is 


1See W. W. Webb, op. ci#., ch. ii; J. P. Gury, op. cit., Pt. II, 
§ 414. 

2 T. Slater, op. cit., vol. II, p. 156, ‘“The sinner in the Sacrament of 
Penance seeks reconciliation with God, and so the motives of his 
sorrow must have reference to God; they must be supernatural,:- 
founded on revelation and on faith.” 

8’ Attrition is often so defined as to include cases of real but imper- | 


ITS REQUIREMENTS 193 


not based upon the degree of sorrow felt, but upon the 
motive which inspires the sorrow. The motive of 
fear of hell, leaving unaltered the affection for sin 
and the desire to commit it except for the fear, is 
insufficient, even with the help of the sacrament, to 
reconcile the sinner with God. 

Contrition properly contains certain essential qual- 
ities! It must be (a) internal, of the heart and soul; 
(b) supernatural, owing its origin to grace and based 
upon enlightened reason or motives supplied by super- 
natural faith; (c) sovereign, or supreme, including a 
hatred of sin as the worst of evils, a willingness to 


fect contrition, e.g., Koch-Preuss, op. cit., vol. II, p. 142; W. W. 
Williams, of. cit., p. 28. On the conflict between Contritionism and 
Attritionism see Pohle-Preuss, The Sacraments, vol. III, pp. 170-180. 
Neither is de fide; but there is a strong and widely spread feeling 
against the sufficiency of attrition to secure absolution. F. J. Hall, 
The Sacraments, pp. 235-238: “Attrition, or feeling caused by antici- 
pated consequences of sin, is not sufficient until converted by love 
into sorrow for sin itself. But the act of confession frequently causes 
true contrition when it is otherwise wanting, and this is one of the 
arguments for resort to auricular confession.”” In general, The Cate- 
chism of Nicholas Bulgaris, p. 14, gives a helpful distinction: “‘Con- 
trition is when a man repents for his sins, not out of fear of punish- 
ment or other penalties, simply because he did not do the will of the 
all-good God, which he regards as the greatest evil of all that he could 
meet with. . . . Attrition is when a man repents for his sins, since 
he fears that for them eternal punishment will overtake him.” 

1See Bp. Webb, op. cit., pp. 21-31; F. G. Belton, Manual for 
Conf., Pt. II, ch. i; W. W. Williams, op. cit., pp. 27-32; Schieler- 
Heuser, Theory and Practice of the Confessional, pp. 98-111. Ibid., 
p. 98, ‘If the Sacrament of Penance is to be received validly and with 
fruit, the contrition must be real, formal, supernatural, universal, 
supreme, and sacramental.’’ Adequate self-examination is obvi- 
ously a necessary prerequisite. 


194 THE SACRAMENT OF PENANCE 


suffer all things rather than to sin, a thorough con- 
version and turning to God; (d) universal, having 
reference implicitly at least to all sins; for no sin can 
be forgiven in isolation from others, if there be such. 
Because sufficient contrition is the proximate matter 
of the sacrament, it must precede absolution or be 
present in the soul when absolution is pronounced. 

(b) Confession is the next step in the sinner’s recov- 
ery by means of Penance, and is the acknowledgment 
before a priest of the sins committed, for the purpose 
of securing absolution. This confession must extend 
to details, a mere acknowledgment of wrong-doing 
in general is not sufficient. If the sins are grievous, a 
mention of the number and species is requisite. For- 
gotten mortal sins should be confessed at the next 
confession after they are recalled. Venial sins are 
“free”? matter severally considered and need not be 
confessed; but besetting sins should not be omitted 
and confession of venial sins generally is most helpful. 
Deliberate silence concerning them when they weigh 
upon the conscience is most dangerous. 

1See Bp. Webb, op. cit., pp. 30-31; F. G. Belton, op. cit., Pt. IL. 
ch. ii; W. W. Williams, op. cit., pp. 32-52; F. J. Hall, Sacraments, 
pp. 238-240; St. Thomas, III, suppl. vi-x; T. Slater, of. cit., vol. IT, 
pp. 163-170; J. P. Gury, op. cit., vol. II, pp. 348-401; Koch-Preuss, 
op. cit., vol. II, pp. 151-162; Schieler-Heuser, op. cit., p. 137, “‘Sac- 
ramental confession is the self-accusation of sins committed after 
Baptism and not yet remitted in the Sacrament, and it is made by 
the penitent to a priest having the necessary faculties” (which means 
with us any priest in good standing) “and with the object of obtaining 


absolution.” We should dwell on the last phrase, for confession is 
not a confidence given a priest as a friend. 


ITS REQUIREMENTS 195 


The needed qualities of confession are variously 
listed,! but include the following elements: (1) entire, 
embracing all remembered mortal and besetting sins 
not yet confessed, with mention of at least the approx- 
imate number and specific circumstances which 
change or affect their nature. Incase of doubt as to 
the nature or quality of a sin, the penitent for safety 
should confess it; (2) clear, not mixed up with 
irrelevant things, but a bare declaration of sins com- 
mitted, with as much brevity as is consistent with 
clarity; (3) humble, in heart and body, the latter 
including posture; (4) prudent, honest, discreet, of 
one’s own faults and not of those of others; and the 
name of any one implicated should neither be asked 
for nor be allowed to be mentioned in any case; (5) 
sincere and faithful, not attempting to misrepresent 
or mitigate, without dissimulation, especially in grave 
matters, lest there be added the sin of sacrilege; (6) 
vocal, not by writing or by signs, except in case of 
necessity; and the penitent must be present. Con- 
fession may not be made by letter;? (7) sorrowful, 
which might be combined with humble. Confession 

1 These are variously reckoned by different writers; St. Thomas 
Aquinas lists sixteen; while J. P. Gury, of. cit., vol. IT, p. 353, thinks 
they may be reduced to two, entire and sincere; but to these Koch- 
Preuss adds clearness. See Bp. Webb, oP. cit., pp. 34-36; whom we 
have followed almost verbally. 

2 The question arising in modern days as to the validity of absolu- 
tion given over the telephone has been left open by Roman authori- 
ties. See Koch-Preuss, of. cit., vol. II, p. 153, note 6; but Pohle- 


Preuss, The Sacraments, vol. III, pp. 99-100, conclude against its 
validity. The safeguarding of the “seal” would be impossible. 


196 THE SACRAMENT OF PENANCE 


is a self-accusation, not an excuse. (8) pure in 
words, and in intention to obtain true absolution or 
the grace of the sacrament—not to obtain the com- 
passion of the confessor, etc. It should be made 
bravely, not as seeking sympathy; (9) with the dis- 
position of amendment, the purpose of abiding by 
the judgment of the confessor, of avoiding occasions 
of sin, of making restitution when possible, of per- 
forming the penance assigned, and of using the reme- 
dies suggested; (10) It is hardly necessary to add 
that it should be voluntary. 

General confessions! are never required, except of 
course in the case of a first confession; but they may 
be made at any time, will at times be found helpful 
as acts of spiritual discipline, and should not be dis- 
couraged unless too frequent, except in the case of a 
particular class of scrupulous penitents of whom we 
speak below. 

(c) Amendment? is an indispensable accompani- 
ment of repentance. It must be firmly purposed, 
efficacious (for avoiding occasions of temptation, so 

1See Bp. Webb, of. cit., pp. 42-44; F. G. Belton, of. cit., Pt. II, 
ch. v; Koch-Preuss, of. cit., vol. II, p. 161; T. Slater, op. cit., vol. II, 
pp. 169-170. 

aF. G. Belton, of. ci#., Pt. II, ch. ii; W. W. Williams, of. cit., 
pp. 31-32; Koch-Preuss, of. cét., vol. II, pp. 146-150. 

§ Roman theologians (Trent, Sess. xiv, cap. 4; J. P. Gury, op. cit., 
vol. II, pp. 342-345) hold that it may be either explicit (formal) or 
implicit (virtual), ordinarily it would certainly be the former. Self- 
examination and contrition have the incidental value of leading to 
proper recognition of the sins wherein an explicit purpose of amend- 
ment is needed. 


ITS REQUIREMENTS 197 


far as is possible), and universal in extending to one’s 
life as a whole.! In short, it is a fixed determina- 
tion of codperating with divine grace in resisting 
temptation for the future. Its hope of success is 
grounded in our trust in God, and rests upon the the- 
ological virtues. Failures should not bring dis- 
couragement and despondency;? but moral effort 
is indispensable. It implies readiness on the part 
of the penitent to employ all means necessary or 
useful for the avoidance of sin, especially to shun all 
voluntary proximate occasions, and to repair, so far 
as possible, whatever injury has been done to others. 

(d) Absolution® must be given by the priest to all 
who confess their sins with a proper disposition, the 
presumption being always in favour of the penitent. 
We have already noticed certain cases in which con- 
ditional absolution may be given. On the other 
hand, the priest is bound under pain of mortal sin 
to deny absolution when there is certainty that the 


1Bp. Webb, of. cit., p. 29, ““This purpose of amendment should 
have three qualities. It should be: 1x. Firm, there should be a vol- 
untary determination not to relapse into sin, no matter how great 
may be the loss, or how much influenced by human fear. 2. It 
should be effectual for all occasions of sin. 3. Universal, extending 
to all mortal sins.”’ To the last we may add, at least impliedly, 
venial sins also. See further, St. Thomas, ITT, lxxxvii, 1, ad z. 

RSC viatt, | xXVls/33-35),00-75. | 

3 Bp. Webb, oP. cit., pp. 50-57; E. B. Pusey, op. czé., pp. 156-158; 
F. G. Belton, op. cit., Pt. IV, ch. vi; Koch-Preuss, op. cié., vol. I, 
pp. 177-182. 

4F, G. Belton, op. cit., pp. 147-148; Koch-Preuss, op. cit., vol. II, 
Pp. 179. 


198 THE SACRAMENT OF PENANCE 


penitent is not properly disposed. But before send- 
ing such a person away the priest should do all in his 
power to secure a proper disposition. Reservation of 
the case is a sort of half-way measure between abso- 
lution and refusal, when there is doubt as to the reality 
of the repentance and no danger in delaying absolution 
for a time. Admittedly, however, it is a modern 
practice and usually unjustified, particularly in our 
own circumstances with which we are immediately 
concerned. Either one alternative or the other had 
better be followed.! As to the form, “I absolve thee” 
is probably sufficient in emergency as a minimum; 
but, as in the case of the other sacraments, the full 
form should be used normally, practically always. 
That given in the Office for the Visitation of the 
Sick in the English Prayer Book is most commonly 
used. 

(e) Satisfaction normally presupposes the imposi- 
tion of a penance, which, however, is not necessary to 
the validity of the sacrament; although as a “‘faith- 
ful steward of the mysteries of God the priest is 
bound to impose a sacramental penance.’? It 
should be proportioned to the sinner’s guilt and 
adapted to the age, sex, condition, abilities, etc. 
The penitent is strictly bound to perform the penance 
assigned. If, however, he deems it too severe, he may 


1 But per contra, see F. G. Belton, of. cit., pp. 147-150, who follows 
Schieler-Heuser, pp. 411-415. 

2F. G. Belton, of. cit., Pt. I, ch. vi; E. B. Pusey, op. cit., ch. v, 
art. 9. 


ITS REQUIREMENTS 199 


ask to have it commuted or consult another priest. 
Failure to perform it, apart from weighty cause or 
the smallness of the matter, becomes a mortal sin. 
One penance may not be substituted for another by 
the penitent, but he may in a subsequent confession 
ask to have it commuted either by the same or by 
another priest. 

The penance should, as far as possible, be contrary 
to the chief sin confessed, ¢.g., almsgiving as a remedy 
for avarice, humiliations for pride, bodily mortifica- 
tions, fasting, etc., for lust. They should by no 
means be grave enough to suggest or imply the idea 
of equivalence. They should be calculated to deepen 
the loathing of the sins confessed. They should be 
usually of a devotional nature, e.g., the Lord’s Prayer, 
a Collect or Collects, a Psalm, a hymn of penitential 
or devotional nature, a meditation. There is danger 
in physical penances, fasting, etc., that they may 
induce a sense of merit and equivalence. The pen- 
ance should be imposed before absolution, but if over- 
looked it may be validly imposed afterwards, but 
before the penitent has left the tribunal. 

Satisfaction ! has to do here with the sinner’s part 
in identifying himself with Christ in His passion, by 
contrite self-mortification and by willing endurance 
of whatever temporal penalties or penances may be 


1¥F, J. Hall, The Sacraments, pp. 232-235; E. B. Pusey, Is Healthful 
Reunion Impossible? pp. 69-73; W. W. Webb, op. cit., pp. 57-70}; 
W. Elwin, Conf. and Absol’n in the Bible, pp. 22-26, 410-415; St. 
Thomas, III, suppl. xii-xv; T. Slater, op. cié., vol. Il, pp. 271-174; 
Koch-Preuss, op. ci#., vol. II, pp. 183-187. 


200 THE SACRAMENT OF PENANCE 


imposed upon him, whether by divine justice or by 
sacramental prescription of a priest. Its value and 
acceptance by God rest entirely in the satisfaction 
made by Christ on the Cross, while its essential con- 
dition in us is true contrition and purpose of amend- 
ment. The sacramental sign of this is the acceptance 
of the penance given. Restitution should be made 
- wherever it is possible. The validity of the absolu- 
tion does not, however, depend upon the performance 
of the satisfaction imposed, and no satisfaction other 
than the penance need be imposed. 

§ 3. The duty and profit of confession is clear; 
and the obligation to resort to sacramental confession 
under certain conditions is partly intrinsic and partly 
of ecclesiastical precept. Intrinsically the institu- 
tion of the sacrament by the all-seeing Ruler of con- 
sciences indicates that it will prove to be necessary in 
cases for the end which it is designed to fulfil. As 
the fulfilment of that end, the remedy of sin, is a 
rudimentary obligation of Christians, resort to con- 
fession will evidently be in cases obligatory. Its 
occasional necessity is grounded in: (a) inability in 
certain cases sufficiently to repent without it; (0) 
the remedial grace involved; (c) the claims of eccle- 
siastical discipline. Extrinsically, ecclesiastical re- 
quirements have varied in different ages and in dif- 


1The moral principle of satisfaction here accepted is ancient, and 
need not be taken to imply the doctrine of indulgences, which is of 
medizval origin, and is by us rejected. Cf. F. J. Hall, Eschatology, 
pp. 88-89; The Church, p. 278 (with refs.). To pursue the subject 
here is foreign to the purpose of this manual. 


DUTY AND PROFIT 201 


ferent parts of the Church. Anciently confession 
was expected after very serious offences, and in time 
of dangerous illness.1 It was customary also for the 
priest to impose upon those guilty of certain offences a 
public acknowledgment of them and submission to 
public penance. As this led to scandal the practice 
was abandoned. 

Later Canon Law both in the Eastern and Roman 
Churches requires private confession once a year, and 
a confession before each communion is often recom- 
mended in the Latin Church. Our own discipline 
makes confession obligatory only when other means of 
repentance do not quiet the conscience, the deter- 
mination being left to individual consciences. This 
means that it is not “compulsory”’ by ecclesiastical 
rule, but that the individual conscience should regard 
it as obligatory when there is need. It should be 
noted, moreover, that Holy Scripture implies that 
those who are dangerously ill and have sins on their 
consciences should confess them.? Such a precept 
binds in every part of the Church, and a priest is 
everywhere bound to move one 7m exiremis to con- 
fession. 

The value of confession is not confined to cases of 
necessary precept, although its use when not indis- 
pensable nor expressly required by the Church is of 
counsel rather than of precept. It is useful: (a) 


1A full history in O. D. Watkins, Hist. of Penance, epitomized in 
F, J. Hall, The Sacraments, pp. 214-223. 
2St. James v. 15-16. 


202 THE SACRAMENT OF PENANCE 


to deepen and perfect repentance, the danger of 
habitually relying on perfecting contrition without 
sacramental aid being often very serious; (0) to fortify 
the bands of ecclesiastical discipline; (c) to revive 
and tone up the powers of resistance against tempta- 
tion; (d) as a routine means of humiliation and self- 
discipline; (e€) to secure competent counsel and guid- 
ance. 

The right of private judgment outside the sphere 
of positive precept is to be maintained. In fact, the 
value of habitual confession depends partly upon its 
voluntariness, and upon the sense of its value in the 
penitent’s mind. Yet the private judgment referred 
to ought to be enlightened judgment. The con- 
science should be educated to discern the value of 
confession, and the unlikelihood that any individual 
can escape spiritual loss altogether or for very long 
intervals while dispensing with its employment. It is 
the prerogative and duty of priests to teach their 
people on this subject, and to encourage and facilitate 
the use of so valuable an aid to perfection, and to 
spiritual security. Such teaching should, however, be 
true. It is quite misleading to say baldly that no mor- 
tal sin can be remedied without resort to confession. 
It is true to teach that great advance towards perfec- 
tion is as a rule dependent upon the use of this means 
of grace, so that one who refuses to use it year after 
year is in all probability suffering spiritual loss, and 
may be failing altogether in really repenting. 

A priest may not exact confession as a prerequisite 


QUALIFICATIONS OF A PRIEST 203 


of Confirmation or other spiritual privilege, 7.e., as 
making this a general precept. But he may, and in 
cases ought to, urge such confessions as obviously 
profitable. Moreover, if he is convinced that in an 
individual case a candidate will not be duly prepared 
for the privilege in question without confession, he 
may refuse to be a party to his presentation until 
such confession has been made. ‘The priest is entitled 
to have reasonable assurance, in accordance with his 
own judgment, that those whom he admits to the 
privileges of grace are duly prepared therefor—sub- 
ject, however, to the laws of the Church and the right 
of appeal to the Ordinary. This prerogative is lable 
to abuse, but so are many things; and a priest who 
lacks sound judgment will always hinder the advance 
of God’s kingdom. 

The unbaptized are not to be admitted to sacra- 
mental absolution, for prior to Baptism there exists 
no capacity to receive the grace of this sacrament. 
Baptism itself is a means whereby previous sins 
are remedied; but the recipient may profitably makea 
confession in advance, being taught that absolution 
is recelved in Baptism. While such a practice may 
rightly be encouraged, it may not be required. Its 
value lies in the additional self-knowledge one secures 
in the preparation, and in the deepening of contrition 
which is gained thereby. 

§ 4. The qualifications of a priest! obviously in- 

1See E. T. Churton, The Use of Penitence, chh. vii, viii, x; Bp. 
Webb, op. cit., p. 1, “A confessor ought to have: 1. The love of a 


204 THE SACRAMENT OF PENANCE 


clude appreciation of the value of confession and of 
his own duty. When it is lacking an attitude of mere 
sufferance will be inevitable. or even of unwillingness. 
That a worthy priest will enjoy hearing confessions 
on any other ground than a love of duty and a desire 
to help sinners is exceedingly unlikely. The gloating 
curiosity imputed to priests by sensation mongers is 
contrary to fact, especially in the case of those who 
hear many confessions. The sinner’s attitude of 
penitence, the sense of official relation, and the grace 
of Order, alike hinder such curiosity. A priest is 
not likely to possess the necessary qualifications unless 
he has felt the need of confession for himself and 
practised it. Personal experience is a great opener of 
the mind. 


Father. 2. Theskillofa Physician. 3. The wisdom of a Theologian 
or spiritual Doctor. 4. The acuteness of a Judge.” For these quali- 
fications in detail, see tbid., pp. 1-13. Bp. Webb does not clearly 
make the distinction between a confessor and a spiritual guide, and 
they need not always be the same. Fenelon’s Spiritual Letters 
show that he was guide to many whose confessions he rarely or never 
heard. Consequently much that is said by Bp. Webb has reference 
to guides rather than to confessors. But the priest’s duty is not 
done when he has heard the confession and given or refused absolu- 
tion. T. Slater, op. ci#., vol. II, p. 216, ‘‘In the confessional he holds 
the place of Christ for the reconciliation of sinners with God; he is 
also the minister of the sacrament, and as such he is_ bound to see 
that it is validly and lawfully received by the penitent.”’ In short, 
his office is not merely mechanical, to convey absolution or refuse it. 
All forms of confession in use request “‘counsel and advice”’ as well as 
“absolution.”” On the four-fold office of the confessor, see further 
Dr. Pusey’s very valuable translation of the Abbé Gaume’s Manual 
for Confessors, pp. 3-75; F. G. Belton, op. cit., Pt. IV; T. Slater, 
op. cit., vol. II, pp. 216-225. 


QUALIFICATIONS OF A PRIEST 205 


“The priest’s lips should keep knowledge.” ! He 
must be well versed in moral science in all depart- 
ments, for the variety of moral questions which he 
will be obliged to answer is practically endless. This 
knowledge should be kept fresh by frequent reading 
of moral works, and by the habit of consulting them 
often on moral problems as they arise. It should not 
be forgotten that individual experience is limited, 
and fails to help in many inevitable questions. More- 
over, the reading of good moral treatises serves to 
protect the priest from loss of realization of the cen- 
tral nature of those Godward factors in life which 
the people about him overlook. 

The priest should none the less have experience of 
human needs, and of the needs peculiar to his time and 
people. Books will help to articulate the results of 
such experience and to guide the priest in taking note 
of the right things. For this reason book-learning is 
needed even in this connection. But experience itself 
is indispensable. Such experience begins within. 
To know oneself is to take a long step in the knowl- 
edge of mankind. The common factors of moral life 
are much larger than the individualistic, and com- 
plete knowledge of one soul contains much knowedge 
of every soul. Moreover, one’s own condition lies 
open always to close study, which is not true of the 
souls of others. Personal self-examination and repent- 
ance is the true primary guide to the real significance 
of the repentance of others. But experience is 

1 Mal. ii. 7. 


206 THE SACRAMENT OF PENANCE 


not to be sought in abnormal lines not opened up by 
divine providence. What is called “slumming” is 
perilous and misleading to the mind. It is our own 
people that we need to understand, and they are, 
for the most part, normal. An effective pastoral 
relation and a reflecting mind will supply what is 
lacking in the experience of one’s own personal con- 
ditions and needs. The reading of the Scriptures 
is not to be overlooked; for they supply us with a 
moral world divinely presented for our study. 
Incidentally: (a) we should not confuse the 
demands of the time with its needs; (6) we should 
study such sciences as sociology, law, and political 
economy; but as revealing the conditions under which 
Christian virtues are to be practised, rather than for 
the purpose of devising social schemes. The true 
priest is a saver of souls, not a leader in politics. 
Fatherly love is essential to success in dealing with 
penitents. (a) This means, first of all, sympathy. 
To be touched with the feeling of the penitent’s 
infirmities, to the avoidance of unfeeling harshness 
of judgment and tone. (6) It means patience also, 
both in hearing the tale and in exercising delibera- 
tion in speech. Impatient expressions will harden 
penitents’ hearts rather than deepen their contrition. 
Severity may be necessary, but it should be evidently 
actuated by thoughtful regard for the penitent’s 
recovery, as the severity of the surgeon who cuts to 
heal. (c) It signifies paternal dignity and a solemn 
sense of authority to bind and to loose. In relation 


QUALIFICATIONS OF A PRIEST 207 


to confession the priest may not address his penitent 
as if on equal terms, whatever may be the case in 
other connections. Thus, if a priest hears the con- 
fession of a bishop, or of a high civil dignitary, he is 
for the time being the superior, and must assume the 
dignity belonging to his office. But such dignity, 
if real, is unaffected. Self-assertiveness and pom- 
posity are hopelessly out of place. (d) Finally, it sig- 
nifies disinterestedness. Personal ties and partialities 
must be banished wholly from the confessional. The 
priest’s manner must be judicially the same for all. 

Self-restraint has often to be exercised in high 
degree. The priest is engaged in the confessional in 
an official capacity, and he may be obliged to recall 
this fact, especially in dealing with females or with 
those whose cases prove to be especially touching. 
The personal element must be eliminated severely. 
This does not mean that we should fail to show 
sympathy when it is called for, but that this sym- 
pathy should be priestly rather than personal—gen- 
uine and abundant, but as from Christ and without 
carnal emotionalism. ‘The lack of personal detach- 
ment will often bring the priest into danger and may 
involve the penitent in the same peril. Sympathy 
may easily become maudlin, if not controlled by the 
purpose which ought to be kept in view. 

Skill in rapid diagnosis is to be cultivated most 
earnestly. Hesitation is apt to breed a lack of con- 
fidence on the penitent’s part; but it will often tax 
a priest’s judgment sorely to give wise counsel with- 


208 THE SACRAMENT OF PENANCE 


out delay. The priest may pause to consider, but 
not too long, nor with evidence of vacillation. If the 
case is very grave, he may even reserve his decision 
to an appointed time in the future; but in doing this 
he must be able to show satisfactorily the need of 
delay and the gravity of the question. Such skill is 
the joint result of the supernatural gift of counsel 
and of earnest study of human nature, accompanied 
by mastery of moral science. Not every priest can 
command the highest skill, but he is under obligation 
to cultivate his gift in this direction and to exercise 
prudence in uttering judgments. Promptness does 
not mean nervous haste, or happy-go-lucky thought- 
lessness. 

Finally the priest must possess reserve. ‘This is 
especially necessary in relation to what is heard in 
the confessional; but a priest who is known to be gos- 
sipy and without reserve in his ordinary conversation 
is not likely to be trusted as to his power of secrecy in 
official matters. 

The seal of the confessional may not be broken 
without the express and voluntary consent of the 
penitent;! and the limitations expressed or implied 
in such consent must be rigidly observed. What is 
learned under this seal is not personal knowledge but 
official; and the priest possesses it not as a man but 


1F, J. Hall, The Sacraments, pp. 240-243; F. G. Belton, of. cit., 
Pt. III; Cath. Encyc., s.v. “Seal”; T. Slater, op. cz#., vol. Il, p. 228, 
‘This obligation is imposed by the natural, the divine, and by positive 
ecclesiastical law.’’ It is founded in justice and charity. 


HEARING CONFESSIONS 209 


\ 


as a representative of God. Personally the priest is 
ignorant here, and according to most authorities may 
honestly deny knowledge. The obligation extends to 
everything connected with the sacrament, e.g., the 
penance assigned, whether a certain person has made 
confession, etc. The right to plead privilege in such 
connection is recognized in the courts of civilized 
nations.! Not only must all verbal betrayal of these 
secrets be avoided, but every line of action which may 
involve betrayal of the knowledge thus acquired. 
Even in case of crime? no testimony may be offered 
without the free consent of the party involved. The 
death of the penitent does not release the priest from 
the obligation. The obligation also extends to the 
penitent, and obviously he ought normally to avoid 
all reference to the matter. To violate the seal is 
regarded universally as a sin of the gravest kind.? 

§ 5. Confessions may be heard wherever circum- 
stances make it necessary or convenient; but when 
practicable they ought to be heard in a religious 
environment, such as an open Church, at a place 
obviously devoted to that purpose, or in a confessional 
box. The latter is especially suited to female peni- 
tents, and to the avoidance of embarrassing publicity.* 


1 See F. G. Belton, Present Day Problems, ch. i. 

2T. Slater, of. cit., vol. II, p. 232. 

3Innocent III, ‘‘The priest who reveals the sin confessed to him 
sins more gravely than he who committed it.” 

4A priest who recommends the use of the sacrament should not 
make it harder or more embarrassing for the penitent than necessary. 
He will promote the use of the sacrament by publicly announcing a 


210 THE SACRAMENT OF PENANCE 


The preliminary devotions should be brief. Thus, 
the priest may say the Our Father and “ The Lord 
be in thy heart and on thy lips that thou mayest 
rightly confess thy sins.” If many are waiting the 
Our Father may be omitted. During the confession 
the priest will sit, and will wear cassock, surplice, 
and violet stole. He should not unnecessarily look 
at the penitent. 

The penitent will invoke the Trinity and will begin 
with some such form as is provided in a book of pri- 
vate devotions or printed on a card provided for the 
purpose; and after the indication of his sins the peni- 
tent will conclude with the appointed form. The 
priest will then give, without unnecessary prolixity, 
such advice as may be called for, impose a suitable 
penance, pronounce the absolution, and dismiss the 
penitent with a blessing. The penitent will retire 
at once and complete his devotions elsewhere. 

§ 6. Interrogations require caution. The peni- 
place and time where and when he may be found for the purpose, thus 
avoiding the necessity on the part of the one who seeks the sacrament 
of making a special appointment. It has been found by experience 
that many who would use the sacrament are kept from it by the 
necessity of arranging for it in advance. This is one of the reasons 
why an unusually large number of confessions is often heard at a 
Mission. 

1E. B. Pusey, of. cit., ch. iv; Bp. Webb, op. cit., pp. 44-48; W. W. 
Williams, op. cit., pp. 82-87; Koch-Preuss, op. cit., vol. II, pp. 162- 
166; J. P. Gury, op. cit., vol. IT, §§ 462 ff. Questions will ordinarily 
concern the number, specific character and attending circumstances, 
of the sins confessed, occasions, relapses, and the duty of restitution. 


They will be asked only when necessary for the formation of a right 
decision, or for the reasons mentioned below. 


INTERROGATIONS 211 


tent presumably has come to make his own confession 
as dictated by his conscience. The priest, therefore, 
in the absence of exceptional reasons, should simply 
listen, assuming that the penitent is aware of his sins 
and is giving a faithful account of them. Interrup- 
tions and questions are normally to be avoided, and 
advice is to be deferred ordinarily until the confession 
has been completed. 

But the priest may not neglect to give assistance 
by question or criticism when evidence appears that 
it is needed to make the confession what it ought to be. 
Thus: (a) If the penitent is too obscure to be under- 
stood, he ought to be questioned sufficiently to remedy 
the obscurity. (0) If there is evidence of an effort 
to avoid full disclosure or to give a false impression, 
of unnecessary disclosures of the sins of others, or of 
any other undesirable element in the confession, the 
priest should intervene to correct the fault and secure a 
proper confession. (c) If the penitent interrupts 
himself to ask a question, the answer to which will 
determine the nature of his confession, the question 
should be answered at once. (d) Ignorance may 
have prevented the making of a good self-examination, 
consequently if the penitent, especially a child or an 
untutored person, betrays important ignorance or 
mistake as to sin or its opposite, ignorance which will 
reduce the value of the confession and may be cor- 
rected without danger of inducing more serious and 
formal guilt, the priest should give the needed instruc- 
tion as briefly as possible. (e) In a first confession, 


212 THE SACRAMENT OF PENANCE 


especially of a child or ignorant person, and when the 
penitent is much embarrassed and unable to express 
himself adequately, the priest may assist with judi- 
cious questioning and direction calculated to secure 
a good confession. In brief, a wise flexibility of 
practice may be allowed. But in any case long inter- 
ruptions, protracted dialogue, and all controversy 
should be avoided, lest the penitent forget his busi- 
ness, which is simply to make a good confession. 
Controversy may never be permitted, for it is utterly 
subversive of the relation to be maintained between 
priest and penitent. 

The utmost caution and circumspection must often 
be exercised both in questioning and instructing a 
penitent. The innocent must not ordinarily be given 
knowledge of evil which their previous experience 
has not supplied. ‘This is especially the case with sins 
of impurity.1 The priest who avoidably supplies a 
mind with material for subsequent vile imaginations 
is gravely responsible. This rule is as effectively 
violated by unnecessary and suggestive questions as 
by direct explanations of the several forms of impure 
action. Innocence is always presumptive. A lesson 
touching impurity should never be illustrated by 
anecdotes which contain descriptions or suggestions 
of impure actions. No questions are justifiable the 
necessity of which is not apparent at the moment. 


17. Slater, op. cié., vol. II, p. 225, “In the matter of chastity it is 
a maxim that it is better to fail in putting many questions than to 
put one which is not necessary.” 


INTERROGATIONS 213 


One’s private knowledge of the penitent’s life may 
not be used in this matter. 

Sex and age determine the limits of safe questioning 
or definition: (a) A female should not be questioned 
beyond what is necessary to make the nature of what 
is confessed sufficiently clear. ‘‘I have been impure,” 
is not sufficiently specific to enable the confessor to 
form a judgment, for the penitent may refer either to 
a passing thought or to an act of the gravest character. 
(6) Neither sex should be questioned concerning the 
sinful actions or words of the other. (c) Questioning 
should cease, if it has been necessary, as soon as the 
requirements of a sincere and sufficient confession 
are being fulfilled. The mind of the penitent should 
not be allowed to dwell on the circumstances of sin 
after they have been sufficiently indicated. (d) 
The young ought not to be questioned as to forms of 
evil that they have not certainly become capable of 
understanding. Sins which are not possible until 
the attainment of puberty must be ignored in dealing 
with those who have not reached that stage of develop- 
ment. (e¢) The private organs or functions should not 
be unnecessarily named, nor should they be described 
vividly. Nicknames should be avoided absoutely, and 
should not be tolerated in confession, because they are 
used chiefly by the impure, and are directly suggestive 
of evil. (f) The unmarried should not be instructed 
or questioned in ways that suggest the relations of 
man and wife, except in view of prospective marriage 
and sincere enquiry occasioned by such prospect. 


214 THE SACRAMENT OF PENANCE 


Questions should be suited to the penitent’s voca- 
tion. Thus the “religious,” those in business, in pro- 
fessional life, etc., need different lines of questioning, 
suited to the duties and temptations, and also the 
desirable ignorances, of each. After advice has been 
given and penance assigned, and before absolution, it is 
often helpful to ask, “Is there anything more that you 
would like to say?” The operation of grace during the 
confession and subsequent advice may move the pen- 
itent to perfect his confession by laying bare some 
previously concealed sin or difficulty. — 

§ 7. Different types of penitents ! require different 
methods of treatment; and they may be conveniently 
classified according to their consciences as these are 
right, erroneous, doubtful, scrupulous, probable, 
optimistic, despairing or lax. These types emerge in 
every walk of life, in both sexes, and at every level of 
mental growth. 

(a) A right conscience is sufficiently enlightened to 
judge correctly, and is exercised with due care and 
success, being kept right by careful self-examination 
and by habitual study of God’s will. To have a right 
judgment in all things is the result of the spiritual 
gifts of wisdom and counsel, duly cultivated by edu- 
cation and self-discipline. In its perfection such a 

1See W. W. Williams, of. cit., chh. v, vii; Koch-Preuss, of. cit., 
vol. I, pp. 194-202; T. Slater, op. cit., vol. I, pp. 58-79; Jeremy 
Taylor, Duct. Dubit., Bk. I, chh. ii ff., who lists five varieties of con- 
science: tender, hardened or obdurate, quiet, restless or disturbed 


and perverse. He treats them at great length. Slater adds, certain 
and strict consciences. 


TYPES OF PENITENTS 215 


conscience is attained with difficulty, is easily lost 
through carelessness and through failure of the will 
to be guided by its judgments, and is a mark of gen- 
uine sanctity. The whole aim of Moral Theology is 
to exhibit scientifically the principles and rules by 
which the judgments of a right conscience are deter- 
mined. 

(b) An erroneous conscience is one that in certain 
directions gives wrong judgments, whether from blame- 
less or invincible ignorance or from blameworthy and 
avoidable causes. If due to invincible ignorance, it is 
not blameworthy so long as it remains really invincible. 
But when the mind becomes aware of means of obtain- 
ing needed enlightenment and fails to make use of 
them, its ignorance is no longer invincible or excusable. 
Dulness or hardness of heart is a frequent cause of 
this refusal of light; and careless or precipitate judg- 
ments of the conscience are sinful causes of error. 
None the less, the conscience is to be obeyed in any 
case, because its judgment expresses what we think 
to be right, so that to disobey it is to do what we be- 
lieve to be wrong—contrary to God’s will. But if 
the conscience is erroneous, we sin materially in obey- 
ing it, although not wilfully and formally, if the cause 
is that of invincible ignorance. If the ignorance is not 
invincible we sin formally whether we obey or disobey 
the conscience. Obviously, therefore, an erroneous 
conscience should be educated and corrected, if pos- 
sible. 

But if it appears reasonably certain that a person 


216 THE SACRAMENT OF PENANCE 


who sins in ignorance, hitherto invincible, will cling 
to his sin after enlightenment, his priest or adviser will 
be justified in remaining silent, provided his silence, 
or refusal to take the matter into official cognizance, 
does not bring public scandal and spiritual injury to 
others. 

(c) A doubtful conscience is one that suspends judg- 
ment, whether wisely and justifiably, or wilfully and 
culpably. Such suspense of judgment may be justi- 
fiable when no immediate action has to be considered; 
and it may even be obligatory pending further enquiry 
and deliberation, inasmuch as moral judgments should 
be based upon adequate enquiry and sound reasons. 
The scrupulous conscience, to which we shall come 
shortly, is a very different matter. When immediate 
determination of action or non-action is obligatory, a 
doubtful conscience ought to condemn actions that 
appear probably to be wrong, and to decide in favour 
of actions which appear probably to be obligatory. 
But so long as real doubt continues, the presumption 
is on the side of refraining from the act under con- 
sideration, if it can be avoided without sin, and of 


1W. W. Webb, op. cit., p. 6, says, “‘If the penitent shows ignorance 
touching things necessary to salvation, he must be enlightened. In 
other things, even of precept, if there is danger of turning material 
into formal sin, he need not be enlightened, except: 7. where there 
may be danger of injury to the general welfare. 7. where the pen- 
itent directly enquires. 7iz. or where he will ultimately be bene- 
fited.”” Koch-Preuss, op. cit., vol. II, p. 165, ‘‘When a confessor 
has reason to doubt whether instruction is likely to prove useful, he 
had better say nothing.” 


TYPES OF PENITENTS o17 


further enquiry. If, however, immediate decision is 
necessary, what appears to be the safer course ought 
to be preferred. In further enquiry and deliberation 
the obtaining of competent advice ought to be in- 
cluded; and official rulings ought to be accepted as 
determinative, unless perceived certainly to be 
wrong. 

(d) A scrupulous conscience! is an evil form of 
doubtful conscience which is obstinately and unduly 
influenced by trifling considerations and motives, to 
the neglect of proper attention to deeper and more 
determinative principles. It vacillates when deter- 
minate judgment and action is called for. It is a 
symptom of moral defect in its possessor, and if 
uncured paralyzes moral effort and spiritual progress. 
It represents either spiritual pride (its most frequent 
cause), the disguise of wilful evasion of responsibility, 
or pathological abnormality. Its diagnosis and 
treatment require the skill of an experienced guide of 
souls. Its ordinary demonstrations are (a) repeated 
questioning without decision; (0) frequent running 

1 Dr. Pusey, op. cit., p. 376, says that the scrupulous ‘‘are like one 
whose eyes are inflamed, and who perpetually adds to the inflamma- 
tion by rubbing them; just so, friction of the conscience increases 
scruple and anxiety of mind.” Bp. Taylor says in of. cit., that 
‘*a scruple is a great trouble of mind proceeding from a little motive, 
and a great indisposition, by which the conscience though sufficiently 
determined by proper arguments dares not proceed to action, or if it 
do so it cannot rest.” Beside the refs. given in the previous note, 


see £..B. Pusey, op. czt., ch. v, art. IT; F. G: Belton, Pt. V, ch. v; 
J. Reuter, Neo-Confessarius, Pars. III, cap. xiii; W. W. Williams, 


op. cit., pp. 195-200. 


218 THE SACRAMENT OF PENANCE 


for advice without result; (c) changes of mind for 
small reasons; (d) habitual brooding over petty 
considerations; (e) lack of assurance and recurrence 
of fears after solemn absolution and comforting advice; 
(f) confusing temptation with sin. 

If the explanation is that of wilful evasion of respon- 
sibility, serious admonition and present refusal of 
absolution is needed. If it is pathological, the case 
will call for merciful regard and pathological treat- 
ment.1 In the more frequent cases, however, the 
following remedies are recommended: (a) to cultivate 
humility; (0) to avoid exciting devotional books; 
(c) to shun the company of scrupulous persons; 
(d) to confine self-examination to the greater and more 
undeniable sins, and in confession to mention lesser 
sins only en bloc; (e) to flee idleness, or opportunities 
of unnecessary self-inquisition; (f/f) to ask grace to 
follow advice implicitly, without running about to 
different advisers. 

(e) A probable conscience is one that does not hesi- 
tate to decide on the basis of probabilities, without 
waiting for certainty. It offers a sharp contrast to 
the scrupulous conscience. When certainty cannot 
be had and decision is obligatory—not a rare circum- 
stance—probability, as Bishop Butler says, is a very 
guide of life, and ought to be followed. But the 
besetting danger of a probable conscience is careless 
neglect of enquiry, and of effort to obtain certainty 


- 1Cf. K. E. Kirk, pp. 233 ff., 202-4, 160; Cath. Encyc., s.v. “ Psycho- 
analysis”; F. G. Belton, op. cit., pp. 224-5. 


TYPES OF PENITENTS 219 


or an approximation to it, when it can be acquired. 
If after due enquiry and deliberation has been resorted 
to, probabilities alone are available, then and only 
then do the principles of “probabilism,”! as it is 
called, apply. Removable doubt is not a just excuse 
for deciding upon a purely probable basis. 

Probabilism when it applies, that is, after unsuc- 
cessful effort to remove doubt, is concerned with two 
alternatives of conduct, one of which appears to be 
safer than the other, but neither of which is certainly 
sinful. In the tribunal of Penance mercy has to 
rule, and the penitent has to be given the benefit 
of reasonable doubt, even when he has followed the 
less safe course. That is, he may not be treated as 
sinning until either his act itself or his motive therein 
is clearly shown to be sinful. None the less the priest 
is bound to cultivate in his penitents not only a sin- 
cere purpose of avoiding sin—a purpose inconsistent 
with habitually choosing the less safe course—but 
also a sense of Christian vocation to make progress in 
virtue. 

He should therefore inculcate, as occasion affords 
opportunity, certain general principles in deciding 
between alternative courses: (1) If both involve 
probable injury, the least injurious should be pre- 
ferred; (2) If both bring moral advantage, the more 
advantageous should be preferred; (3) If one is 


1Qn which, see especially C. J. Shebbeare, in Ch. Q. Rev., July, 
1912. His account of the various theories is summarized in p. 44, 
note, above, where other refs. are given. 


220 THE SACRAMENT OF PENANCE 


always desirable and right and the other not always 
so, the former should be adopted; (4) If one is always 
likely to be injurious and wrong and the other not so, 
the latter should be chosen. In general, that good 
which is most clear and likely to be attained, and that 
course which is least likely to be injurious or to lead 
to wrong doing is to be chosen. But the judgment of 
conscience cannot alter the material quality of the 
act or refusal to act, although it does determine 
immediate obligation and the formal guilt or non- 
guilt of the course adopted. Therefore we ought to 
gain the fullest light practicable and govern our 
decisions by rationally ordered principles, deferring to 
sufficiently authoritative commands.! 

§ 8. Confessions of the sick and dying? should be 
dealt with in a manner neither apologetic, timid nor 
perplexed, but authoritative, calm and decisive, 
although sympathetic, kind, friendly and fatherly, 
without stiffness and formality. He may well take 
as his model the sick-room manner of a good physician. 
He should get quickly to his task, and should insist 
on being left alone with the patient, for his visit is 
not merely that of a friendly caller, in which a mem- 
ber of the family may rightly remain present to share 
in the conversation. 

1QOn the whole subject of a probable conscience and its right guid- 
ance, see K, E. Kirk, op. cit., pp. 191-201; W. W. Williams, op. cit., 
pp. 191-195; N. Porter, op. cit., ch. xvii (a significant recognition of 
the need of casuistry). 


2See E. B. Pusey, of. cit., pp. 324-353; F. G. Belton, op. cit., 
Pt. VI; E. C. Linton, Notes on the Absolution of the Sick and Dying. 


THE SICK AND DYING 221 


EK. C. Linton gives three classes of sick people; ! 
the well-instructed, the partially instructed, and the 
ignorant, that is, in the use of the sacrament of 
Penance. Practically, all may be placed in either the 
first or third group. With the first there is no diffi- 
culty, and they may be particularly exhorted to recall 
sins that have been omitted in previous confessions, 
especially if the omission has been deliberate. With 
the third class it may be well to avoid the technical 
terms connected with “confession,” in order not to 
rouse invincible prejudice. The following procedure 
has been found helpful: The priest will ask if the sick 
person has any sin troubling him. He may, perhaps, 
speak of the influence of moral and spiritual condi- 
tions upon the physical. If he receives the common 
response “I have committed no sin”’ showing igno- 
rance as to the nature of sin and failure to prac- 
tise self-examination, he may question about 
Church attendance, and ask whether absenting 
oneself from public worship may not be thought of 
as sin, and whether there is sorrow for it. He may 
then follow the same procedure with reference to 
prayer, going on to sins against God in general. He 
may then proceed to sins against oneself or against 
men, taking first those which the world treats lightly, 
such as profanity. Next he may take up such sins 
as men are apt most jealously to conceal. The exam- 
ination may be concluded by some general questions: 
“Are you sorry for all these?” “Do you want God 

10>. cit., chh. iv-vi. 


222 THE SACRAMENT OF PENANCE 


to forgive you?” “‘Do you forgive all those who have 
in any way injured you?” The priest will proceed to 
give instruction concerning absolution, not neces- 
sarily using the word, however, but speaking of it as 
God’s assurance, ministering consolation to our doubts. 
He will then give absolution, conditional or absolute, 
if there is reason to hope that the man feels any 
penitence. With the unconscious this may be taken 
for granted. All can be done in a surprisingly short 
time, a time not exceeding that to which a priest 
should be expected to confine himself in visiting the 
sick; and it will be found in many cases most efh- 
cacious in opening the eyes of the soul to the presence 
of sin and in leading to sincere repentance. 


CHAPTER IX 
SIN 


§ x. The Old and New Testaments use a number 
of terms to describe sin in its various phases.! It was 
necessarily dealt with from the beginning in the pa- 
tristic age, and its nature was brought out with 
increasing clarity as the Church gained practical 
experience in dealing with its manifold forms. Much 
of the theoretical treatment of the subject belongs 
properly to Dogmatic Theology,? and we need not 
concern ourselves at length with general definitions or 
distinctions. Perhaps as good a definition as any 
is that of St. Augustine: ‘‘Anything done or said 
or desired contrary to the eternal law.’’? It is there- 

1Space is lacking here for detailed treatment; but the Hebrew 
and Greek terms and their proper meanings can be ascertained in 
the lexicons, especially Brown-Driver-Briggs, Hebrew-English Lexicon 
of the Old Testament, and J. H. Thayer, Greek-English Lexicon of the 
New Testament. See also A. B. Davidson, Theol. of the O. T., ch. vii; 
E. R. Bernard in Hastings, Dic. of the Bib., g.v.; 5S. A. B. Mercer, in 
Anglican Theol. Review, vol. II, No. 3, pp. 234-236. 

2¥F. J. Hall, Creation and Man, pp. 270 ff.; H. P. Liddon, Some 
Elem. of Religion, Lec. iv; H. V. S. Eck, Sin; T. B. Strong, Christ. 
Ethics, Lec. v; Wilhelm and Scannell, Manual of Cath. Theol., Bk. IV, 


ch. 1. 
3In c. Faust, xxii, 27. “The will of admitting or retaining that 


228 


224 SIN 


fore unnatural; that is, when nature is considered 
from the standpoint of its Creator! It is a dis- 
turbance of right order, and order has been described 
as heaven’s first law. 

§ 2. Sin has certain characteristics, the considera- 
tion of which will help us to deal with it from the 
moral side that properly concerns us here: (a) It does 
not inhere in the nature of things, nor proceed from 
the divine essence or from some other independent 
principle; but owes its existence entirely to free will. 
“By the will a man sins or lives a good life.” 2 This 
is the distinctively Christian teaching in contrast to 
that of Aristotle, who placed sin in a defect of the 
understanding. It is not, in scholastic terms, a sub- 
stance, but an accident. It is a privation or corrup- 
tion of good. (6) God is not the Author of sin# 


which righteousness forbids, and from which one is free to abstain,” 
tbid., c. Jul., i, 47. St. Ambrose, de Parad., cap. viii, 39, ‘What is 
sin but the transgressing of the divine law and disobedience to the 
heavenly precepts?” St. Thomas, I, lxxi, 6. T. Slater, op. cit., 
vol. I, p. 133, ‘A sin is nothing but a bad human act, and it may be 
defined as a free transgression of the law of God,” “act” here in- 
cludes thought and word, of course. Koch-Preuss, op. cit., vol. II, 
pp. 3-11; J. P. Gury, op. cit., §§ 143-184. The Westminster Shorter 
Catechism, ‘Sin is any want of conformity unto, or transgression of, 
the law of God.” 

1St. Aug., c. Ep. Manich. Fund., xxxv, 39, ‘Sin is not nature, but 
against nature.” 

2 Tbid., Retract, I, ix, 4. St. Thomas, I, II, Ixxvii, 6, “‘Sin consists 
essentially in an act of free choice, which is a function of the will and 
of reason.” Jbid., II, II, lxxx, 1, “‘A man’s will alone is directly the 
cause of his sin.” 

8 Tbid., I, xix, 9, “God in no wise wills the evil of sin, which is the 


CHARACTERISTICS AND ORIGIN 225 


The doctrine of the “divine concursus’’ does not make 
God the Author of evil, but the accomplice, if we may 
so speak, of the will’s freedom, for without Him 
nothing can be done; but the will, by virtue of its 
freedom, has the power of doing good or ill, and is the 
determining cause.! (c) Because sin proceeds from 
opposition of the human will to the will of God, who 
is the supreme Lawgiver and the benevolent Father 
of all, it is an act of disobedience and ingratitude. It 
diverts man also from his own true end. It derives 
its motives from an inordinate self-love. 

As to its origin, according to Scripture, (a) the first 
sin, that of Lucifer and his angels, was purely spiritual. 
Man’s sin differs in that it is not purely spiritual but 
partly carnal, and therefore, not the result of malice 
alone but of malice and infirmity combined. Also 
in human sin the effect of original sin is to be allowed 
for, because even after its removal the wound of 
privation of right order towards the divine good. The evil of natural 
defect, or of punishment, He does will, by willing the good to which 
such evils are attached.” Jdid., I, xlix, 2, ‘‘God is the Author of the 
evil which is penalty, but not of the evil which is fault.” 

1 Jbid, I, II, xxix, 2, “God is the cause of the act of sin, yet He is 
not the cause of sin (as such), because He does not cause the act to 
havea defect.” Koch-Preuss, op. cit., vol. II, p. 8, ‘‘God’s contribu- 
tion toa sinful act isin itself good. He merely enables man to employ 
the faculties which He has given him for a good purpose. It is man 
who renders the act evil by having a wrong intention.” Jbid., p. 9, 
‘Besides, God often employs sin as a means of punishing the sinner 
and thus indirectly causes good to spring from evil.” In brief, 
although God operates in man’s sinning, His end is holy and this 


ultimately triumphs, overruling the evil. Cf. F. J. Hall, Creation and 
Man, p. 74; B. Boedder, Natural Theol., pp. 355-370. 


226 SIN 


concupiscence remains. Man, as distinguished from 
the angels, can consequently be redeemed from sin. 
(6) To understand the origin of sin aright, and to avoid 
the modern tendency to make little of it, we must 
remember that whether we take the Eden narrative 
historically or symbolically, the Holy Spirit teaches 
us thereby that sin grew out of ingratitude and con- 
tempt towards special privileges and gifts. All light 
views of sin are impossible when we recollect that 
Christ became Man and died because of it. Its 
heinousness to-day is aggravated by the fact that it is 
committed by those whose minds are enlightened by 
revelation, whose wills are strengthened by grace, 
and whose emotions are stirred by the love of the 
Atonement. 

§ 3. The distinction between mortal and venial 
sin is very important both for priests and for peni- 
tents, not less so because requiring judgment in appli- 
cation. It helps priests in dealing with penitents 
to avoid the opposite errors of rigorism, which treats 
every sin as fatal, and of laxism, which underesti- 
mates the gravity of certain sins and treats venial 
sin as practically negligible. It also helps penitents 
to avoid these errors in estimating the results of self- 
examination and in making confessions which are at 
once sufficiently full and discriminating Mortal sins 
are those which because of their gravity in matter 
and formal guilt are fatal to the life of grace. Venial 
sins are less grave, proceeding largely from weakness 
rather than from deliberate wilfulness, and not imme- 


MORTAL AND VENIAL 227 


diately fatal in their results. The unequal gravity 
and effect of various sins is everywhere taken for 
granted in Scripture; 1 and St. John tells us expressly 
that ‘‘there is a sin unto death . . . All unrighteous- 
ness is sin: and there is a sin not unto death.” ? 
The ancient exomologesis presupposed this distinc- 
tion, and emphasized the peculiar gravity of certain 
sins;* and as the Church’s experience widened, the 
difference between mortal and venial sin was clarified 
and technicalized.+ 

The practical rules for applying this distinction 
are easy to be understood, whatever may be the uncer- 
tainties that in cases attend their use. The compara- 
tive gravity of sins depends upon their matter and 
upon the degree of deliberate wilfulness with which 
they are committed. If the matter is grave, that is, 
if the act itself is highly subversive of the divine will, 
the sin is presumably mortal; and it certainly is so 
when committed with consciousness of its gravity 
and with deliberate wilfulness. On the other hand, 
if the matter is comparatively light, like a momentary 
loss of patience, the sin is presumably venial; as is 
also the case when there is no deliberate wilfulness in 


1Cf. especially St. Matt. v. 22; xil. 31-32; xxiii. 23-24. 

21 St. John v. 16-17. 

3See O. D. Watkins, op. cit., passim; F. H. Hallock in Anglican 
Theol. Review, Oct., 1921. 

4QOn the distinction, see pp. 11-13, above; F. J. Hall, The Sacra- 
ments, pp. 239-240; K. E. Kirk, op. cit., ch. xi; T. B. Strong, op. cit., 
pp. 228-231; W. W. Williams, of. cit., pp. 178-183; J. G. H. Barry, 
Holy Eucharist, pp. 48-58; St. Thomas, I, II, lxii, 5, Ixxxvili-Ixxxix. 


228 SIN 


its commission. Clear as these rules appear to be, 
in practice both the gravity of matter and the delib- 
erate wilfulness are matters of judgment, in many 
instances of uncertain judgment. To forget this is to 
make the distinction between mortal and venial sin 
a source of danger instead of help to priest and pen- 
itent. In doubt, the penitent will most safely sus- 
pect himself of mortal rather than of venial sin; but, 
in dealing with penitents, the priest errs most safely 
for them on the side of merciful judgment, that is, of 
course, when the sinner appears in practical effect 
to repent truly of all his sins. 

In judging whether a sin is mortal or venial, the 
following considerations are helpful: (a) Even when 
the matter is light, if the sinner thinks it to be grave 
and under such impression commits it with formal 
wilfulness, he sins mortally. In fact, any sinful act, 
regardless of the sinner’s estimate of its material 
gravity, is mortal when committed with gravely sinful 
intention and deliberation. (6) When a particular 
species of venial sin becomes habitual and is wilfully 
cherished, it becomes mortal, especially when per- 
ceived to nullify one’s purpose of conforming to the 
will of God. (¢) A sin which is ordinarily mortal 
because of the gravity of its matter may be judged 
to be venial when the sinner is either blamelessly 
ignorant of its gravity, or does not act deliberately 
and intentionally in committing it. Marriages per- 
mitted by civil law but forbidden by the law of God,! 

1 Marriages contrary to the law of God introduce a continuing 


TEMPTATIONS AND OCCASIONS 229 


and killings either in self-defence or by accident, 
supply examples. 

Absence of certainty in determining whether 
given sins are mortal or venial will not bring disaster, 
if priest and penitent observe: (a) that all sins, even 
venial ones, are really sinful and need to be repented 
of; (6) that, if all sins known or thought to be mortal 
and all besetting faults, so far as they can be recalled, 
are contritely confessed, along with sincere expression 
of contrition for sins not remembered, God will not 
refuse mercy, and His priest may not in final issue 
refuse sacramental absolution. 

§ 4. As we have seen, the will is the cause of sin; 
for its functioning is the determinative factor in 
converting moral motives into action. The fact that 
evil impulses are thus actualized by the will consti- 
tutes actual sin, and sin is wilfulness. But the 
motives—feelings and considerations—by which the 
will is influenced in sinning, while partly due to 
inward habitual dispositions and native concupiscence, 
are also called forth by external factors. Of these are 
temptations and occasions. 

Temptation to sin means putting the will to moral 
proof, testing it, by affording opportunities and in- 
ducements to sin.! In this its proper sense to be 


state which is materially sinful in grave degree. The question of 
their treatment by a priest is elsewhere considered. The possibility 
of converting a sin of ignorance into formal rejection of God’s law, 
and the interest of the children, have to be taken into account. The 
priest may be justified in certain cases in not taking official cogni- 
zance, if no public scandal is involved. 

1Qn temptation, F. J. Hall, Incarnation, pp. 250-259; Hastings, 


230 SIN 


tempted involves no sin whatever until we yield and 
will the evil act°or non-action which is suggested. 
The appeal is to natural cravings and propensities 
which are lawful in themselves, but which cannot be 
gratified or obeyed in the specific manner suggested 
without sin. The fierceness and pain-producing 
power of temptation are felt in degrees proportioned 
to the will’s resistance. That is, one who remains 
sinless alone experiences to the full the brunt and 
agony of temptation; and Christ alone has fully 
entered into the personal cost of overcoming tempta- 
tion.! 

(a) We are placed in this world on probation, and 
inasmuch as without temptation no real probation 
and establishment of interior virtue is possible, the 
natural conditions of our lives afford opportunities 
and inducements to sin, and divine providence brings 
them to bear on us in manners wisely adapted to our 
testing and to a fair chance to advance by rightly 
meeting the test. In this sense alone we are tempted 
of God? 

(b) Because of that native lack of the supernatural 
grace originally given to our first parents and conse- 
quent insufficiency of our moral powers which we 
call original sin, temptations come from within as well 
as from without, and we are apt to yield to them. 
Dic. of Christ, Blunt’s Dic. of Theol., and Cath Encyc., q.vv.; Hastings, 
Dic. of Bible, s.v. “Tempt, Temptation”; J. B. Mayor, Ep. of Si. 
James, on i. I-15. 


1F, J. Hall, as cited, and refs. there given. 
3 Cf. St. James i. 12-18. 


TEMPTATIONS AND OCCASIONS 231 


We cannot invariably avoid actual sin, although in 
no single instance are we literally obliged to sin, 
unless previous habits of sin have deprived us of 
all power to resist. This native tendency is called 
concupiscence; and is symbolically described as sin, 
not as really so, but as springing from primitive sin 
and predisposing us to acts of sin of our own! By 
divine mercy we have been redeemed; and the grace 
of baptismal regeneration, while it does not at once 
eradicate concupiscence and put sinlessness within 
our power of immediate attainment, imparts the 
potential principle of progress through life-long disci- 
pline towards final and complete victory.” 

(c) Men are social by nature and their develop- 
ment is conditioned by social relations, and by the 
influence of other persons than themselves. We are 
also surrounded by personal spirits or angels, and are 
subject to their influence, under limitations of divine 
appointment; and among these are evil spirits 3— 
the devil and his angels. So it is that we are often 
tempted from without by evil men and angels, who 
wilfully offer us suggestions and inducements to sin. 
These sources of temptation are summarized in the 
phrase “the world and the devil.” To social beings 
in a world not wholly made up of perfect persons the 
liability to external personal influence for evil is 
inevitable—a necessary incident in the probation of a 


1¥F, J. Hall, Creation and Man, pp. 277-279 and ch. ix. 
2 Idem, The Sacraments, pp. 15 ff. 
3 Idem, Creation and Man, ch. v. 


232 SIN 


race. But even so, we are not in any given instance 
tempted beyond power of resistance, unless our own 
previous fault has made us helpless. We may be com- 
pelled to perform actions materially sinful, but no one 
can compel us to will sinfully, that is, to become per- 
sonally guilty of sin.! Moreover, the power to 
resist all forms of temptation, to outgrow concu- 
piscence, is assured to us by sacramental grace when 
codperated with in a life of progressive self-discipline 
and imitation of Christ. 

An occasion is an external circumstance which is 
apt to afford temptation.2 It does not always bring 
temptation, for there are many such occasions the 
tempting factors of which do not secure our atten- 
tion; but when attended to they tempt by suggest- 
ing evil thoughts and inciting concupiscence. Like 
temptations, occasions are indispensable tests of vir- 
tue. For example, our honesty incurs no actual test, 
when there is no occasion to steal2 Foreseen occa- 
sions of sin are to be avoided whenever this is possible 
without evasion of duty. 

Various distinctions in regard to occasions have been 
made: (a) a proximate occasion is one which leads a 
person to sin more often than not; (6) a remote 
occasion leads to the commission of sin only occa- 
sionally. A proximate occasion is either absolute, 
in that it constitutes a danger for all in all circum- 

1_ Cor. x. 13. 


2T. Slater, op. c#t., vol. II, pp. 220 ff. 
+ Eccles, xxxi..r0; 5. (Cor. v.20; 


TEMPTATIONS AND OCCASIONS 233 


stances; or relative, when the danger involved de- 
pends upon individual character or disposition. An 
occasion of this sort which offers temptation to one 
may offer none at all to another. Occasions are also 
distinguished as either (a) voluntary, if wilfully 
sought after when the danger has been discovered; 
or (6) necessary, if they can be avoided only with 
great difficulty or not at all. In the latter case, they 
are called physically necessary. An occasion morally 
necessary Is one which cannot be avoided without 
great injury or inconvenience, because there is in- 
volved a conflict of duties, perhaps an evasion of 
responsibilities in one’s providential vocation. 
Occasions are never to be sought, for such seeking 
is foolhardy.! To avoid all remote occasions, how- 
ever, Is impossible;? but we are morally bound to 
avoid all proximate and voluntary occasions? To 
expose oneself wittingly and without necessity to an 
occasion which is apt to lead to mortal sin is itself a 
grave sin, being in effect an acquiescence of the will 
in mortal sin. And so long as one wilfully remains 
thus exposed, although able to escape, he ought not to. 
receive priestly absolution. In a morally necessary 
proximate occasion one is bound to do all in his power 
by fervent prayer, frequent and devout reception of 
the sacraments, renewal of intention, avoiding perilous 


1 Ecclus. iii. 27. 

21 Cor. v. 9-10; St. John xvii. 15. 

3 Prov. vi. 27-28; xviii. 6-10; St. Matt. v. 29-30; St. Mark ix. 
41-46. 


234 SIN 


company and other methods to convert the proxi- 
mate into a remote occasion. The dangers of a 
physically necessary occasion ought to be met by 
the use of extreme caution and all other available 
means. : 

§ 5. Sins are classified in numerous ways, and 
knowledge of the distinctions involved is helpful in 
dealing with penitents. Several of them have been 
indicated, but a SpE survey seems desirable 
at this point.! 

The first series of distinctions have to do with 
estimating the several degrees of guilt: (a) Material 
sin means any objective violation of God’s will, any 
action or non-action which as such is sinful; but is 
very commonly restricted to sins which are committed 
ignorantly or without sinful intention. Formal sin 
is one committed knowingly and wilfully, and there- 
fore culpably. (6) Venial sin is concerned with a 
comparatively light matter, and represents momen- 
tary weakness or impulsiveness. Mortal sin is con- 
cerned with a grave matter, and is committed wit- 
tingly and with deliberation. It benumbs the soul 
and, unless remedied by adequate repentance, is 
fatal to the life of grace.2 (c) Sins of ignorance, 
that is, vincible and culpable ignorance; sins of 
infirmity, due to passion and unconquered evil habits; 


1 Qn these distinctions at large, W. W. Williams, op. cit., ch. vi; 
W. W. Webb, of. cit., ch. iii; St. Thomas, I, II, lxxii-lxxiii; A. Lehm- 
kuhl, Theol. Moralis, vol. I, §§ 220 ff. 

2 Considered in § 3, above, where refs. are given. 


CLASSIFICATION 235 


and sins of malice committed with deliberate fore- 
thought; constitute a rising series in the degrees 
of guilt. (d) Sins that cry aloud for vengeance; and 
the sin against the Holy Ghost, which is obstinately 
impenitent defiance of light, are singled out in Scrip- 
ture as especially grave—the latter not subject to 
forgiveness.? (e) Actual sins, are distinguished from 
habitual, the latter consisting of such as are cherished 
and persisted in without repentance, therefore espe- 
cially grave. 

A second series has to do with species of sin con- 
sidered in the manner of their committal, or their 
subjective factor. (a) Of commission, in violation of 
prohibitive law; and of omission, failing to fulfil some 
positive requirement. The former are usually more 
grave, but the latter are apt to become dangerous 
through neglect of repentance. (6) Sins are spiritual 
or carnal according as they proceed from, or are com- 
mitted in, the higher or lower part of our nature. 
The latter are most scandalous, but the former, 
especially pride, are the deepest and most difficult 
to remedy, and therefore are often the most serious.® 


1 J. J. Elmendorf, op. cit., pp. 92-106; K. E. Kirk, of. cit., p. 224; 
T. Slater, of. cit., vol. I, pp. 30-34. 

2St. Matt. xii. 31 and parallels. Cf. Heb. x. 26-31; 1 St. John 
v. 16-17 (perhaps not pertinent). See §§ 7-8 below. 

3 St. Thomas, I, II, lxxiii, 5, ‘Spiritual sins are of greater guilt than 
carnal sins: yet this does not mean that each spiritual sin is of 
greater guilt than each carnal sin; but that, considering the sole 
difference between spiritual and carnal, spiritual sins are more griev- 
ous than carnal sins, other things being equal.” 


236 SIN 


(c) Sins of thought, of word and of deed are distin- 
guishable without the aid of definition. All sins 
begin in thought, of course, but their classification 
depends upon whether they are manifested in words 
or deeds. Thought becomes sin when it amounts to 
evil consent of the will, as in impure imagination 
wilfully pursued, and in pride and hatred. 

A third series of distinctions is determined by 
external standards of right and wrong and by the 
parties other than ourselves who are offended. (a) 
In the category of law, sins may be against the Jaw of 
natural reason or against the commands and prohibi- 
tions of positive law. (6) They may be against the 
revealed law of God or against human law, whether 
ecclesiastical or civil. (c) Sins against God’s law are 
chiefly against the Decalogue, and are then classified 
according to its several commandments.! (d) With 
reference to the parties involved, sins are aimed either 
against God, against our neighbours, or against self. 
In ultimate analysis, however, all sins are against 
God. 

§ 6. The capital sins are so called as constituting 
heads or categories under which all forms of sin can 
be classified. They are comprehensive categories 
because they are determined by the instincts in us 
which make up the possible roots of sinful action; 
and the list, which is ancient, is found to be substan- 
tially in accord with modern psychological investi- 
tigation. They are sometimes called “deadly sins”; 

1 Treated in ch. iv, Pt. III, above. 


THE SEVEN CAPITAL SINS 237 


but this is quite misleading, for each of them may be 
either venial or mortal according to its comparative 
degree of malice and gravity of matter. They are 
seven in number: pride, covetousness, lust, envy, 
gluttony, anger and sloth.’ Of these, lust and glut- 
tony are carnal; pride, covetousness, envy and anger 
are spiritual; and sloth may be either spiritual or 
carnal, 

Pride is inordinate self-esteem, with desire to 
induce others to accept one’s exalted opinion of self. 
Under this head are to be included: (a) vanity, which 
may be shown either in undue care for one’s personal 
appearance, attainments, talents and repute or in 
the contemptuous neglect of the same; (6) ambition, 
that is, inordinate as distinguished from that which is 
fitting; (c) arrogance, including bragging and boast- 
fulness; (d) hypocrisy or the feigning of virtues or 
qualities which one does not possess. ‘The danger of 
pride lies in its turning one’s thoughts from God, as 
the source of all we have and are, and in making one 
feel self-sufficient and independent, thus making 
repentance unlikely. It is the sin of the Pharisee. 


1 Thus enumerated in St. Gregory I, Moralia, xxxi, 45. On capital 
sins, see St. Thomas, I, IT, lxxxiv, 3-4; T. B. Strong, op. cit., pp. 2597 
266; K. E. Kirk, op. cit., pp. 264-270; W. W. Webb, od. cit., ch. ili, C.; 
H. V. S. Eck, Sin, Pt. II, ch. vi; T. Slater, op. cit., vol. I, pp. 154-164. 
For treatments of them severally, see in each case Cath. Encyc., 
Hastings’ Encyc. of Relig., and Dic. of Bible, q.vv., where further refs. 
are given. 

2St. Matt. vi. 1-6; vii. 1-5; St. Luke xviii. 9-14; 1 Cor. x. 123 
Phil. ii. 3-8. St. Thomas, I, I, clxii. 


238 SIN 


It begets contempt of others and kills charity. The 
opposed virtue is humility, a fundamental Christian 
virtue! It is the mean between pride and the 
opposed evil of pusillanimity or mean-spiritedness, 
which keeps a man from occupying the place for 
which God created him. Humility keeps him in his 
place both with reference to God and to his fellowmen. 

Covetousness or avarice is an inordinate longing for 
earthly goods, with an immoderate desire to possess, 
keep and increase them. It leads to the service of 
Mammon instead of that of God;? and begets a 
numerous offspring of sins, such as lying, deceit, 
perjury, theft, treason, lack of charity in the narrow 
sense of the term, and every form of injustice. There- 
fore St. Paul terms it “the root of all evils.”? It 
leads to insatiability, discontent and fear of poverty, 
and is often responsible for great unhappiness tend- 
ing to become fixed.4 

Lust is that form of inordinate desire which breeds 
the sins of unchastity. It may be either internal, 
confined to thoughts and desires, or external, of words 
or acts. Unless promptly overcome in time of temp- 


1St. Matt. xi. 20, cf. v. 3; xviii, 3; St. Luke xiv. 1; St. John v. 14; 
St. Jas. iv. 6. J.B. Scaramelli, Direct. Asceticum, vol. III, art. XI. 

2St. Matt. vi. 21, 24; St. Paul calls it idolatry, Eph. v. 5; Col. iii. 5. 

$1 St. Tim. vi. ro. Cf. St. Thomas, I, II, Ixxxiv, 1. Generally, 
see St. Matt. vi. 31-33; St. John xii. 4-6; Heb. xiii. 5; 1 St. John 
ii. 15. 

4 T. Slater, of. cit., vol. I, pp. 157 ff. Ibid., p. 158, ‘It is opposed to 
liberality by defect, while prodigality is opposed to liberality by 
excess.” 


THE SEVEN CAPITAL SINS 239 


tation it is apt quickly to result in mortal sin. The 
subject has been dealt with elsewhere.! 

Envy is grief because of another’s good. Accord- 
ing to one theory, it caused the fall of Satan.2 Envy 
seeks another’s hurt or loss rather than his good, and 
is therefore opposed to charity. From it spring 
hatred, revenge, calumny and slander. A deeply 
seated vice, it has far-reaching effects and destroys 
interior peace. 

Gluttony is inordinate desire for food and drink 
on account of the pleasure they give. Of those 
addicted to it St. Paul says that “their god is their 
belly.” 4 It is opposed to the cardinal virtue of tem- 
perance. Excessive eating and drinking are its chief 
manifestations; but drunkenness is its most common 
form. Sins committed during drunkenness are mor- 
ally imputable, unless the state is due either to an 
accident or to ignorance. Excessive drinking, even 
when not resulting in intoxication, is sinful, and may 
become very grave and mortal by reason of foreseen 
liability to cause injury to health, scandal and neglect 
of duty, and because practically every man knows 
that excessive drinking is for him a proximate cause 


1 Tn ch. iv, §13, above. Cf. ch. v, § 7. 

2St. Aug., Serm. 254, alias 151, de Temp.; St. Thomas, II, II, 
xxxvi, 1-4. Cf. Wisd. ii, 24. But see Isa. xiv. 12-15; 1 Tim. iii. 6. 

3 On envy, 1 Cor. iii. 3; xiii. 4; 2 Cor. xii. 20; St. James iii. 14, 16; 
v. 9. It is described as cause of the first murder, Gen. iv. 3-8; and 
of the demand for our Lord’s crucifixion, St. Matt. xxvii. 17-18. 

4 Phil. iii. 19; cf. St. Luke xxi. 34; Rom. xiii. 13-14; 1 St. Pet. iv. 3. 


240 SIN 


of further sin It is a most common cause of crime, 
disease, and human misery generally. 

Anger is craving for revenge. Abstractly consid- 
ered it is not always a sin, for there is a ‘‘righteous 
anger’’ 2 which is praiseworthy and the lack of which 
may be a sin, as when one is unmoved by evil acts. 
But even this becomes a sin when it leads a man to 
lose control of himself and harbour feelings of hatred 
and enmity. And this is especially true when anger 
lacks a just cause. It becomes a sin in a way analo- 
gous to lust, by failure to control oneself ad rem.? 

Sloth is sluggishness of soul which makes one shirk 
physical and mental labour in the fulfilment of duty 
and the practice of virtue. It may take the form 
either of lukewarm indifference to these things, or of 
disinclination for them, developing into positive aver- 
sion. Its result is spiritual and moral paralysis.* 

§ 7. Sins that cry to heaven for vengeance, men- 
tioned above, include in usual reckoning wilful mur- 
der, sodomy, oppression of the poor, and defrauding 
labourers of their hire5 They are not only moral 
transgressions positively considered, but they violate 

1 Prov. XX. 13 XXiii, 29-35; St. Luke xxi. 34; 1 Cor. vi. 10; Eph. 
v. 18. 

2St. Matt. iii. 7; St. Mark iii, 5; St. Matt. xxi. 12; Rom. xii. 17; 
Acts v. 3 fi. 

8 Psa. xxxvil. 8; Prov. xiv. 17, 29; xvii, 14; St. Matt. v. 22; 
Ephes, iv. 31; St. James i. 19-20. 

4 Prov. vi. 6-11; St. Matt. xxv. 26-27; Rom. xii. 11; 2 Thess. 
iii, 10-12; Revel. iii, 15 ff. 

5 Gen. iv. 10; xviil. 20 ff.; Ex. ill. 7; xxii. 22 ff.; Deut. xxiv. 14 ff.; 
St. James v. 4. 


THE SIN AGAINST THE HOLY GHOST 241 


with peculiar directness the laws of nature, out- 
raging certain generally recognized natural instincts, 
including those of self-preservation, the sexual and 
the social. By their nature they are always mortal. 
Of the first two mentioned we have already treated.} 
Oppression of the poor, especially of widows and 
orphans, is committed in a variety of ways, ¢.g., by 
unjustly administering an estate, by the unjust 
appropriation of goods, by defrauding one who is 
unable to defend his right, by oppressive combina- 
tions and monopolies of food, fuel, and other neces- 
sities of life, by adulteration of such necessities, and 
by usury. Labourers are defrauded of their hire 
when compelled by necessity to accept a lower 
wage than that to which they are justly entitled, as in 
“sweat shops.” The latter forms of these sins 
require special study at the present time in the light 
of modern sociology and political economy. 

§8. In final analysis every wrongdoing is sin 
against the Holy Ghost, for all sins are in ultimate 
reference against God. In particular, all sin is op- 
posed to sanctity, of which the Holy Ghost is the 
Author. But, technically speaking, the description 
applies to a certain kind of sin? It is the most 
malignant sin of all and the only unforgivable one, 
for it does not proceed from ignorance or infirmity, 


1In ch. iv, §§ 12, 13, above. 

2 See T. Slater, Questions of Moral Theology, pp. 78 ff.; 176 ff. 

3St. Matt. xii. 24, 31-32; St. Mark iii. 28-30; St. Luke xii. 10; 
Heb. x. 26-31. 


242 SIN 


but is a deliberate and unalterably fixed opposition 
to the will of God as revealed by the Holy Ghost. St. 
Augustine and Peter Lombard enumerate six distinct 
sins of this kind,! but all may be reduced to one, 
deliberate revolt from God with final impenitence. 
Such sin is necessarily unpardonable, not because in 
objective form any human sin is beyond the reach of 
divine mercy, but because the sinner himself delib- 
erately and finally rejects such mercy. He who thus 
sins against the Holy Ghost cannot obtain forgive- 
ness for the simple reason that with, incurable obsti- 
nacy he refuses to be forgiven. It isthe fixedness of 
his attitude of rebellion which explains the situation, 
and all forms of sin are susceptible of final develop- 
ment to this climax of incurable malignity. Pre- 
viously to such development all are forgivable on 
repentance. 

1 Presumption against God’s mercy, despair, resisting known 
Christian truth, envy at another’s spiritual good and obstinacy in 


sin, are all steps leading to the last which is alone unpardonable. 
See H. B. Swete, on St. Mark, inloc.; A. Plummer, St. Matt., in loc. 





BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INDEX 


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AtpHonsus Licuort, St. Theol. Moralis. Many edd. 

AMBROSE, St. JN. and P.N., vol. 10; M.P.L., vols. 15-17. 

American Church Monthly. N. Y., 1917 ff 

Anglican Theol. Review. N. Y., 1918 ff. 

Anglo—Cath. Theol., Lib’y of. Ed. by E. B. Pusey and others, 88 
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Ante-Nicene Fathers, The. Ed. by Coxe, 10 vols. N. Y., 1905 ff. 
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ARISTOTLE. See Welldon. 

AucusTINE, St. NV. and P.N., 1st ser., vols. 1-8; M.P.L., vols. 
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BICKERSTETH, CyrtLt. The Ministry of Absolution. Lond., 1912. 

BICKNELL, E. J. A Theol. Introd. to the Thirty-nine Arts. Lond., 
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BIGG, GANA The Church’s Task under the Rom. Empire. Oxf., 1905. 

BLACKIE, J.S. Four Phases of Morals. N. Y., 1871. 

deat. SIR Wm. Commentaries on the Laws of Engl. Many 
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Brunt, HucH F. Great Penitents. N. Y., 1922. 

BLUNT, J.H. Dic. of Doctr’l and Hist’l T eae Lond., 1870. 

BoEDDER, B. Natural Theol. Lond., 1801. 

BrRown-DrivEr-Briccs. Heb, and Engl. Ps of the Old Test. Bost., 


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Bruce, A. B. The Moral Order of the World in Ancient and Modern 
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Bruce, W.S. Ethics of the Old Test. Edinb., 1895. 

Butcaris, Nicw. The Holy Catechism of. Lond., 1893. 

Butt, P. B. The Threefold Way. Lond., 1916. 


243 


PAA BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INDEX 


an Jos. Serm’s on Human Nature. Ed. by W. E. Gladstone. 

xf., 1896. 

CatrD, J. Fund’l Ideas of Christy. 2 vols., Glasg., 1899. 

CALDERWOOD, H. Handb’k of Moral Philos. 12th ed., Lond., 1885. 

Carey, W. J. The Life in Grace. Lond., 1914; Prayer and Some of 
its Difficulties. Lond., 1915. 

Catholic Encyc., The. Ed. by Herbermann, 16 vols., N. Y., 1907. 

Church Quart. Review, The. Lond., Spottiswoode. 

Cuurton, E.T. The Use of Penitence. 2ded. Lond., 1913. 

Coprens, C. Moral Prin’s and Medic. Practice. New and enl. ed. 
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Costin, JoHN. Works. In A-C. Lib. 5 vols. Oxf., 1843-55. 

CupwortH, Rate. Treatise concerning Eternal and Immutable 
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D’Arcy, C.F. A Short Study of Ethics. Lond., 190r. 

Darwin, Cuas. The Origin of Species by Nat’l Selection. New ed. 
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Davips, T. W. Rays. In Sacred Books of the East, vol. 2. Oxf. 

Davipson, A. B. Theol. of the Old Test. N.Y., 1906. 

Davinson, W.L. Christian Ethics. N. Y.,n. d. 

Davis, N. K. Elements of Ethics. WN. Y., 1900. 

DEARMER, PERcy. Body and Soul. N. Y., 1909. 

De LEHEN, FRr., S.J. The Way of Interior Peace. N. Y., 1888. 

Denzincer, H. Enchirid. Symb. et Definitionum. 12thed. Freib., 
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DEWEY, JOHN, and Turts, J.H. Ethics. N. Y., 1900. 

Didache, The, or Teaching of the Twelve Apos. In A-N, vol. 7. 

Didascalia Aposiolorum in English. Transl. by Eadem. Cambr., 
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ELwin, W. Confession and Absol. in the Bible. Lond., 1883. 

Ey, R. T. Monopolies and Trusts. N. Y., 1900; Socialism: Its 
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FENELON, ABP. Spiritual Letters. Transl. 2 vols. N. Y., 1878. 

Ficcis, J. N. The Will to Freedom. N. Y., 1917. 

FLiInT, Rosert. Socialism. Lond., 1904. 

FOERSTER, F. W. Marriage and the Sex Problem. Lond., 1912. 

Forses,A.P. An Explan. of theXXXIX Aris. athed. Oxf., 1881. 

GAMBLE, H. R. Sunday and the Sabbath. Lond., N. Y., 1901. 

Gaume. See Pusey. 

Gippincs, F. H. Prin’s of Sociology. N. Y., 1898. 

Giover, T. R. Conflict of Religions in the Early Rom. Empire. 
Lond., 1908. 


BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INDEX 245 


Gore, CHas. In Lux Mundi. Lond., 1904; Christian Moral 
Prin’s. Oxf., 1921; Dominant Ideas and Corrective Prin’s. 
Oxf., Mil., 1918; The Sermon on the Mount. Lond., 1896. 

Gott, Joun. The Parish Priest of the Town. Lond., 1888. 

GoupbcE, H. L. The First Ep. to the Corinth. 3ded. Lond., 1911. 

GREEN, T. H. Prolegom. to Ethics. Oxf., 1890. 

Grecory I., St. In M.P.L., vols. 75-79. Trans. in Lib. of Frs. 
Oxf., 1844. 

Gury, J. P., S. J. Compend. Theol. Moralis. 2 vols. Ratisb., 
1874. 

HAECKEL, Ernst. Riddle of the Universe. N. Y., 1900. 

Hatt,A.C.A. Christ. Doctr. of Prayer. N.Y. , 1904; Confirmation. 
Lond., N. Y., 1900. 

Hatt, F.J. Theol. Outlines. 3 vols., Mil., 1905 ff.; The Being and 
Altirib. of God. N.Y., Lond., 1909; Creation and Man, ibid., 19123 
The Incarnation, ibid., 1915; The Passion and Exalt. of Christ, 
ibid., 1918; The Church and the Sac’l System, ibid., 1920; The 
Sacraments, ibid., 1921; Eschatology, ibid., 1922. 

Hay, T.C. Hist. of Hihics within Organized Chrisi’y. N.Y., 1910. 

Harris, Caas. Pro Fide. New ed. Lond., rorq. 

Hastincs, James. (ed.) Dic. of the Bible. 4 vols. with extra vol. 
Edinb., N. Y., 1898-1904; Dic. of Christ and the Gospels. 2 vols. 
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of Religion and Ethics. 12 vols., 1908-21. 

HERMANN, WILHELM. Faith and Morals. N. Y., 1904. 

HessEy, J. A. Sunday. 4thed. N. Y., 1880. 

HrpeBen, J.G. The Problems of Philos. N, Y., 1898 

Hosses, THos. On Human Nature. Lond., toy. “The Leviathan. 
Oxf., 1881. 

Hosson, J. A. Evolution of Modern Capitalism. Lond., 1894. 

Hooker, Ricu. Works. Ed. by J. Keble. 3 vols. Oxf., 1865. 

Hueco or St. Victor. In M.P.L. Vols. 175-177. 

Hume, Davip. Treatise on Human Nature. Ed. Selby-Bigge. 
Oxf., 1896. 

Humpureys, A. J. Christian Morals. Lond., 1920. 

HunTeER, R. Poverty. N. Y., 1904. 

Hutcaines, W.H. The Life of Prayer. Lond., 1897. 

Hux tery, THos. Collected Essays. 9g vols. N. Y., 1908. 

Hype, W. DEW. Five Great Philos. of Life. 2ded. N. Y., 1913. 

Hystop, J. H. Elements of Ethics. N. Y., 1895. 

ILLINGWORTH, J. R. Christian Character. Lond., 1905. 

IRENAEUS, ST. Against Heresies. In A-N., vol. 1. 

JAMES, Wm. Psychology. Briefer Course. N. Y., 1920. 

Joun or Damascus, St. Expos. of the Orthod. Faith. In N. and 
P-N., 2d ser., vol. Q. 

Journal of the Soc. of Oriental Research. Chi., 1917 ff. 

Kant, Immanuet. Introd. to Metaph. Elements of Ethics. Trans, 
by Semple. 3d ed. Edinb., 1871. 


246 BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INDEX 


Kirk, K. E. Some Prin’s of Moral Theol. and their Application. 
2dimpr. Lond., N. Y., 1921. 

Krrxup, THos. A Hist. of Socialism. Lond., 1909. 

Kwox-LitrLe, W. J. Holy Matrimony. Lond., N. Y., 1900. 

Kocu, A. Ed. by Preuss, A. A Handb’k of Moral Theol. 5 vols. 
St. Louis, 1918 ff. 

Lambeth Conferences, The Five. Ed. R.T. Davidson. Lond., N. Y., 
1920. 

Deca W.E.H. Hist. of European Morals. 2 vols. N. Y., 1874. 

Lecc, J. W. Papal Faculties Allowing Food before Communion. 
Lond., 1906. 

LEGGE, J. Religions of China. Lond., 1880. 

LEHMKUHL, AuG., S. J. Theol. Moralis. 2 vols. Freib., 1886. 

LeusaA, J. H. A Psychol. Study of Religion. N. Y., 1912. 

Lippon, H. P. Univ. Sermons. 1st ser. Lond., 1869; Some Elem. 
of Religion. Lond., 1904; Clerical Life and Work. Lond., 
1894. 

Licutroot, J. B. Epis. to the Philippians. Lond., 1900; Epp. 
to the Colossians and to Philemon. Lond., tgo0o. 

LINDNER, D. Die gesetzliche Verwandtschaft als Ehehinderniss im 
abendlindischen Kirchenrecht des Mittelalters. Paderb., 1920. 

Linton, E. C. Notes on the Absol. of the Sick and Dying. Lond., 
IQI5. 

Locke, JoHN. Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Oxf., 1894. 

LorrHousE, W.F. Ethics and the Family. N. Y., 1912. 

LorzE, Herman. Prac’l Philos. In Outl. of Philos. Ed. by G. T. 
Ladd, vol. 3. Bost., 1885-92. 

Lutwarpt, C. E. Hist. of Christ. Ethics before the Reformation. 
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MacCotzr, Matcotm. Christianity in rel. to Science and Morals. 
Lond., 1903. 

MAcKENZIE, J.S. Manual of Ethics. 4thed. N. Y., 1901. 

Mackenzigz, W. D. Ethics of Gambling. Lond., 1889, 1897. 

MANDEVILLE, BERNARD. The Fable of the Bees. Lond., 1714. 

MartTInEAvU, Jas. Types of Ethical Theory. 2 vols. Oxf., 1901. 

Mayor, J.B. The Epis. of St. James. Lond., 1892. 

McDovucatt, Wu. Introd. to Social Psychol. Lond., 1912. 

Mercer, S. A. B. Growth of Relig. and Moral Ideas in Egypt; and 
Religious and Moral Ideas in Babylonia and Syria. Both Mil., 


IQIQ. 

Micne, L’Appk. (ed.) Patrologiae Cursus Completus. (Latin 222 
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Moore, AuBREY L. Essays Scientific and Philos’l. Lond., 1890. 

Mortimer, A. G. Cath. Faith and Practice. 2 vols. N. Y., Lond., 
1907, 1909; Helps to Meditation. 2vols. N. Y., 1881. 

Moztey, J. B. Ruling Ideas in Early Ages. N. Y., 1879. 

Myers, P.V.N. Hist. as Past Ethics. N. Y., 1913. 


BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INDEX 247 


Newso.t, W.C. E. The Cardinal Virtues. Lond. n. d.; Speculum 
Sacerdotum. Lond., 1894. 

Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, The. 1st series ed. by P. Schaff. 
14 vols. Buffalo, 1886 ff. 2d ser. ed. by Schaff and Wace. 
14 vols. N.Y., 1890 ff. Referred to as N. and P-N. 

OricEN. In A-N., vol. 4; M.P.G., vols. 11-17. 

Orttey, R. L. Aspects of the Old Test. Lond., 1904; The Rule of 
Life and Love. Lond., 1913. 

Parmer, G. H. The Field of Ethics. Bost., root. 

PASCAL, BLAIsE. Provincial Letters. Many edd. 

Preazsopy, F. G. Christian Life in the Modern World. N. Y., 1915. 

Perry, R.B. Approach to Philos. N. Y., 1905. 

PLummMer, A. An Exeg. Com. on the Gospel according to St. Matt, 
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Pour, Jos. (Ed. andtrans. by A. Preuss). Penance. In The Sac- 
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Pottock, F. First Book of Jurisprudence. Lond., 1896. 

Porter, Noan. Elements of Moral Science. N. Y., 1887. 

Poutain, A. The Graces of Interior Prayer. Lond., 1912. 

Putter, F. W. The Fast before Communion. Lond., 1891; The 
Anointing of the Sick. 2d ed. rev. Lond., roro. 

Pusey, E. B. Advice for those who Exercise the Ministry of Recon- 
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. . . adapted, etc. Lond., 1893; Is Healthful Reunion Posst- 
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Rann, BENJ. The Classical Moralists. Bost., 1900. 

RASHDALL, Hastincs. Conscience and Christ. N. Y., 1916; Is 
Conscience an Emotion? Bost., 1914; The Theory of Good and 
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REvTER, J.,S. J. Neo-Confessarius. Paris, 1895. 

Ricwarpson, G. L. Conscience, Its Origin and Authority. Lond., 
1915S. 

RICKABY, Jos.,S. J. Moral Philos. WLond., 1912. 

Rocers, R.A. P. <A Short Hist. of Ethics, Greek and Modern. Lond., 
IQII. 

RowntTrEE, B. S. Betting and Gambling. Lond., 1905; Poverty: 
A Study of Town Life. Lond., 1901. 

SANDERSON, BisHop. Lectures on Conscience and Human Law. 
Transl. and ed. by Chr. Wordsworth. Lond., 1877. 

SanrorD, A. E. Pastoral Medicine. N. Y., 1905. 

ScARAMELLI, J. B., S. J. The Directorium Asceticum. 4th ed. 4 
vols. Lond., 1897. 

Schaff-Herzog Encyc., The New. Ed. by Jackson. 12 vols. N. Y., 
1908-12. 

Scureter, C. E. (Ed. by H. J. Heuser.) Theory and Prac. of the 
Confessional: A Guide in the Admin. of the Sacrament of Penance. 
ad ed. N. Y., 1906. 

Scuweitzer, A. The Quest of the Hisi’l Jesus. 2d Eng.ed. Lond., 
IQII. 


248 BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INDEX 


ScuLLarD, H.H. Early ssihW te Ethics in the West, from Clement to 
Ambrose. Lond., 190 

SHarrr, J. C. Studies in hats and Philos. WN. Y., 1868, 1872. 

SIDGWICK, Henry. Methods of Ethics. Lond., 1890; Outlines of 
the Hist, of Ethics. Lond., 1886; Practical Ethics. Lond., 1909. 

SKINNER, JAS. A Synopsis of Moral and Ascetical Theol. Lond., 
1882. 

SLATER, THos., S. J. Cases of Conscience. 2 vols. N. Y., 1911; 
A Manual of Moral Theol, 2 vols. N. Y., 1918; Questions of 
Moral Theol. N. Y., 1915; Short Hist. of Moral Theol. N.Y., 


1900. 

SmitH, P.V. The Legal Position of the Clergy. Lond., N. Y., 1905. 

Sortey, W.R. On the Ethics of Naturalism. Edinb., 1885. 

SPENCER, HERBERT. Data of Ethics. N. Y., 1880; Justice. In 
Prin. of Ethics, Pt. V, Lond., 1893. 

StaLey, V. The Practical Religion. Oxf., 1897. 

StopparT, J.T. The New Socialism. Lond., 1909. 

Stone, DaRwELL. The Holy Communion. Lond., 1904. 

Stronc, THos. B. Christian Ethics. Lond., 1896. 

Swett, H. B. The Gosp. according to St. Mark. Lond., 1908. 

TANQUEREY, A. Brevior Synop. Theol. Moralis et Pastoralis. N.Y., 
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Tayior, JEREMY. In The Works of. Ed. by Eden. trovols. Lond., 
1883. 

Tuaver, J.H. Greek-Engl. Lex. of the New Test. N. Y., 1887. 

THAYER, W.R. Theodore Roosevelt. Bost., 1919. 

Tuomas Aquinas, St. Summa Theologica. Many edd.; Aquinas 
Ethicus: or the Moral Teaching of St. Thomas, by Jos. Rickaby, 
S.J. 2vols. Lond., 1896. 

Toucner, E. D. La. Person of Christ in Modern Thought. Lond., 
Bost., 1912. 

TREVELYAN, W. B. Sunday. Lond., N. Y., 1902. 

UEBERWEG, F. Hist. of Philos. Transl. from 4th ed. by G. S. 
Morris, with addns. by N. Porter. 2 vols. N. Y., 1876. 

UntHorn, G. Christian Charity in the Ancient Church. N. Y., 1883. 

VERMEERSCH, A. De Castitate. Roma, roro. 

Warp, W. G. Essays on the Philos. of Theism. 2 vols. Lond., 
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Watkins, O. D. A Hist. of Penance. 2 vols. Lond., 1920; Holy 
Matrimony. Lond., 1895. 

Wess, W. W. The Cure of Souls. 2d ed. Mil., 1910. 

WEBER, A. Hist. of Philos. N.Y., 1907 

WELDON, foo OD he N ED ethics of Aristotle. Lond., 
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WESTERMARCK, E. Origin and Devel’t of Moral Ideas. 2 vols. 
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Wairraker, THos. The Theory of Abstract Ethics. Cambr., 1916. 

WILBERFORCE, SAMUEL. Addresses to Candidates for Holy Orders. 
qthed. Oxf., Lond., 1878. 


BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INDEX 249 


WILHELM, Jos. and SCANNELL, T. B. A Manual of Cath. Theol. 
2vols. 2ded. Lond., 1899. 

Wirtrams, C. M. Review of Evol’y Ethics. N. Y., Lond., 1893. ® 

Wixuiams, W. W. The Moral Theol. of the Sacrament of Penance. 
Lond., 1917. 

Wis, E. F. The Worship of the Old Covenant. Oxf., 1880. 

Wiroman, A. T. The Doctr. of Confirmation. Lond., 1897. 

WoopwortH, A. V. Christian Socialism in England. Lond., 1903. 

Wor.uebcE, A.J. Prayer. Lond., 1909. 

Wonpt, Wu. Ethical Systems. Transl. 3 vols. Lond.,’1891. 





INDEX OF PRINCIPAL SUBJECTS 


Adultery and related sins, 119 ff, 
cf. “Impurity.” 

Absolution, conditions of, 197f. 

Agent, the moral, 62 ff. 

Almsgiving, 155 ff. 

Amendment, 196 f. 

Ascetic Theology, 8. 

Attrition, 192 f. 


Baptism, 131 ff. 
Body, moral aspect of the, 75 f. 


Candidates, ministerial, 143. 

Canon law, 40. 

Capital and labour, 127 f. 

Capital punishment, 118 f. 

Capital sins, 91, 236 ff. 

Casuistry, 7, 47, 189 ff. 

Celibacy, 182 f. 

Character, 176. 

Children and parents, 113 f. 

Christian ideal of conduct sum- 
marized, 186 f. 

Church: jethical place of the, 
36 f, 92; authority and pre- 
cepts of, 114 f. 

Civil obligations, 157 ff. 

Combinations and trusts, 170 f, 

Communion, Holy, 135 ff. 

Confession, sacramental:  re- 
quirements of, 194 ff; duty 
and profit of, 200 ff; qualifica- 
tions of priests for, 203 ff; 
mode of hearing, 209 ff; inter- 
rogations in, 210ff; of the 
sick and dying, 220 ff. 

Confirmation, 133f, 202 f. , 

Conscience, 43, 50, 52, 63 ff; 
authority of, 67 f, 83; types of, 
214 ff. 


251 


Contraceptives, use of, 149 f. 

Contracts, 164 f. 

Contrition, 192 ff. 

Counsels, 181 ff; of perfection, 
182 f. 

Covenant obligations, 106. 

Covetousness, 127 f. 


Decalogue analyzed, 104 ff. 

Dispensations, divine, 76. 

Double moral standard, error of, 
rr ff. 

Duty, 8s. 


Economic laws and obligations, 
165 ff. 

Emotions, 68 f. 

Employer and employee, 116 f. 

End, man’s chief, 4, 58 {, 78, cf. 
“Summum bonum.” 

Ends of action, 77 f. 

Ethics: the term, 18 f; outline 
of, ch. iii; and religion, 2, 8, 
19, 92, 100. 

Ethics, systems of: classified, 
551; Altruism, 56; Aristot- 
elic, 28; Buddhist, 20 ff; Chris- 
tian, 34 ff; Confucian, 22 f; 
Egoism, 56; Epicurean, 31 f; 
Evolutionary, 53 ff, 57; He- 
donist, 32, 57; Idealism, 57; 
Intuitional, 51, 56 f; Old Tes- 
tament, 33f; Platonic, 25 ff; 
Protestant, 46 {; Roman Cath- 
olic, 44 ff; Scholastic, 41 ff; 
Socialistic, 57; Socratic, 24 f; 
Stoic, 30; Transcendental, 55; 
Utilitarianism, q.v., below. 

Evil, problem of, 27 f, 224 f. 


252 


Example, 79, 185 f. 

Expediency, 179. . 

Extreme Unction. See 
tion.” 


“Unc- 


Fasting, 135, 136, 137, 154 f. 


Gambling, 168 f. 

Good, three kinds of, 77; the 
highest. See “Summum bo- 
num.” 

Grace and nature, 10, 74. 


Habits, 73, 235. 

Happiness, 4, 79. See “Utili- 
tarianism.” 

Holy Ghost, sin against the, 235, 
241 f. 


Tgnorance, 215 f, et passim. 

Impediments of Matrimony, 
147 fi. 

Impurity, forms of, 119 ff, 149 f; 
safeguards, rar f. 

Indulgences, 43, 44, 46. 

Industrial problems, 163 f. 


Justification, 92 f. 
Knowledge, responsibility for 
gaining, 62. 


Labour and capital, 127 f. 

Law, 97 ff; of natural reason, 
too ff; superimposed, 102 ff; 
of Christ, 103; of the deca- 
logue, 104 ff. 

Lay officials, duties of, 144. 

Laymen, duties of, 145. 

Liberty and license, 73. 

Love, 82, 117." See." Virtues.’ 

Lying and related sins, 124 ff. 


Manners, 178 f. 

Married, obligations of the, 149 f. 

Material and formal good, 43; 
sin, 88, 234. 

Matrimony, 146 ff. 

Meditation, 153 f. 


INDEX OF PRINCIPAL SUBJECTS 


Mercy, works of, 2 f. 

Merits, 43, 46, 93, 176. 

Moral, the term, 18. 

Moral agents, 62. 

Moral Philosophy, 7, 17 f, ch. iii. 
See “ Ethics.” 

Moral science: divisions of, 7 ff; 
history of, ch. ii; study of, 
ch. i; sources of, 5, 7. 

Moral Theology Proper, 7, 17 f, 
95, 97; general treatment of, 
chh. iv-vi. 

Morality: of acts, 83, 86 f; ulti- 
wale ground and standard of, 
85 f. 

Mortal and venial sin, 12, 88 f, 
139, 226 ff, 234. 

Motives, 69, 72, 80 ff. 

Murder and related sins, 118 f. 

Mystical theology, 8. 


Natural obligations, 100 f. 
Notable duties, 152. 


Oaths, 108 f. 
Obedience, 112 f, 158 f. 
Occasions of sin, 232 ff. 
Order, Holy, 142 ff. 


Parents and children, 113 f. 

Penance, sacrament of, 14 f, 
Ta7 ity TOs i, 

Penances, 140 f. 198 f. 

Penitents, types of, 214 ff. 

Perfection: aim of, 78 f, 175 f; 
counsels of, 182 f. 

Permissions and privileges, 180 f. 

Poverty, 171 f. 

Prayer, 106 f, 152 ff. 

Precepts of the Church, 114 f. 

Probability and  Probabilism, 
44 {, 190, 218 ff. 

Probationary, this world, 3, 61. 

Psychology, 10 f. 


Relapses, 13 
Religion in relation to ethic, 2, 
19, 92. 


INDEX OF PRINCIPAL SUBJECTS 


Responsibility, 62, 72, 85. 
Restitution, 123 f. 

Reverence, 107 f. 

Revolution, the right of, 158. 
Roman Catholic Moral Theol- 


ogy, Of, 44 ff. 


Sacraments: requirements of, 
129 ff; obligations of, 131 ff. 

Sacrifice, 93 f. 

Satisfaction, penitential, 108 ff. 

Scrupulous consciences, 184 f, 


Seal, the sacramental, 130 f, 
208 f. 

Sin: defined, 87; general treat- 
ment of, ch. ix; classifications 
of, 234 ff; specific forms of, 
ch. iv. Pt. II, ef passim. See 
“ Capital sins.” 

Social ethics, 79 f. 

Socialism, 161 f. 

Sociological obligations, 160 ff. 

State, authority of the, 116. 

Stealing and related sins, 122 ff. 

Summum bonum, 87, 92; ideas 
Oly 703: 25,130,301, ATs (42) 
See “End, man’s chief.” 


253 


Sunday, roo ff. 
Synderesis, 43, 63, 65 ff. 


Temptation, 229 ff. 


Unction of the Sick, 150 f. 
Unions, labour, 171. 

Usury, 46, 169 f. 

Utilitarianism, 2 ff, 47, 49, 52 £, 


SPP Ate 


Venial sin. See ‘ Mortal.” 

Via media, 28 f. 

Vices, 87, oI. 

Virtue, ideas of, 22, 25 ff, 28, 30; 
defined, 80. 

Virtues, cardinal and theological, 
27, 43, 901, 176 fi. 

Vocational obligations, 173 f. 

Vows, 108 f, 172 f, 183. 


Will, the, 69 ff; freedom of and 
its limits, 70 ff, 74; and grace, 
74; and motives, 8o fi. 

Will of signs, the divine, 96 f. 

World betterment, 2 ff. 

Worship, 93, 106 f. 


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